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ARTICLES
A DEFAULT RULE OF OMNIPOTENCE: IMPLIED
JURISDICTION AND EXAGGERATED REMEDIES IN
EQUITY FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES 1
George P. Roach 2

1. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 322 (1999) (“To accord a type of relief that has never been available before—and
especially (as here) a type of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by
longstanding judicial precedent—is to invoke a ‘default rule,’ . . . not of flexibility but
of omnipotence.”).
2. George P. Roach is the founder of a Dallas litigation consulting and valuation
practice, Multi Discipline Consultants, and is a Senior Advisor to the litigation
consulting firm of Freeman & Mills, Inc. in Los Angeles. His background includes an
M.B.A., J.D. and an A.B. in Economics. See www.multidisciplineconsultants.com for
more information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“In the mental map of most lawyers, restitution consists largely of
blank spaces with undefined borders and only scattered patches of
familiar ground.” 3
Most authorities describe restitution as either a misunderstood,
ignored or unknown area of the law. Those few professors who teach it
find it difficult to overcome restitution’s unappealing image in today’s
law schools. 4 Contrary to this image of a fading discipline, restitution
case law has actually been growing rapidly in the federal courts. The
two most important sources of this growth have been in intellectual
property and claims for equitable monetary relief by federal agencies
(“agencies”). Undeterred by the cobwebs and uncertainty, agencies are
winning a large number of sizable claims for unjust enrichment that total
in the billions of dollars per year for the U.S. Treasury. 5 The
uncertainty and confusion said to be so prevalent among lawyers and

3. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1277 (1989).
4. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96
(1995), stating:
Confusion over the content of restitution carries significant adverse consequences. To
put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not
know what restitution is. The subject is no longer taught in law schools, and the
lawyer who lacks an introduction to its basic principles is unlikely to recognize them
in practice. The technical competence of published opinions in straightforward
restitution cases has noticeably declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp
the rudiments of the doctrine even when they know where to find it.

Id.; See also Elaine Shoben, Forum: Spinning Restitution: From Cauliflower to
Coconut, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1027 (2003).
5. See 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (It is not presently known what percentage of the money
deposited into the U.S. Treasury is ever paid out to consumers. At present, most of the
money deposited is collected in escrow for the benefit of the consumers except, for
example, for recent settlement agreements between the FDA and various
pharmaceutical companies relating to violations of the FDA’s standards for good
manufacturing practices. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires agencies to deposit
into the Treasury monies that otherwise come into their possession during the normal
course of operation.); 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (The Anti-Deficiency Act precludes a federal
agency from spending any money that might otherwise come into its possession without
the express authorization of Congress. The agency can hold the proceeds in escrow but
cannot spend it for itself.).
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courts 6 may entreat rather than discourage the agencies as their repeated
claims and strained interpretations of the law in equity prevail for want
of informed resistance or significant counter-pressure.
This article is an outgrowth of the author’s ongoing survey of the
consistency of the definition and measurement of restitutionary
monetary remedies in all areas of commercial litigation. It became
apparent early in the survey that the measurement of agencies’ remedies
under the doctrine of implied jurisdiction differs substantially both
between the different agencies and in comparison to other areas of the
law that measure restitution. Based on the same equitable tradition,
jurisdiction and claim, agencies are securing uniquely large measures of
unjust enrichment.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress intentionally implies
jurisdiction in equity when an agency’s enabling statutes fail to clearly
preclude such jurisdiction. In effect, agencies are making claims for
unjust enrichment in which federal statutes provide the basis for
establishing the unjust nature of the defendant’s actions. The result is
presumptive jurisdiction in which agencies substitute civil litigation for
administrative law, 7 and the agencies enjoy greater freedom to file a
broad range of claims in equity without having to comply with specific
statutory authority.
As further demonstrated in the chart in Appendix A, the average
number of case opinions per year from federal courts relating to the
defendant’s profits has increased approximately 700% in the last 40

6. United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26821, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2005) (quoting Dobbs, Law of Remedies, Damages, Equity,
Restitution § 4.1(1), at 369 n. 28) (2d ED. 1993); see also id. § 1.1, at 5 (“Judges
frequently speak of ‘damages’ when they mean restitution; the reader of restitutionary
material is always challenged by . . . loose usage to analyze cases by their content rather
than their terms.”); Kull, supra note 4, at 1191 (“Few American lawyers, judges, or law
professors are familiar with even the standard propositions of the doctrine, and the few
who are continue to disagree about elementary issues of definition.”).
7. Sections 13(b), providing for general jurisdiction in equity, and 19 (15 U.S.C.S.
§ 57b (2005)), providing for specific jurisdiction and specific remedies subject to
certain administrative limitations, respectively, were enacted for the FTC at roughly the
same time. Despite the specific applicability of Section 19, the FTC has generally
chosen to file its claims under Section 13(b) for implied jurisdiction, thereby avoiding
Section 19’s statute of limitations and other administrative prerequisites. See Peter C.
Ward, Restitution For Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good
Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139 (1992).
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years. 8 From 1965 to 2005, the federal share of federal and state case
opinions increased from 50% to 80%. Given (1) the state of neglect
attributed to practice in equity, (2) the increase in federal opinions and,
most importantly, (3) that a handful of agencies file a disproportionately
large share of the claims for implied jurisdiction, there is significant
potential for this agency litigation to change the interpretation of unjust
enrichment.
The traditional role of courts in equity and especially the
Chancellor’s Court in England was to provide a safety net to ensure
justice for cases that would otherwise slip through the cracks of the
system of courts at law. 9 Judges in those courts generally enjoyed
greater discretion and authority to “do justice” on an exceptional basis

8. A simple survey was made on the basis of querying the LEXIS database for a
listing of all case opinions that included the term “defendant profit.” This listing was
sorted by state civil, state criminal, federal civil and federal criminal cases. The
comparison between state and federal civil cases is listed in the table below and the
graph in Appendix A. The results confirm general observed trends and the magnitude
of the recent increase appears significant, however inexact.

Year

STATE AND FEDERAL OPINIONS CONTAINING ‘DEFENDANT PROFIT’
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895

1900

State

4.0

6.0

6.0

3.5

3.5

5.2

5.2

Federal

1.1

2.9

2.9

3.7

3.7

3.9

3.9

Year

1905

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

State

8.8

11.4

11.2

12.6

14.2

13.2

11.6

Federal

4.4

4.4

6.3

6.3

6.8

6.8

6.0

Year

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

State

11.4

9.2

9.6

8.9

8.9

9.6

9.6

6.0

8.3

8.3

8.6

8.6

10.3

10.3

Year

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

State

9.8

14.4

12.2

16.2

12

24.8

22.4

17.2

22.0

34.6

52.0

67.6

73.6

81.2

Federal

Federal

9. Henry Lacey McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity § 24, at 53 (2d
ED. 1948) (“[E]quity is a system for the correction of the defects in the law.”).
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and frequently with the benefit of a view of the legal system that today
would be characterized as “outside the box.” Conscripting a court in
equity as the “work horse” for the administrative claims of federal
agencies is at odds with such history and tradition.
Overall, this article will explore the justification for implied
jurisdiction and compare how restitution is measured differently by
different agencies. There will be specific focus on claims by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), Department of Energy (“DOE”),
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”). Some of the larger inconsistencies are analyzed and traced
back to the widespread confusion about the meanings of specific terms
pertaining to either remedies in equity, at law, or both.
II. CLARIFYING RESTITUTION 10
“[G]ive a dog a bad name and hang him.” 11
In a recent ERISA opinion, the district court of Connecticut
observed that one of the most important lessons in the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson 12 is that
labels for remedies in restitution and unjust enrichment should not be
taken at face value: “[I]n Great-West . . . the Supreme Court made it
clear that an individual cannot evade this restriction on damage claims
by characterizing one’s request for monetary relief as ‘restitution.’”13
The differences between specific restitution, unjust enrichment 14
10. In addition to the specific cites in the article, the author wishes to acknowledge
the reference resource provided by Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary
Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577 (2002).
11. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 1983).
12. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
13. Coan v. Kaufman, 333 F. Supp. 2d 14, 25 (D. Conn. 2004); See also Scholastic
Corp. v. Kassem, 389 F. Supp. 2d 402, 408 (D. Conn. 2005) (“Of course, as the insurer
in Great West learned to its chagrin, mere labels do not govern the Court’s analysis.
Instead, ‘in determining the propriety of a remedy, [a court] must look to the real nature
of the relief sought, not its label.’” (quoting Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., 329 F.3d 317, 321
(2d Cir. 2003))); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29261, at *36 (D.
N.J. 2005) (“Third, the plaintiffs’ efforts to cloak their damages in the garb of an
‘equitable decree’ does not advance their argument.”).
14. As suggested by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 1, cmt. c (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000), the practical differences
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and especially criminal restitution cause a great deal of the
misunderstanding in this body of case law. 15 The confusion is
compounded by the fact that some of the key cases for implied
jurisdiction use and abuse the term restitution for the purposes of
justifying the appropriateness of a proposed remedy. 16 Frequently, the
FTC or FDA claim restitution of revenues but justify their proposed
measurement of restitution with cases that advocate restitution as
measured by profits. 17
The law of restitution/unjust enrichment is based on two
overlapping theories of recovery: specific restitution 18 and restitution
based on unjust enrichment. According to Professor Laycock, no
complete definition can exclude either form of restitution. 19 He
emphasizes that the two forms of restitution are not distinct and one can
enhance or extend the other. For example:
Specific restitution of misappropriated property both restores the
property to the rightful owner and deprives the misappropriator of
his unjust gain. But such explanations are often indirect and
between restitution and unjust enrichment are not sufficiently significant to warrant
distinct terms for restitution and unjust enrichment for the purposes of this article. The
two terms, unless qualified, are to be considered indistinguishable.
15. United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26821, at *19
n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2005) (“Another source of confusion is the fact that courts also
give the term ‘restitution’ various meanings. See, e.g., Dobbs, Law of Remedies,
§ 4.1(2), at 371 (‘some major ways of talking about restitution should be understood’
‘because confusion has sometimes run very deep’)).
16. See Dobbs, supra note 6, § 1.1, at 5.
The law of restitution can be difficult and confusing because restitution may be
identified by terms that refer to some particular form of restitution or some particular
piece of remedial history. For example, some particular restitution claims may be
identified as quasi-contract claims or as claims in assumpsit or quantum meruit.
Claims for a constructive trust, for an equitable lien, or for subrogation are all
restitutionary claims. The list goes on. So restitution today is a general term for
diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant
and measured by the defendant’s gains, but it has many specific forms, each of which
must be addressed separately.

Id.
17. Among other opinions, the Courts’ opinions in FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530 (7th
Cir. 1997) and Gem Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir.
1996) in effect use this approach, consciously or not. See the discussion in Part VII, D
below for further analysis of these cases.
18. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 4 cmts. c, d (1937); id. § 128. The same
usage appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372 (1981).
19.

Laycock, supra note 3, at 1279.
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sometimes ill-fitting in more complex situations.
The
misappropriator is unjustly enriched whether or not the rightful
owner can trace the specific property taken. Yet a plaintiff who can
trace the specific property gets a far more powerful remedy than one
who cannot. The conceptual basis for this remedy is plaintiff’s claim
to restoration of property that is still identifiable as his. Elaborate
tracing rules separate the property still identifiable as plaintiff’s from
20
property that has passed into the misappropriator’s general assets.

As such, both sources are distinguished from compensating
damages or criminal restitution, which Professor Laycock explains is
mistakenly equated with restitution/unjust enrichment:
‘Restitution’ is sometimes used in a third sense—to restore the value
of what plaintiff lost. The Restatement employs the term this way at
least occasionally, and the usage is common in the statutes requiring
criminals to make restitution to their victims. But restitution of the
value of what plaintiff lost is simply compensatory damages. Used
in this sense, ‘restitution’ loses all utility as a means of
distinguishing one body of law from another. Restitution must be
distinguished from compensation, either by its focus on restoration
of the loss in kind or by its focus on defendant’s gain as the measure
21
of recovery.

Confusion or juxtaposition of civil restitution and criminal restitution is
so widespread among the opinions of federal district and appellate courts
that comments from equally authoritative sources are provided to
emphasize the point. 22 The March 31, 2000 discussion draft of the
Restatement (Third) states: “Law that establishes (by statute or
otherwise) the terms on which a convicted criminal may be ordered to
make restitution to crime victims is not part of the law of restitution as
20.
21.

Id. at 1280.

Id. at 1282-83. See also Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 169
(Ct. App. Md. 2005) (“‘The damages recovery is to compensate the plaintiff and it pays
him, theoretically, his losses. The restitution claim, on the other hand, is not aimed at
compensating the plaintiff but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be
unjust for him to keep . . . .’” (quoting Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1 (1973) as quoted
in Consumer Protection Div. Office of Attorney Gen. v. Consumer Pub. Co., 874 A.2d
919 (Md. 2005))).
22. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (“Rarely
will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry,’ (quoting Great-West Life &
Annuity, 534 U.S. at 233-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)), than consulting, as we have
done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements,
which make the answer clear.” (internal citation edited)).
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defined by this Restatement.” 23 Professor Andrew Kull, the Reporter for
the Restatement (Third), lends further support:
For many lawyers the immediate connotation of the word
‘restitution’ will be something else entirely: criminal sanctions
requiring wrongdoers to make restitution to their victims, a topic
having almost nothing to do with the subject at hand. The linguistic
confusion that bedevils the law of restitution—necessitating
laborious definitions before anyone can understand what you are
talking about—affords an early indication that the common name of
24
this neglected body of law was singularly ill-chosen.

A simple example of the potential confusion lies in the Fifth Circuit
opinion in SEC v. Huffman in which the court defined restitution as
compensating damages or criminal restitution but labeled the remedy of
unjust enrichment of profits as disgorgement, holding that
“disgorgement” is different from “restitution.” 25 While it is certainly
accurate to distinguish restitution of profits from compensating
damages, the Fifth Circuit has created further confusion by the use of
generic terms for restricted meanings. 26
One appropriate contrast between compensating damages and
unjust enrichment is that the former aims to restore the plaintiff to her ex
ante position while the latter aims to restore the defendant to her ex ante
position. 27 Only equitable rescission attempts to restore both the
23. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 1 cmt. h (Discussion Draft, March 31, 2000).
24. Kull, supra note 4, at 1191-92.
25. SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993).
26. Id.
Despite some casual references in our caselaw to the contrary, see, for example, SEC
v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (describing disgorgement order in one
isolated phrase as ‘this restitution’), disgorgement is not precisely restitution.
Disgorgement wrests ill-gotten gains from the hands of a wrongdoer. Commodities
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1993);
Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1335. It is an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer
from enriching himself by his wrongs. Disgorgement does not aim to compensate the
victims of the wrongful acts, as restitution does. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs.,
Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978). Thus, a disgorgement order might be for an
amount more or less than that required to make the victims whole. It is not restitution.

Id. (internal citation edited).
27. See Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV.
1577, 1625 n. 265 (2002) (quoting David Schoenbrod et al., Remedies: Public and
Private 727 (3d ED. 2002) (“Restitution aims at the defendant’s [rightful position].
Disgorgement is the key concept. By making the defendant disgorge the benefits he
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plaintiff and defendant to their ex ante positions. 28 However, restoration
is a questionable goal for restitution/unjust enrichment because
restoration for the plaintiff generally relates to compensating damages, a
remedy at law. 29
III. MEASURING THE DEFENDANT’S BENEFIT
“[T]his is equity, not rocket science.” 30
Companies typically sell directly to their customers at a retail price
or they sell to a wholesaler or a retailer at a wholesale price which is
then marked up to a retail price. Assume that the company, Unjustly
Enriched Inc. (“UEI”), sells its product for $50 and nets $10 per unit
after paying for all direct or variable costs. After the product leaves
UEI, it gets marked up 100% to $100 per unit for sale at the retail level.
Therefore, the UEI’s revenue per unit would be $50, its benefit or profit
would be $10 per unit and assuming that the product or service provided
no benefits to the customer and has no remaining asset value, the
customer’s loss would be $100 per unit.
Absent consideration of indirect and fixed costs, most jurisdictions
would measure the UEI’s unjust enrichment as $10 per unit. Unjust
enrichment ignores the customer and only focuses on depriving UEI of
any benefit or profit. The customer’s compensating damage would be
cannot justly retain, the law of restitution returns the defendant to the position he
should, ‘in equity and good conscience,’ have occupied.”).
28. Schoenbrod et al., supra note 27, at 727. Under some circumstances, specific
restoration can also restore the defendant or even both parties to their ex ante positions,
especially when neither party has incurred any losses or additional expenses relating to
the asset before the restitution.
29. Murphy, supra note 27, at 1592 n. 78. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Modern
American Remedies: Cases and Materials 15-16, at 15 (2d ED. 1994) (writing that “‘the
essence of compensatory damages’ is ‘to restore the injured party as nearly as possible
to the position he would have been in but for the wrong’”); see also McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995) (stating in an employment
discrimination case that “‘the object of compensation is to restore the employee to the
position he or she would have been in absent the discrimination’”); In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (D. Mass. 1989) (“‘Were the
Court to accept the argument that a monetary award is restitutionary simply because it
returns a party to pre-injury status, little would be left in the realm of compensatory
damages.’”).
30. In re Alpha Telecom, Inc., No. CV 01-1283-PA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002,
at *29 (D. Or. August 18, 2004).
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$100 and, depending on the jurisdiction and nature of the claim, the
applicable customer loss for the purposes of consumer redress or
criminal restitution would be either $50 or $100 per unit. 31
The remedy of unjust enrichment may not be well suited for a
consumer plaintiff. If the case relates to a company selling a worthless
product to a consumer, civil restitution will always be less than
compensating damages. Normally the consumer would claim damages
of $100 per unit compared to restitution of $10 per unit but the agencies
assert the remedy of restitution in equity for the implied jurisdiction and
then work to convince the court that compensating damages should be
awarded as a form of equitable restitution. The consequences for
consumers of choosing a remedy in equity over a remedy at law are
ignored. Instead, courts often ask rhetorically why the measure of
restitution requires the consumer to pay for the direct expenses of the
fraudulent tortfeasor. 32 They forget that restitution focuses on the
defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff’s loss. They also overlook that the
unsuitability for consumers of the remedy elected by an agency is not
the responsibility of the defendant nor is it sufficient reason to modify
the standard measure of restitution from profit to revenue or consumer
loss. A true damages measure can only be supported by an alternative
claim at law for which there may be no implied jurisdiction.
For a company with a single product line or those companies in
which the offending operation is a significant percentage of their total
operations, the remedy of refunding the total amount paid by all
customers ($100 per unit) is the corporate equivalent of capital
punishment with prejudice. Net profit margins of ten to twenty percent
are considered high in today’s economy but even for such profitable
companies, the remedy of disgorging revenues would amount to five to

31. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993).
Figgie also objects that the district court’s order forces Figgie to pay for losses beyond
its gains. Figgie does not contest the award of prejudgment interest and bases its
argument instead on the role of the distributor in its marketing system. Figgie sells
heat detectors for cash to distributors, who apparently have complete discretion to set
their own mark-ups. Many consumer dollars therefore go into the distributors’
pockets, not Figgie’s. This objection may be met several ways. First, Section 19(b)
[Federal Trade Commission Act § 18, 15 USC § 57b] does not limit its remedies to
the amount of the unjust enrichment. Statutory remedies include “the payment of
damages.”

Id.
32. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 763 (6th Cir.
1999).
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ten times its net profits. Disgorging five to ten times the company’s
cumulative profits will force the company to file for liquidation as the
remedy is also likely to be non-dischargeable. 33 The ‘prejudice’ of the
remedy lies in the personal liability that is frequently assessed against
one or more individual defendants who may not be able to discharge the
liability in bankruptcy or even upon death. 34 The defendants may
deserve severe remedies but the refund measure of customer redress, i.e.,
revenue disgorgement, seems unsuited for the nature of the implied
jurisdiction process and stands apart from traditional remedies in equity.
Such a severe remedy would normally require a jury trial as the large
punitive component of revenue disgorgement should exclude it for
consideration as a traditional remedy in equity.
Furthermore, unless the unjust activity is a very minor part of a
bigger operation, it seems unlikely that an agency will actually succeed
in collecting the defendant’s past revenues. Whether or not the
defendant’s costs of production and administration are legitimate offsets,
they represent the vast majority of a defendant’s use of her revenue.
Most businesses don’t accumulate enough reserves to disgorge even two
years of profits. The end result of a successful claim by the FDA and
FTC is likely to include the extinction of the defendant business
operation, whether intentional or not.
A. Rescission and Counter Restitution
Rescission is an alternative monetary remedy which can be claimed
as rescission at law or in equity. Rescission in equity is a combination
of specific restitution and unjust enrichment and it aims to restore both
the defendant and the plaintiff to their ex ante positions. First, a contract
or transaction is rescinded by both parties returning their consideration
in kind. Second, both parties are obligated to make counter-restitution
to each other by disgorging any benefits derived from their temporary
holding of the other party’s consideration. 35 This is meant to include
33. See FTC v. Porcelli (In re Porcelli), 325 B.R. 868, 871-74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2005).
34. FTC v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004). See infra
text accompanying notes 170-71.
35. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 13 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 6, 2001).
Where an exchange transaction has been at least partially performed on both sides, the
party seeking rescission as a transferor is also a transferee. By the reasoning set forth
in the preceding paragraph, a rescinding plaintiff becomes subject to a duty of
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interest, rent, profits, usage value and any other consequential benefits.
Counter-restitution therefore tries to assure that both parties are restored
to their ex ante positions, devoid of any consequential benefits to the
transaction or contract for either party. 36 To get equity, both parties
must do equity. 37
While rescission has been described as a second-choice remedy for
securities claims, 38 it is appropriate for claims by the FTC and FDA
counter-restitution with respect to any benefits received in the nullified transaction.
The plaintiff’s restitutionary obligation is commonly expressed through the judicial
formula that a party seeking rescission must, as a condition of relief, offer to restore
anything of value received in the transaction that is being repudiated. The obligation
of counter-restitution is not enforced equally on all rescinding parties, and a claimant
who is a fraud victim may be excused from a duty of restitution that would be strictly
enforced were the claimant seeking to rescind a transaction in which the other party
was not at fault. See § 54, cmt ___.

Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 37 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 3, March 22, 2004) (“Rescission is
mutual: a plaintiff seeking to be restored to the status quo ante must likewise restore to
the defendant whatever the plaintiff has received in the transaction. See § 51.”).
36. Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 4.3 at 254 (West 1973).
37. E.g. Cardiac Thoracic & Vascular Surgery, P.A. Profit Sharing Trust v. Bond,
840 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Ark. 1992).
The equitable objective of a return to the status quo as the result of a rescission is
consistent with the equitable maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ The
practical meaning of this maxim is that whatever the nature of the remedy sought, the
court will not give equitable relief to one seeking it unless he will admit and provide
for all of the equitable rights, claims and demands of his adversary growing out of, or
necessarily involved in, the subject matter of the controversy.

Id. See also Sample v. Sample, 466 S.W.2d 935 (Ark. 1971); Metcalfe v. Talarski, 567
A.2d 1148, 1152 (Conn. 1989) citing Ankeny v. Clark, 148 U.S. 345, 359 (1892);
Harral v. Leverty, 50 Conn. 46, 51 (1882); Little v. Pearson, 24 Mass. 301, 302-03
(1828); Kavarco v. T.J.E., Inc., 478 A.2d 257, 261 (Conn. App. 1984).
The very idea of rescinding a contract implies that what has been parted with shall be
restored on both sides, and hence the general rule, which is to be reasonably applied
. . . is that a party who wishes to rescind a contract must place the opposite party in
status quo. 17 Am. Jur. 2d., Contracts § 512, p. 994.

Id. Rice v. Hilty, 559 P.2d 725, 726 (Colo. 1976).
In suits involving rescission, the parties must be placed in status quo. Bankers Trust
Co. v. Hall, 183 P.2d 986 (Colo. 1947). Since the Rices have already surrendered the
possession of the motel to the Hiltys, the Hiltys must now return whatever
consideration they received under the contract. Therefore, in addition to the $19,000
awarded by the trial court, the Rices are entitled to a return of their payments on the
promissory note, and to interest on each payment from the date thereof.

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 66 and 156; see 66 AM. JUR. 2d
RESTITUTION & IMPLIED CONTRACTS § 166).
38. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986).
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relating to products or services that are fraudulent, worthless, or both.
Section 19 of the FTCA specifically provides for this remedy under that
independent jurisdiction. 39 While the typical case for rescission expects
both parties to return what they received and gained in the contract or
transaction, the requirement for specific restoration is subject to a
flexible standard. 40
B. Unjust Enrichment Not Refund
On the other hand, the FTC and FDA have avoided the requirement
in rescission for the plaintiff to compensate the defendant for the value
of any assets or services received by the plaintiff. 41 When the defendant
to an FTC claim raises the issue of the uncompensated asset value of the
product which the consumer gets to keep under the agency’s remedy for
consumer redress, some courts have adopted an enigmatic response,
citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Figgie International: 42
This measure of restitution applies even if the product purchased by
consumers has some value. See Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d at 606 (noting
that “courts have previously rejected the contention ‘that restitution
is available only when the goods purchased are essentially
43
worthless.’”)

The clear implication of this statement is that a defendant whose
product has some asset value does not need to be compensated or
credited for that value in the refund approach. The reference to Figgie is
questionable because that case concerned an FTC claim under Section
19, which has statutory authority for remedies that “may include, but
shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund
of money or return of property, the payment of damages.” 44 An opinion
on appropriate remedies under Section 19 is largely irrelevant because
claims under that section have explicit statutory jurisdiction separate
from Section 13(b)’s implied jurisdiction. The Figgie opinion provides:
39.
40.

15 USCS § 57b (2006).
Griggs v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir. 2004).
See also Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 223 A.2d 168, 173-74 (Md. 1966).
41. See FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Ind.
2000).
42. FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993).
43. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
44. 15 USCS § 57b (2005).
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The district court ordered that consumers be allowed to receive full
refunds for their Vanguard heat detectors, whose value, “given the
misrepresentations recommended by Figgie and made by distributors
to consumers, is de minimis.” Figgie protests that the “de minimis”
finding and the resulting full refund are inappropriate in light of the
Commission’s conclusive finding that heat detectors have some
value. Although we agree with Figgie that the district court is not
free to make this finding, we find the error harmless. Courts have
previously rejected the contention “that restitution is available only
when the goods purchased are essentially worthless.” FTC v.
International Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cases Par. 65,506,
45
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (“Diamond I”).

International Diamond was a case under Section 13(b), based on
traditional remedies in equity. In a subsection labeled “Appropriateness
of Rescission and Restitution When the Goods Are Not Essentially
Worthless” the Northern District of California stated:
Defendants’ final contention—that restitution is available only when
the goods purchased are essentially worthless—rests upon
administrative cases which were decided prior to Heater v. FTC,
supra. Those decisions reflect self-imposed restraints by the
Commission in its efforts to develop standards under Section 5 in
order to justify administratively ordered redress. The Ninth Circuit
in Heater held that the Commission lacked authority to order
administrative redress, which rendered the Commission’s self46
imposed [sic] standards nugatory.

Restitution of revenues without offsets or counter-restitution may
approximate the effect of rescission when the goods purchased are
worthless so the original FTC administrative policy roughly complied
with traditional equity. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Heater adds an
interesting background note about the original source of the ‘recall’
remedy:
This refund provision is based upon and reflects a far-reaching
construction of the clause in Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), which empowers the
Commission to order a person using any unfair method or deceptive
act or practice in commerce to ‘cease and desist from using such

45.
46.

Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d at 595.
FTC. v. Int’l Diamond Corp./Full Service Import Brokers, Inc., 1983-2 Trade
Cases Par. 65,506 P *13-14 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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47

Therefore, the FTC developed its own administrative interpretation of
restitution and instituted an internal rule that full refunds should not be
applied unless the product in question was deemed worthless. The main
import of the opinion is that the FTC was not empowered to issue refund
orders and that whatever standards it applied previously were irrelevant
as a standard for the defendant to assert in civil litigation. The case does
not represent the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the refund measure of
restitution (especially when the purchased good is not worthless), a
remedy originated within the FTC in the twentieth century not courts in
equity in the eighteenth century.
Finally it is important to note that the remedy of ordering a
defendant to provide a full refund to a consumer for the retail price has
been transformed in the hands of the agencies and, eventually, in the
opinions that discuss their claims. Originally, the remedy was identified
as administrative redress, 48 then it developed into the refund measure of
restitution, 49 and now you can find a number of opinions regarding
claims by the FTC and FDA in which the remedy is called
‘restitution.’ 50 Semantic juxtaposition becomes court opinion as soon as
the court recites the misleading ‘truism’ that ‘restitution is an equitable
remedy.’ 51 Unfortunately, this sort of quasi-logic is not uncommon in
case law relating to remedies in equity. Further lost in the process is any
meaningful discussion of how a court should choose the appropriate
remedy.
IV. EQUITABLE REMEDIES ARE BASED ON A NET CONCEPT
Most remedies included as restitution or unjust enrichment are
47.
48.

Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 322 (9th Cir. 1974).
Int’l Diamond Corp., 1983-2 Trade Cases Par. 65,506, *13-14 (N.D. Cal.

1983).
49. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d at 606-07.
50. FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d. 1013, 1020 (N.D. Ind.
2000)
51. The following cases represent recent opinions of circuit courts that have stated
or held that “restitution is an equitable remedy.” See Larocca v. Borden, Inc., 276 F.3d
22, 28 (1st Cir. 2002); Ellett Bros. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388
(4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2001); First
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine-Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1992);
Houston Oil & Ref., Inc. v. U.S. F.E.R.C., 95 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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based on the parties’ net advantage or net benefit, generally represented
by profit before or after income tax. While there are variations in both
the types of expenses or expenditures that can be offset against a party’s
gross benefit, and the circumstances in which a party can make such
offsets or present claims for counter-restitution, the overwhelming
tradition for such remedies at law or in equity is to assess unjust
enrichment or restitution on a net basis. 52
52. According to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S.
189 (1881), the following opinions on patent claims were all based on the
plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief and an accounting. Reflecting our courts’
earliest implementation of remedies in equity, they all relate to the determination of
the defendant’s profits: Dean v. Mason, 61 U.S. 198 (1858); Fenn v. Holme, 62
U.S. 481 (1859); Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 803-04 (1869) (“In
estimating the cost, the elements of price of materials, interest, expenses of
manufacture and sale, and other necessary expenditures, if there be any, and bad
debts, are to be taken into the account, and usually nothing else.”); Mowry v.
Whitney, 81 U.S. 620 (1872); Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716 (1876); Elizabeth v.
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 138-39 (1877) citing Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434
(“But one thing may be affirmed with reasonable confidence, that, if an infringer of
a patent has realized no profit from the use of the invention, he cannot be called
upon to respond for profits; the patentee, in such case, is left to his remedy for
damages.”); Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 138-39 (1877) citing Rubber
Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788; See also Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146
(1888).
The infringer is liable for actual, not for possible gains. The profits, therefore, which
he must account for, are not those which he might reasonably have made, but those
which he did make, by the use of the plaintiff’s invention; or, in other words, the fruits
of the advantage which he derived from the use of that invention, over what he would
have had in using other means then open to the public and adequate to enable him to
obtain an equally beneficial result. If there was no such advantage in his use of the
plaintiff’s invention, there can be no decree for profits, and the plaintiff’s only remedy
is by an action at law for damages.

Id. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604,
621-22 (1912); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400
(1940) (“Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909, there had been no statutory provision
for the recovery of profits, but that recovery had been allowed in equity both in
copyright and patent cases as appropriate equitable relief incident to a decree for an
injunction.”); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (citing Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946)).
The Government contends, however, that a suit enforcing civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act is similar to an action for disgorgement of improper profits,
traditionally considered an equitable remedy. It bases this characterization upon
evidence that the District Court determined the amount of the penalties by multiplying
the number of lots sold by petitioner by the profit earned per lot. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
An action for disgorgement of improper profits is, however, a poor analogy. Such an
action is a remedy only for restitution a more limited form of penalty than a civil fine.
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The norm in remedies for restitution/unjust enrichment is to seek
profits but not proceeds, as the defendant disgorges a net amount rather
than a gross amount. 53 Defendants under claims from the SEC, CFTC
and DOE are all allowed to deduct the cost of their securities,
commodities or energy supplies before they make restitution. In most
cases, they are also generally allowed to offset a few additional
operating or administrative expenses. There are only three areas of
substantive law that may not require the plaintiff to make counterrestitution to the willful defendant: (1) intentional trespass to minerals,
(2) the recovery of stolen goods, and (3) mistaken improvements. 54
These cases both relate to the legal traditions for the misappropriation or
trespass of tangible property which is unique.
Although the tradition is sometimes overridden by statutes
regarding misappropriation or misuse of intellectual property, it is
nevertheless true that the defendant’s profits are only awarded to a
plaintiff when the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge. 55 While Laycock has shown that a defendant’s culpability
and ‘directness’ can influence a court’s determination of how much of
the defendant’s profits should be disgorged, if any, his important point
does not apply to the difference between restitution of profits and

Restitution is limited to “restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.

Id.
53. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991
F.2d 71, 77 n. 10 (“Appellant argues that the measure of disgorgement should be
unlawful ‘profits.’ Appellees argue that the measure should be unlawful ‘proceeds.’
The term most frequently used in reported decisions appears to be ‘profits.’”).
54. See further discussion in Part VII. The net effect of the remedy can also
resemble revenue restitution due to procedural issues such as the denial of offsets for a
defendant that fails to substantiate the offsets or even the denial of jurisdiction to the
defendant whose actions reveal unclean hands or other facts not worthy of a remedy in
equity. See Andrew Kull, Private Law, Punishment, and Disgorgement: Restitution’s
Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17 (2003).
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 1,
cmt. c (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000); 2 cmt. d (“Restitution in a proper case may
strip a defendant of all profits gained in a transaction with the plaintiff . . . . Such a
result is permissible only against a defendant whom the law treats as a conscious
wrongdoer.”); id. 3 cmt. c (“Liability to disgorge profits is ordinarily limited to
instances of conscious wrongdoing . . . . As an exception to this general rule, trustees
and other fiduciaries may be made liable for profits realized even as the result of an
unintentional breach of fiduciary duty.”).
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restitution of revenues. 56
The Supreme Court has held that awards of unjust enrichment
against willful defendants face the limit of actual profits:
Petitioners stress the point that respondents have been found guilty
of deliberate plagiarism, but we perceive no ground for saying that in
awarding profits to the copyright proprietor as a means of
compensation, the court may make an award of profits which have
been shown not to be due to the infringement. That would be not to
57
do equity but to inflict an unauthorized penalty.

Consider the opinion in Farnum v. Silvano, in which a 90 year old
woman, suffering from a brain disease, was fraudulently induced by a
close friend into selling her home for half of its value. Within six
months of the transaction, the woman was also diagnosed as suffering
from dementia and was committed to a nursing home. Eventually, the
court ordered the sale of the house to be rescinded but not without the
victim making restitution to the defendant for any real estate taxes paid
or necessary repairs made. A remedy in equity is expected to be
conducted in manner to achieve complete equity. 58
The assessment of penalties or the application of punitive statutory
provisions are not remedies in equity but rather remedies at law. 59 Judge
Posner argues in Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co. that the plaintiff’s claim for
reimbursement rather than the defendant’s profit is evidence of the fact
that the claim is actually a claim at law, not in equity:

56. Laycock, supra note 3 at 1289.
Courts sometimes award plaintiff all the profits produced by defendant’s use of the
property, but sometimes they award only the market value. The Restatement and
Professor Palmer explain such distinctions partly in terms of culpability and partly in
terms of directness. The more culpable defendant’s behavior, and the more direct the
connection between the profits and the wrongdoing, the more likely that plaintiff can
recover all defendants’ profits.

Id.
57.
58.
59.

Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940).
Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E. 2d 202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987), citing Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946). (“First, while a court in equity may award
monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive relief, it may not enforce civil
penalties.”); SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2002) (“SEC v. Clark assumed,
but without discussion, and we think erroneously, that civil penalties in SEC cases are
not a form of legal relief.”).
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But was the Department of Labor seeking restitution? It was seeking
not a profit, but merely a receipt, an insurance premium, net of some
expenses; to call this a ‘profit,’ it could be argued, would convert
every suit for the price of a contract into a suit for restitution,
60
contrary to the law.

It would be an overstatement to conclude that all restitutionary remedies
that seek the defendant’s revenue (as opposed to the defendant’s profit)
are remedies at law, but it does seem reasonable to conclude that
remedies for revenue are suspect as remedies in equity.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF IMPLIED JURISDICTION IN EQUITY
A. Conceptual Outline
As a simplified overview, a federal agency’s complaint that
normally enjoys implied jurisdiction includes a claim for injunctive
relief and an ancillary monetary remedy. Asserted by itself, however,
either the relief or remedy can be sufficient.
Implied jurisdiction is available as long as the court does not
conclude:
(1) That the equitable claim or relief would be adverse to the
legislative purpose of the agency’s statutory scheme; 61
(2) That the agency’s statutory scheme is sufficiently specific to
exclude the equitable relief claimed; 62 or
(3) That the language of the statute specifically precludes the
claimed relief. 63
60. Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 1 Dobbs,
supra, § 4.1(2), p. 559).
61. Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) holding only
[t]hat in a renegotiation case the contractor is obliged to pursue its administrative
remedy and, when it fails to do so, may not attain its ends through the route of judicial
interference. The nature of the renegotiation process mandates this result, and, were it
otherwise, the effect would be that renegotiation, and its aims, would be supplanted
and defeated by an FOIA suit.

Id.
62. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (“That RCRA’s citizen suit
provision was not intended to provide a remedy for past cleanup costs is further
apparent from the harm at which it is directed.”).
63. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) Relying
on Mertens, the Supreme Court noted that Great-West’s claim could be brought under
ERISA only if the relief it was seeking fell within those categories of relief that were
typically available in equity.
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Assuming that implied jurisdiction is available, the specific
complaint is entitled to implied jurisdiction in any one of the following
three cases:
(1) In the absence of a claim for injunctive relief, 64 the agency’s
claim is determined to be compatible with traditional claims
in equity, 65 or
(2) The injunctive relief and claims for monetary remedies are
both compatible with traditional equitable relief 66 ; 67 or
64. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990).
In this case, the only remedy sought is a request for compensatory damages
representing backpay and benefits. Generally, an action for money damages was ‘the
traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.’ Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
196 (1974). This Court has not, however, held that ‘any award of monetary relief
must necessarily be legal relief.’

Id. (Emphasis added). See also Granfinanciera, supra, at 86, n. 9 (White, J.,
dissenting). (“Nonetheless, because we conclude that the remedy respondents seek
has none of the attributes that must be present before we will find an exception to
the general rule and characterize damages as equitable, we find that the remedy
sought by respondents is legal.”).
65. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212. The Court stated that,
[s]econd, petitioners argue that their suit is authorized by § 502(a)(3)(B) because they
seek restitution, which they characterize as a form of equitable relief. However, not
all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in equity. In the days of the
divided bench, restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in
equity.

Id.
66. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
318 (1999) (“Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the
jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act, 1789, 1
Stat. 73 (1789).” A. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure 660
(1928); “The substantive prerequisites for obtaining an equitable remedy as well as the
general availability of injunctive relief are not altered by [Rule 65] and depend on
traditional principles of equity jurisdiction.” 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2941 at 31 (2d ED. 1995). We must ask, therefore,
whether the relief respondents requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of
equity.”); see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975):
We turn, therefore, to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that respondent’s claim was
not to be judged according to traditional equitable principles, and that the bare fact
that petitioner violated the Williams Act justified entry of an injunction against him.
This position would seem to be foreclosed by Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321
(1944).

Id.
67.

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210 (“Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose
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(3) The injunctive relief is compatible with traditional equitable
relief; the claims for monetary remedies are more
compatible with traditional claims at law; but the nature of
the injunctive 68 and monetary relief are such that the ‘cleanup’ doctrine 69 would allow such ancillary remedies at law. 70
In most cases the second set of conditions collapses into two
considerations: is the monetary remedy compatible with traditional
equitable remedies or is the injunctive relief sufficiently significant to
warrant the ‘clean up’ doctrine that permits ancillary remedies at law?
Implied jurisdiction is based on the assumption that if Congress
intended to preclude a district court’s jurisdiction in equity relating to a
specific statutory scheme, Congress would have done so with specific
language. A lesser known corollary to this analysis is that if Congress
wanted a court’s jurisdiction in equity to vary from traditional
jurisdiction in equity, it would have said so in the statute. 71 In the last
ten years the Supreme Court has emphasized traditional remedies in
personal liability on respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money -- relief
that was not typically available in equity. A claim for money due and owing under
a contract is ‘quintessentially an action at law.’”).
68. Id. at 210-11.
First, petitioners argue that they are entitled to relief under § 502(a)(3)(A) because
they seek ‘to enjoin an act or practice’—respondents’ failure to reimburse the Plan—
‘which violates . . . the terms of the plan.’ But an injunction to compel the payment of
money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary
obligation, was not typically available in equity.

Id. See also, e.g., 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1979).
69. Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 442-43 (7th Cir. 1984).
There are, however, two relevant limitations to the equity clean-up doctrine. The first,
which is absolute, is that the plaintiff must have a good case in equity if he wants the
equity court to award him legal relief as well; otherwise a plaintiff could bypass the
law court and litigate a purely legal claim in equity. See 1 Pomeroy’s Equity
Jurisprudence § 237d n. 5 (Spencer W. Symons, ed., 5th ED. 1941) (1881). In other
words, the invocation of equity jurisprudence must not be frivolous. But there is no
indication of that here. The second limitation, discretionary rather than absolute, is
more problematic in this case. If the equitable relief sought was merely incidental to
the legal relief sought, the equity court might refuse to entertain the suit and the
plaintiff would then have to bring his suit in the law court and abandon his incidental
equity claim.”)

Id. (internal citations altered).
70. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987) (“First, while a court in
equity may award monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive relief, it may not
enforce civil penalties.” See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399
(1946)).
71.

See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944).
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equity as a limit to current court remedies awarded in implied
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Porter v. Warner Holding Co. 72
and Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc. 73 established the doctrine
of implied jurisdiction in two stages. First, Porter held that if a statutory
scheme provided for injunctive relief, a district court is presumed to
have jurisdiction for the full range of equitable relief in the absence of
preclusive language in the statutes. 74 Second, Mitchell held that a
statutory scheme did not need to provide for any equitable remedies;
Congress presumptively implied the full range of equitable remedies in
the absence of preclusive language. 75
The Court’s opinion in Hecht, 76 which preceded Porter, provides
necessary background. Like Porter the opinion in Hecht addressed the
powers of the Price Administrator under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942. The “Price Administrator” sought for the court to enjoin
the store’s charging excessive prices and to order restitution of the
store’s unjust enrichment. Section 205(a) of that Act provided
jurisdiction for the Price Administrator to obtain injunctive relief and the
Act was later amended to provide penalty provisions under Section
205(e). No mention is made in either section of other equitable
monetary remedies.
The holding in Hecht confirmed a court’s equitable discretion to
deny any relief, even if the defendant has violated the statute, when the
court believes that rules of fairness or equity preclude such relief.77
72.
73.
74.

328 U.S. 395 (1946).
361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960).
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398 (“Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable
jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command.”).
75. Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 291-92 (1960) (“When Congress entrusts to an equity
court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be
taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief
in light of the statutory purposes.”).
76. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 330.
77. Id.
We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as is here
proposed should be lightly implied. We do not think the history or language of § 205
(a) compel it. It should be noted, moreover, that § 205 (a) governs the procedure in
both federal and state courts. For § 205 (c) gives the state courts concurrent
jurisdiction with federal district courts of civil enforcement proceedings. It is
therefore even more compelling to conclude that, if Congress desired to make such an
abrupt departure from traditional equity practice as is suggested, it would have made
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Specifically, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding that
the defendant’s violations were technicalities, inadvertent and
adequately resolved by the defendant’s remedial measures. The Court
stated that a district court that hears a case based on implied jurisdiction
presides as a court in equity and operates in the manner of a traditional
court in equity. The traditional equitable discretion of a judge sitting in
equity was sufficient authority for the Hecht opinion to deny the remedy
claimed by the Price Administrator.
The Court’s opinions in Porter and Mitchell share circumstances
that have confused subsequent opinions regarding implied jurisdiction
and equitable remedies. First, neither opinion held that the monetary
remedies at issue were remedies in equity. Both opinions state that the
proposed remedies may better resemble remedies at law, but that the
remedies were sufficiently ancillary to legitimate claims for injunctive
relief. This ‘clean-up’ doctrine, or doctrine of complete relief, precluded
the need to evaluate the proposed remedies. 78
The second common characteristic relates to a coincidence in the
calculation of monetary remedies. For both back pay and excess rents,
the plaintiffs’ loss was equal to the defendants’ benefit. Furthermore, in
both cases the defendants’ net benefit was equal to its gross benefit
because neither defendant incurred any additional expenses to produce
the unjust benefits. The result is that both cases can be held out to
support a claim for the plaintiffs’ losses, the defendants’ gross benefit
(which is otherwise known as revenue disgorgement) or the defendant’s
net benefit. 79
At times, the Court’s opinion in Porter has been misinterpreted to
stand for the assertion that the restoration of the plaintiff to his ex ante
position by refund or reimbursement provides a remedy in restitution,
presumably even an equitable remedy in restitution. Restitution is
its desire plain.

Id.
78. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399.
It may be considered as an equitable adjunct to an injunction decree. Nothing is more
clearly a part of the subject matter of a suit for an injunction than the recovery of that
which has been illegally acquired and which has given rise to the necessity for
injunctive relief. To be sure, such a recovery could not be obtained through an
independent suit in equity if an adequate legal remedy were available.

Id.
79. According to the Seventh Circuit, however, Porter holds for profits
disgorgement. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
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limited to “restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which
rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.” 80 The context of the
essential Porter quote was that the Court was distinguishing the
proposed restitutionary remedy from the damage provisions in Section
205(e) to show why that subsection did not exclude the remedy of
restitution. 81 As Professor Murphy points out, restoring the plaintiff to
status quo and compensating damages have a great deal in common. 82
B. Limits for Implied Equitable Remedies
While some courts have recognized limits or boundaries to the
range of appropriate remedies applicable to implied jurisdiction, most of
the heavy lifting in this area has been undertaken by the Supreme Court
in its opinions on general jurisdiction in equity and under ERISA.83
Combined, the opinions in Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. 84 and Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance
Co. v. Knudson, 85 tend to emphasize the traditional limits to the Court’s
holding in Mitchell which states that in the absence of any relevant
language in the statutory scheme, a district court is free to infer the full
extent of traditional authority and jurisdiction in equity. The Court’s
opinion in Grupo shows how a district court should determine the full
range of traditional jurisdiction in equity and the Court’s opinion in
80.
402).
81.

Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1987) (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at
See Murphy, supra note 27, at 1610.

Later decisions have read the Porter language of ‘restoring the status quo and
ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant’ as a
definition that distinguishes restitution from compensatory damages. Such an
interpretation pulls the language out of context. The Court in Porter had no occasion
to distinguish compensatory damages from restitution, but rather was faced with
deciding whether monetary relief incidental to an injunction could be awarded without
circumventing the scheme of treble damages and attorney’s fees set forth in section
205(e). Furthermore, ‘restoration of a loss to the plaintiff’ does not distinguish
restitution from compensation or damages when the loss is that of money. The
Court’s language should not be read as providing a meaningful distinction between
restitution and compensation.

Id.
82.
83.

See Murphy, supra note 27.
See Murphy, supra note 27, at 1619. Judge Posner’s opinions, especially that
in Reich, appear to have greatly influenced some of Justice Scalia’s more recent
opinions; Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
84. 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
85. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
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Great-West provides (1) some needed guidelines on the distinctions
between remedies in equity and remedies at law and (2) an example of
how relevant language limits the range of available remedies for
statutory claims in ERISA.
The test for whether a remedy is a traditional remedy in equity 86
was confirmed by Justice Scalia’s opinion in Grupo, 87 in which he
shows that the remedy must have been in general practice in the courts
in equity in England in 1789. The specific issue in that case was
whether a district court has the authority to issue a preliminary
injunction to freeze some or all of the defendant’s assets.
Substantially, then, the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is the
jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in
England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and the
enactment of the original Judiciary Act. . . . We must ask, therefore,
whether the relief respondents requested here was traditionally
88
accorded by courts of equity.

While this conceptually-simple test reflects many previous Supreme
Court opinions, 89 the dissenting opinions in Great-West decry the
difficulty of determining the typical practice of courts in equity in
eighteenth century England. Indeed, such objections and complaints of
needless inflexibility for such a “static” 90 standard were raised by other
justices in their dissent. 91
86. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(“Deciding whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim for equitable relief requires
an examination, in accordance with Grupo Mexicano, of the equitable claims
historically available.”).
87. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 318-19.
88.
89.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
See Fenn v. Holme, 62 U.S. 481 (1859); Root v. Ry Co., 105 U.S. 189, 212

(1881).
This firm and indisputable doctrine of the English chancery has been recognized and
declared by this [C]ourt, in Hipp v. Babin (19 How. 271), to be part of the system of
equity jurisprudence administered by the courts of the United States, founded not only
upon the legislative declaration in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ‘that suits in equity shall
not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States in any case where plain,
adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law,’ but also upon the intrinsic
distinctions between the different jurisdictions of law and equity.

Id.
90.
91.

See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221-34
(2002) (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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The Court’s opinion in Great-West 92 related to a claim by an
insurance company under ERISA 93 against a beneficiary.
The
beneficiary suffered a severe auto accident, which required extended
medical care. Prior to the personal injury litigation filed by the
beneficiary, the insurance company funded all of the victim’s medical
expenses, but then sued the beneficiary for reimbursement after she
settled her personal injury claim. The key problem for the insurance
company was that the proceeds of the settlement were paid directly into
a trust for the future medical care of the beneficiary. The key issue for
the Supreme Court was whether the insurance company’s claim against
the beneficiary was permitted under the ERISA statutory scheme which
restricts civil claims under ERISA to equitable remedies. 94
Some circuit courts have previously assumed that remedies based
on either unjust enrichment, restitution, or both, were similar to
remedies in equity. Thus the Supreme Court was observed to have made
a change in direction 95 in Great-West by holding that restitution can be a
remedy at law or a remedy in equity. 96 Furthermore, there can be at
least four sources of jurisdiction for a remedy in restitution: as a remedy
at law for a claim of assumpsit; as a remedy at law for a tort which is
waived in favor of assumpsit; as a remedy in equity; and as a remedy at
law that is ancillary to traditional relief in equity. 97 Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion emphasized the distinctions between claims for
remedies that are related to a specific asset or res which are remedies in
equity 98 and cash remedies that better resemble claims in assumpsit
92.
93.
94.
95.

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 204.
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
See infra note 101 for the statutory language.
See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 214-15 (“Admittedly, our cases have not
previously drawn this fine distinction between restitution at law and restitution in
equity, but neither have they involved an issue to which the distinction was relevant.”).
96. However, this was not the first time that the Supreme Court distinguished
restitution at law from restitution in equity. In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), the Court addressed this issue. See supra note
64.
97. See infra notes 202-206 and accompanying text for an example of how a claim
for trespass to minerals has been pled under different sources of jurisdiction. For
further explanation of the different sources of jurisdiction for unjust enrichment, see
George P. Roach, How Restitution/Unjust Enrichment Can Enrich a Corporate Claim
REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2007).
98. Zarycki v. Mount Sinai/NYU Health, 02 Civ. 6236, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28104, at *31-32 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2005).
Even though the plaintiff in Nechis sought restitution, the Second Circuit affirmed the
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which are restricted to courts at law. 99
This opinion should be viewed from the perspective that it
perceived the statutory provision under Section 502(a)(3)(B) 100 as a
restriction on the jurisdiction normally accorded matters regarding trusts
and fiduciary duties.
Historically, such issues were resolved
predominately by courts in equity as trusts and fiduciaries were regarded
as creations of courts in equity. The key logic of the Court’s opinion
relates to the import of the phrase “to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief” under Section 502(a)(3)(B). 101
As we explained in Mertens, “‘equitable’ relief must mean
something less than all relief.” Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S.
248, 258, note 8 (1993). Thus, in Mertens we rejected a reading of
the statute that would extend the relief obtainable under § 502(a)(3)
to whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the
particular case at issue (which could include legal remedies that
would otherwise be beyond the scope of the equity court’s
authority). Such a reading, we said, would “limit the relief not at all”
and “render the . . . modifier [‘equitable’] superfluous.” Id. at 257258. Instead, we held that the term “equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3)
must refer to “those categories of relief that were typically available
102
in equity . . . .” Id. at 256.

The Great-West opinion also provides further guidance on the
district court’s decision to dismiss the claim because the plaintiff could not show that
the defendant was under an obligation to segregate or that it did in fact segregate the
funds he was seeking into a separate account.

Id. (Referring to Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir.
2005)).
99. Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., Civ. No. 96-3587, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29261, at
*37 (D. N.J. Nov. 22, 2005)
While plaintiffs disclaim any resort to equitable relief, their purported ‘equitable
decree’ is on all fours with the type of ‘legal restitution’ that the Great-West case held
was not recoverable under Section 502(a)(3). Thus, plaintiffs’ calling the award of
back pay-type damages an equitable decree will not save their claim. See Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (holding “although they often dance around the
word, what petitioners in fact seek is nothing other than compensatory damages. . . .”).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
101. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002).
Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a civil action “by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates . . . the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce
any provisions of . . . the terms of the plan.”

Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994 ED.).
102. Id. at 209-10 (emphasis deleted) (internal citations altered).
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necessary elements to qualify for ancillary jurisdiction for a legal
remedy in equity. It reinforces the policy that the injunctive relief that is
requested by a plaintiff and that is offered as the source of the ancillary
jurisdiction must conform to traditional standards, that the proposed
injunction must be scrutinized for mere artful pleading designed to
bypass the jurisdictional restrictions. However, the opinion does not
preclude ancillary jurisdiction nor does it preclude the traditional
opinion that most matters relating to trusts or fiduciaries have traditional
jurisdiction in courts in equity. 103
C. How Much Authority is Implied?
Underlying the Supreme Court’s opinions in Grupo and Great-West
is a concern that traditional or implied authority is subject to abuse and
needs to be better defined and more clearly limited:
We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the
federal system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad
boundaries of traditional equitable relief. To accord a type of relief
that has never been available before—and especially (as here) a type
of relief that has been specifically disclaimed by longstanding
judicial precedent—is to invoke a ‘default rule,’ post, at 342
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), not of flexibility but of omnipotence.
When there are indeed new conditions that might call for a
wrenching departure from past practice, Congress is in a much better
position than we both to perceive them and to design the appropriate
104
remedy.

The Grupo opinion was not focused on implied jurisdiction, but the
Court’s general intent to restrict jurisdiction in equity is clear.
Therefore, implied jurisdiction may be just one example of a default rule
that has been poorly applied.
One possible explanation for the seeming willingness of some
courts to accommodate the agencies’ proposed remedies beyond the
point of traditional remedies in equity is that the courts show great
sympathy for the goals and responsibilities of the agencies. Historically,
a court in equity was expected to solve problems and provide a safety
103. Both the majority opinion and Ginsburg’s dissent agree that ancillary
jurisdiction can be appropriate occasionally. See id. at 215 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)).
104. Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322
(1999).
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net for problems in the system of courts at law as well as protect the
public as a whole. In addition to a court’s equitable discretion, some
courts appear to infer the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to assist
the agency and, for example, protect the consuming and investing public
from crooks, swindlers and other unjustly enriched defendants. This can
lead to a court’s justifying its opinion for appropriate remedies on the
basis of the needs of the agency to function properly.
These grand aspirations evolved from a humble origin. For
example, the Ninth Circuit’s statement in FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc. was
limited to a traditional remedy in equity:
We hold that Congress, when it gave the district court authority to
grant a permanent injunction against violations of any provisions of
law enforced by the Commission, also gave the district court
authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish
complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable
105
power explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.

This quote has been passed from opinion to opinion, steadily
veering away from the limit of traditional remedies in equity, and was
recently repeated as “[t]his grant of permanent injunctive power gives
the court broad equitable authority to ‘grant any ancillary relief
necessary to accomplish complete justice.’” 106
Other opinions justify the proposed remedy on the basis of the
agency’s need:
The deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly
undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge
illicit profits. As Judge Waterman said in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971): “It would severely defeat
the purposes of the Act if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to
retain the profits from his violation.” Accord, SEC v. Giaconda
105. 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). See id. at 1111.
It is clear that, because the district court has the power to issue a permanent injunction
to enjoin acts or practices that violate the law enforced by the Commission, it also has
authority to grant whatever preliminary injunctions are justified by the usual equitable
standards and are sought in accordance with Rule 65(a).

Id.
106. FTC v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(quoting H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113 (9th Cir. 1982). See also FTC v. World Travel
Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1024-26 (7th Cir. 1988); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas
Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1433-34 (11th Cir. 1984); but see FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665
F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 973 (1982).
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Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259 (S.D.N.Y.1971). We hold that it
was appropriate for the district court to order appellants to disgorge
107
the proceeds received in connection with the Manor offering.

Recently, the justification of the agency’s need has evolved into the need
to improve consumer confidence: 108
Restitution that reimburses consumers who paid for unapproved
drugs, and may have been defrauded or deceived about their
effectiveness, restores aggrieved parties to the same economic
position they enjoyed before the Act was violated. This strengthens
the financial protection offered to the public by the FDCA and
enhances consumer confidence in the drug market. Whether or not
Congress specifically contemplated restitution under the FDCA, the
ability to order this remedy is within the broad equitable power
granted to the district courts to further the economic protection
109
purposes of the statute.

The Third Circuit misses the point: the key issue is whether ‘restitution
that reimburses consumers’ is a traditional remedy in equity. Congress’
contemplations can only restrict the range of traditional remedies in
equity applicable to implied jurisidiction.
Comments similar to that of the Third Circuit rarely attract a
response. To be fair, some of this language can be attributed to a court’s
need to confirm that the claim is compatible with the purpose of the
statutory scheme. However, in light of the courts’ expansive measure of
an agency’s remedy as compared to traditional remedies in equity, the
courts’ justification on the basis of their seeming enthusiasm for the
goals of the agencies seems misplaced and irrelevant. 110
107. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972). See
also SEC v. Sekhri, 98 Civ. 2320, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13289 (S.D.N.Y. July 22,
2002); Crude Co. v. FERC, 923 F. Supp. 222 (D.D.C. 1996), aff’d 135 F.3d 1445 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); and United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra,
683 F. Supp. 1411, 1447-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 879 F.2d 20 (2d
Cir. 1989).
108. Wright v. Scotton, 121 A. 69 (Del. Ch. 1923). See also Weatherford Oil Tool
Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1960).
109. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 229 (3d Cir. 2005).
110. See SEC v. Unioil, 951 F.2d 1304, 1306 (D.D.C. 1991).
Since disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may
exercise its equitable power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing.
The remedy may well be a key to the SEC’s efforts to deter others from violating the
securities laws, but disgorgement may not be used punitively. Therefore, the SEC
generally must distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits.
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D. Four Limiting Issues for Implied Jurisdiction
Following the opinions in Porter and Hecht, four substantial issues
have developed to limit the nature of remedies that are appropriate under
implied jurisdiction: the applicability of the clean-up doctrine; the nature
of traditional remedies in equity; the punitive nature of the proposed
remedy and personal liability of the defendant.
1. Clean-Up Doctrine
To apply the clean-up doctrine, a court needs to confirm that:
(1) The injunctive relief sought is traditional injunctive relief;
(2) That the relationship between the injunctive relief and the
proposed ancillary monetary relief is appropriate; and
(3) That there is no other alternative legal relief which could
otherwise resolve the plaintiff’s claim. 111
A substantial portion of the case law on the clean-up doctrine
relates to the right to a jury trial. In 1962, the Supreme Court held that
the clean-up doctrine was not applicable to jury trial issues, i.e. that a
party’s right to a jury trial must not be overridden by the doctrine. 112 At
the same time, the Court did not preclude other applications of the
doctrine and therefore case law regarding the right to jury trials may not
be directly applicable to the doctrine for non-jury issues.
Id.; and CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 78 (3d Cir. 1993).
On the other hand, an award of damages in the amount of investor losses may go
beyond the scope of a Commodity Exchange Act enforcement proceeding. Absent a
hearing to calculate ill-gotten gains, the disgorgement ordered in an amount equal to
investor losses could be a penalty assessment. If investors wish to seek recovery of
their losses as a remedy, they are free to do so in an independent civil action against
defendants. The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as an excuse
to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls outside that
remedy’s recognized parameters.

Id.
111. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
Finally, the Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition to, or
independent of, legal relief. Section 1319 does not intertwine equitable relief with the
imposition of civil penalties. Instead each kind of relief is separately authorized in a
separate and distinct statutory provision. Subsection (b), providing injunctive relief, is
independent of Subsection (d), which provides only for civil penalties. In such a
situation, if a “legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on
the legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact.”

Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.11 (1974).
112. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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Second, the necessary or appropriate relationship between the
injunctive relief and monetary remedy may vary by jurisdiction as that
jurisdiction’s interpretation of the clean-up doctrine varies. A Delaware
Chancery Court has the discretion to hear such a claim in equity with
ancillary relief at law. 113 The necessary relationship in the Seventh
Circuit 114 is that the equitable nature of the overall claim must be ‘noninconsiderable’ while the First and Second Circuits 115 require the
equitable relief to dominate the claim. Much of the recent opinions from
the Supreme Court has related to their rejection of the plaintiff’s
injunctive relief because the relief was either not traditional injunctive
relief or the remedy at law was determined to be the dominant issue in
the case, 116 perhaps reflecting the Supreme Court’s preference for the
“dominant” criterion rather than the “non-inconsiderable” criterion of
the Seventh Circuit. 117
Third, the Supreme Court requires that the injunctive relief conform
to traditional relief in equity:
We turn, therefore, to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
respondent’s claim was not to be judged according to traditional
equitable principles, and that the bare fact that petitioner violated the
Williams Act justified entry of an injunction against him. This
position would seem to be foreclosed by Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321

113.
114.

Wright, 121 A. at 76. See also Weatherford Oil Tool, 340 S.W.2d at 954.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 725 F.2d 440, 442-43 (7th Cir. 1984)
(According to Judge Posner, a “good case in equity is required” but a court has the
discretion to reject the application of the doctrine if the claim in equity is only
‘incidental’ to the remedy at law).
115. USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 574 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1978); Schine v.
Schine, 367 F.2d 685, 688-70 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring).
So long as Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 55 S. Ct. 310, 79 L. Ed.
440 (1935), and Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 63 S. Ct. 163,
87 L. Ed. 176 (1942) stand, federal appellate courts will necessarily have difficulty in
determining whether an appeal is attracted by the rule of those cases or the contrary
one of City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., Ltd., 337 U.S. 254, 69 S. Ct. 1067, 93
L. Ed. 1347 (1949) and Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 182185, 75 S. Ct. 249, 99 L. Ed. 233 (1955), when a complaint seeks both legal and
equitable relief. The best solution of an essentially insolvable problem appears to be
the dominant purpose test, with any fair doubt being resolved against the claim that
the action was predominantly one at law.

Id.
116.
117.

Tull, 481 U.S. at 424-25.
Medtronic, 725 F.2d at 442-43.
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Subsequently, the Court rejected the claim for implied jurisdiction in
Tull due to the facts that the defendant had stopped the activities that led
to the complaint and that the EPA’s claim for $22 million of penalties
dominated the claim. 119 In Grupo, the plaintiff’s claim for temporary
injunctive relief was rejected based on the conclusion that such a form of
relief was not awarded in the English courts of equity in the late
eighteenth century. 120 Finally, the Supreme Court’s opinion in GreatWest held that the injunctive relief claimed by the plaintiff amounted to
a court order to the defendant to comply with contract payment
provisions and was not a traditional form of injunctive relief. 121
A seasoned opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court provides some
historical background on the clean-up doctrine which indicates that the
clean-up doctrine may have been practiced in the Courts of Chancery
before 1789 and before the Lord Cairns Act was passed in 1858:
Before the passage of that act, it was held in numerous cases that
such power existed in Courts of Chancery, and would be exercised if the
peculiar or particular circumstances of the case required it to do full
justice. The following cases may be mentioned: Jesus College v.
Bloom, (1745) 3 Atk. 262, 26 Eng. Rep. 953; Louden v. Nash, (1747) 3
Atk. 512, 26 Eng. Rep. 1095; _______ v. White, (1818) 4 Swanst. 107,
Eng. Reprint. 792; Ferguson v. Tadman, (1877) 1 Sim. 530, 57 Eng.
676; Nelson v. Bridges, (1838) 2 Beav. 239; Prothers v. Phelps, (1855) 7
Deg. M. & G. 734. 122
118.
119.

Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
Tull, 481 U.S. at 424-25 (“A potential penalty of $22 million hardly can be
considered incidental to the modest equitable relief sought in this case.”).
120. Based on the Judiciary Act of 1789, the United States formally adopted the
courts in equity as they existed at that time. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Grupo
Mexicano, as an extension of several earlier Supreme Court opinions, held that the
proponent must prove that the claimed relief was traditionally awarded by English
courts in equity in 1789. See also Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 207-15 (1882); Fenn
v. Holme, 62 U.S. 481 (1859); Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. 271 (1857).
121. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 211 (2002); see
also Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21007, p*21 (S.D. TX
2005) (“This request for an injunction is simply an indirect attempt to recover from
Defendants what she cannot recover directly--the value of the life insurance proceeds.
Plaintiff cannot obtain the relief she seeks under ERISA § 502(a)(3), and her
§ 502(a)(3) claim must therefore be dismissed.”). See also Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co.,
392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004).
122. Wright v. Scotton, 121 A. 69, 76 (Del. Ch. 1923).
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From 1850 to 1880, the clean-up doctrine, as applied to patent
claims for injunctive relief and an accounting in equity, was frequently
discussed in Supreme Court opinions. These opinions, as well as other
lower court opinions, analyzed the impact on implied jurisdiction for an
accounting in equity when the injunctive relief claimed for a violation of
a patent was denied. Does the denial of the injunctive relief necessarily
dictate that the case be transferred to a court at law? 123 What if the
plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief was reasonable on the date of claim
but subsequent events warranted the denial of the injunction? 124
An opinion from the Seventh Circuit in 1932 provides a useful
summary of these opinions. The court breaks the analysis down into
three parts: when the patent has already expired before the claim is filed
and no injunctive relief can be afforded the court has no jurisdiction; 125
when there is a small amount of time remaining on the patent after the
claim is filed, jurisdiction is discretionary with the court; 126 and when
the claim for injunctive relief is a subterfuge to gain jurisdiction in
equity, the court should transfer the case to a court at law. 127 The key
concept appears to be that under most circumstances, the plaintiff’s
jurisdiction is discretionary with the court. 128
Professor Murphy’s article makes a case that the irreparable injury
doctrine applies in the area of the clean-up doctrine. She notes that there
are exceptions to this conclusion, especially relating to claims on trusts
or fiduciary duties 129 but she has assembled impressive support from
123. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102-03 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that the denial of an injunction does not preclude the remedy at law).
124. Busch v. Jones, 184 U.S. 598, 599 (1902) (holding that equitable jurisdiction
must be determined by the conditions existing at the time the bill is filed, and not by
conditions which come into existence after the commencement of the suit).
125. King Mechanism & Eng’g Co. v. W. Wheeled Scrapper Co., 59 F.2d 546, 547
(7th Cir. 1932); Root, 105 U.S. at 189; Bourne v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 811 (1869); Le
Roy v. De Vry Corp., 16 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1926); Wright’s Automatic Tobacco Packing
Mach. Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 220 F. 163 (D.C. Va. 1915).
126. King Mechanism & Eng’g Co. at 547; See also Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322
(1886); Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509 (1929); Le Roy, 16 F.2d at 18;
W.W. Sly Mfg. Co. v. Cent. Iron Works, 201 F. 683 (7th Cir. 1912).
127. Id. at 548 citing Root, supra note 120; Hayward v. Andrews, 106 U.S. 672
(1883); Goldschmidt Thermit Co. v. Primos Chem. Co., 216 F. 382 (D. Pa. 1914);
Diamond Stone-Sawing Mach. Co. v. Seus, 159 F. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
128. Root, 105 U.S. at 215-16.
129. Murphy, supra note 27, at n.124; see 1 John N. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity
Jurisprudence 181, at 257 (5th ED. 1941).
Hence, there developed the practice that claims against fiduciaries, including claims
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many of the traditional experts on the topic. 130 For example, the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg 131 states that
“even if the checks respondent seeks to recover lay untouched in
petitioners’ offices, legal remedies would apparently have sufficed.” 132
Justice Marshall’s opinion in Tull echoed the Court’s opinion in Dairy
Queen and rejected the use of the clean-up doctrine to impinge on the
right to a jury. 133 In addition, Root v. Ry. Co. 134 reviews many of the
Supreme Court opinions in the nineteenth century that analyzed the
application of the clean-up doctrine to patent claims and strongly
supports Murphy’s assertion that the clean-up doctrine was not intended
to be applied if there existed a sufficient alternative remedy at law.
However, current case law regarding the FTC would seem to
contradict this position. The FTC statute has two specific provisions
that provide jurisdiction for the agency’s claims. Section 13(b) provides
for injunctive relief and Section 19 provides for specific remedies. The
more specific provision for jurisdiction has been held to neither constrict
nor preclude the FTC’s jurisdiction because the statute specifically says
that Section 19 was not intended to limit any other jurisdiction that the
FTC might have under any other sections. 135
The irreparable injury rule seems unreliable in light of the facts that
(a) the holding in Tull related to the defendant’s right to a jury, (b) the
isolated nature of the cases that actually dismissed cases because an
for restitution, were asserted in equity. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, 160 cmt. e,
at 645 (“Even though what is transferred is money . . . the payor or transferor is
entitled to maintain a proceeding in equity for specific restitution if the payment or
transfer was procured by an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relation.”).

Id.
130.
131.
132.

Murphy, supra note 27, at 1603 n. 126.
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1987).
Id. at 49 n. 7; See also Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478 (“The necessary
prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting, like all other
equitable remedies, is, as we pointed out in Beacon Theatres, the absence of an
adequate remedy at law.”).
133. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 229 (2002).
134. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 212 (1881).
135. FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982).
However, § 19(e) provides: Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission
under any other provision of law. Thus, there is no necessary or inescapable
inference, or, indeed, any inference, that Congress intended to restrict the broad
equitable jurisdiction apparently granted to the district court by § 13(b).

Id.
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adequate legal remedy exists, and (c) the lasting impression of Professor
Laycock’s conclusion that the irreparable injury rule is mainly applied as
an excuse for some other unspoken issue. 136 Though strongly supported
by legal theory and 19th century case law, the irreparable injury rule a
valid cause for today’s courts to deny jurisdiction, but not predictably so
and it therefore remains an additional source of the heightened
variability of remedies in equity.
2. Identifiable Assets or Funds Traceable to the Defendant
Many of the remedies for unjust enrichment that force a defendant
to disgorge her benefit or unjust profit are actually claims in assumpsit,
which are claims at law. “However, not all relief falling under the rubric
of restitution is available in equity. In the days of the divided bench,
restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in
equity.” 137 A verdict of a court in equity was accompanied by an order
from the court to transfer title to a specific asset or surrender control of a
segregated account or trust.
Actual possession of the relevant property was one of the key
determinants of the Great-West opinion:
In cases in which the plaintiff ‘could not assert title or right to
possession of particular property, but in which nevertheless he might
be able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for some
benefit the defendant had received from him,’ the plaintiff had a
right to restitution at law through an action derived from the
common law writ of assumpsit. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, Damages,
Equity, Restitution § 4.2(1), at 571; see also Dana M. Muir, ERISA
Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 Iow L. rev.
1, 37 (1995). In such cases, the plaintiff’s claim was considered
legal because he sought ‘to obtain a judgment imposing a merely
personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money.’
Restatement (First) of Restitution § 160, cmt. A (1937). Such claims
were viewed essentially as actions at law for breach of contract
138
(whether the contract was actual or implied).
....

136. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687 (1990).
137. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212.
138. Id. at 213 (internal citations edited).
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But where ‘the property [sought to be recovered] or its proceeds
have been dissipated so that no product remains, [the plaintiff’s]
claim is only that of a general creditor,’ and the plaintiff ‘cannot
enforce a constructive trust of or an equitable lien upon other
property of the [defendant].’ Restatement (First) of Restitution,
supra, § 215, cmt. a (1937). Thus, for restitution to lie in equity, the
action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property
139
in the defendant’s possession.

To secure jurisdiction on the basis of the clean-up doctrine, the
plaintiff attempted to disguise his claim within the language of a claim
for injunctive relief to order the insurance beneficiary to pay the contract
obligation. The artful pleading for injunctive relief failed:
The basis for petitioner’s claim is not that respondents hold
particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to petitioners, but
that petitioners are contractually entitled to some funds for benefits
that they conferred. The kind of restitution that petitioners seek,
therefore, is not equitable—the imposition of a constructive trust or
equitable lien on particular property—but legal—the imposition of
personal liability for the benefits that they conferred upon
140
respondents.

In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg makes a valid point about the
importance of possession of the relevant assets. She asserts that if the
insurance company chose to sue the needs trust rather than the
beneficiary of the trust, the logic of the majority opinion would demand
that such a claim be deemed a claim in equity. 141 To generalize a
statement by Professor Dobbs on constructive trusts, courts in equity

139. Id. at 213-14 (alterations to internal citations added) (textual alterations in
original).
140. Id., see Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 577-78 (7th Cir.
2004); See supra text accompanying note 65.
141. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
That Congress did not intend to strap § 502(a)(3) with the anachronistic rules on
which the majority relies is corroborated by the anomalous results to which the
supposed legislative ‘choice’ leads. Although the Court recognizes that it need not
decide the issue . . . its opinion surely contemplates that a constructive trust claim
would lie; hence, the outcome of this case would be different if Great-West had sued
the trustee of the Special Needs Trust, who has ‘possession’ of the requested funds,
instead of the Knudsons, who do not.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
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focus more on assets than liability. 142
Chief Justice Roberts recently handed down a unanimous opinion
that succeeds Great-West and emphasizes Justice Ginsburg’s point.143
In that case, the defendant agreed with the plaintiff to segregate the
funds in dispute. Under those circumstances the court affirmed the
Fourth Circuit and the district court in their holding that such a claim for
a particular fund could proceed. 144
Interestingly, however, this unanimous opinion either made a
mistake or has introduced a substantial change in the analysis detailed in
Grupo and endorsed in Great-West. To distinguish between remedies at
law and remedies in equity, Chief Justice Roberts states that “we
examined cases and secondary legal materials to determine if the relief
would have been equitable ‘in the days of the divided bench.’” 145 Given
the pinpoint cite, Chief Justice Roberts is referring to the statement in
Great-West that “[i]n the day of the divided bench, restitution was
available in certain cases at law, and in certain others in equity.”146
Later in the Great-West opinion, Justice Scalia stated the reference point
for distinguishing remedies in equity from remedies at law:
Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry’ . . . than
consulting, as we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs,
Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the answer clear.
It is an inquiry, moreover, that we are accustomed to pursuing, and
will always have to pursue, in other contexts. See, e.g., Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 318 (1999) (discussing the powers of federal courts under the
Judiciary Act’s grant of jurisdiction over “all . . . suits in equity”);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (discussing the scope of
the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial “in suits at common
147
law”).

The cite to Grupo is a reference to the inquiry of whether the equitable
remedy was within implied jurisdiction in equity or whether the remedy
142. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238,
251 (2000) (“See e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION ch. 7, Introductory Note, p. 522
(1937)”); Dobbs, supra note 6, at 597 (“The constructive trust is based on property, not
wrongs.”).
143. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869, 1874 (2006).
144. Id.
145. Sereboff, at 1874 (quoting Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212).
146. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212.
147. Id. at 217 (internal citation omitted) (alterations to internal citations added).
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had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of
Chancery at the time of the separation of the American colonies and
England. 148
In subsequent cases relating to ERISA claims, the Supreme Court’s
opinion was followed closely by most lower courts. Some of the Circuit
Courts have acknowledged the need to revise prior opinions that were
not in agreement with the Great-West opinion, indicating the
significance of the Supreme Court’s ‘revision.’ 149 In Scholastic Corp. v.
Najah Kassem, 150 the Connecticut district court states that the Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits largely follow the same basic test:
These circuits apply a three-part test for determining whether a
remedy sought by a plan, and labeled as a constructive trust or
equitable lien, is typically equitable. Though first developed by the
Seventh Circuit in Administrative Committee of Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 686-88 (7th Cir. 2003), the three-part
test was succinctly summarized by the Fifth Circuit in Bombardier
Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer as follows:
“Does the Plan seek to recover funds (1) that are specifically
identifiable, (2) that belong in good conscience to the Plan, and (3)
that are within the possession and control of the defendant
151
beneficiary?”

The Second Circuit may be applying the Great-West opinion further
than intended. 152 The case facts relate to claims against the officers and
directors of a financially distressed corporation for breaches of fiduciary
duty unrelated to ERISA. The Second Circuit acknowledges the fact
that Great-West overturned its opinion in Strom v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., 202 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999):
On appeal, defendants challenge the court’s characterization of the
relief as equitable. They emphasize that, because they never
possessed the funds in question and thus were not unjustly enriched,
the remedy sought against them cannot be considered equitable.
Rather, according to defendants, the remedy sought was legal and
148. See Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
318 (2002).
149. See, e.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 340 (2d Cir. 2005); Coop. Benefit
Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2004).
150. Scholastic Corp. v. Kassem, 389 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D. Conn. 2005).
151. Id. at 408 (quoting Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v.
Ferrer, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003)).
152.

Pereira, 413 F.3d at 339-40.
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thus they were entitled to a jury trial. We agree.
We have to concede that our decision in [Strom], points to a contrary
result. In Strom, we characterized as equitable the monetary relief
sought by plaintiff for defendant’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty
even though the defendant did not actually possess the funds in
153
question. Id. at 144.

The standard in Great-West is directly applicable to the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Strom 154 as both cases relate to ERISA claims, but
the standard for the claim in Periera, relating to corporate governance,
could still allow for the clean-up doctrine. Furthermore, if the claim in
Periera is one for breach of fiduciary duty, a claim for a remedy at law
unaccompanied by injunctive relief might lie in a court in equity, which
was the traditional jurisdiction for claims of breach of fiduciary duty.155
Of course, in the absence of other considerations, the Court’s
distinctions between remedies at law and in equity would be directly
applicable in the review of a claim that was neither ancillary to
appropriate injunctive relief nor was otherwise subject to special
consideration as a traditional claim in the courts in equity. For example,
jurisdictional disputes relating to relief or nominal defendants should be
guided by the Great-West standard.
As a final note on the possession of assets, it may be useful to point
out that the relevant assets in the defendant’s possession does not
include the economist’s figurative asset of opportunity cost or otherwise
what might have been an asset to the plaintiff. Basically, economic
concepts of opportunity cost do not apply or, perhaps more
appropriately, can not be used to bootstrap a plaintiff’s loss or damage

153.
154.

Id. at 339.
See Amschwand v. Spherion Corp., Civil Action No. H-02-4836, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21007, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005).
Thus, Plaintiff argues, the term “equitable relief” includes “the recovery from a
fiduciary of any direct monetary losses caused by the fiduciary’s breach of its duties”.
This is precisely the argument that the United States Secretary of Labor advanced, and
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected, in Callery v. United States Life Ins. Co.,
392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004).

Id. (internal citations omitted); Callery v. United States Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 409
(10th Cir. 2004) (stating that, “though the issue is close, we must adhere to the Supreme
Court’s rather emphatic guidance and therefore conclude that in a suit by a beneficiary
against a fiduciary, the beneficiary may not be awarded compensatory damages as
‘appropriate equitable relief’ under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA.”).
155. SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2002).
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into an identifiable asset. “Callery is persuasive for the proposition that
monetary damages equal to the benefits a beneficiary would have
received but for the fiduciary’s breach do not constitute ‘equitable relief’
and are therefore unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3).” 156
3. Is the Remedy Punitive?
Traditional remedies in equity do not include punitive damages.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice White’s dissenting opinion
in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates seem to agree on this point. 157 Justice
Scalia further points out, however, that exceptions have begun to appear
in the last twenty years. 158
Many cases state that a remedy in excess of profits is punitive. The
Second Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc. is a
good example:
Having held that ordering the refunding of the proceeds was a proper
exercise of the district court’s equity powers, we hold that the court
erred in ordering appellants to transfer to the trustee all the profits
and income earned on such proceeds. As we noted in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., supra, 446 F.2d at 1308, the SEC may seek relief
other than injunctive relief, “so long as such relief is remedial relief
159
and is not a penalty assessment.”

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that in some fact patterns, the
failure to offset certain expenses would be punitive: “Disgorgement is
156. Amschwand, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21007, at *20 (citing Callery v. United
States Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401 (10th Cir. 2004)).
157. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 n. 5, 259 n. 7 (1993); see also
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 587 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, 423 n.7 (1987);
Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1855); Livingston v. Woodworth, 56 U.S.
546, 559-60 (1854); Beals v. Wash. Int’l, Inc., 386 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Del. Ch. 1978).
In order to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction to award punitive damages,
therefore, it is first necessary to ascertain whether the high court of chancery in
England had such jurisdiction in 1776. Defendants rely heavily on Colburn v. Simms,
2 Hare 543, 67 Eng.Rep. 224 (1843) where the Court held that the high court of
chancery in England did not have jurisdiction to order penalties or forfeitures.

Id.
158. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 259 n.7 (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law
of Remedies, § 3.9, at 211 (1973)).
159. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972); see also
CFTC v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
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remedial and not punitive. The court’s power to order disgorgement
extends only to the amount with interest by which the defendant profited
from his wrongdoing. Any further sum would constitute a penalty
assessment.” 160 Equally relevant are the securities cases that have held
that equitable rescission cannot restore the plaintiff to a better position
than she would have had before the unjust act. 161
The remedy of restitution can punish in one of two ways: the
remedy can include statutory or discretionary penalties or it can deny a
party’s access to offsets or counter-restitution. Professor Kull recently
explored the latter concept in a recent article about “Restitution’s
Outlaws”: “[R]estitution does not punish, but it punishes negatively: not
by imposing liability on disfavored parties, nor by enhancing the
liability to which disfavored parties are subject, but by denying a
restitutionary claim (or counterclaim) to which the disfavored party
would otherwise be entitled.” 162 Kull describes a group of plaintiffs
with unclean hands who violated the spirit or the letter of the legal
system but, when their schemes failed, they were surprised to discover
that the law rejects their claims in equity to salvage anything out of their
unjust schemes. Thus a party that bribes a judge should not expect a
court to order the judge to return the bribe money; the bribing party has
unclean hands and will be denied access to a court in equity. 163
Similarly, the willful trespasser to another’s minerals or timber is denied
counter-restitution or offsets for their expenditures.
Revenue disgorgement is far more punitive than profit
disgorgement; without a specific finding, it denies the possibility that the
victim received anything of value from the defendant. As penalties or
disguised fines, disgorgement orders are not part of traditional equitable
remedies and the federal district courts have no jurisdiction to hear
160. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,1335 (5th Cir. 1978); see also SEC v. Thomas
James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
The SEC further argues, however, that the amount to be disgorged by defendants is
the entire amount of excessive markups, because the measure of disgorgement is the
injury to the market, and because only the gross profits, unadjusted for expenses,
adequately reflect such injury. The SEC’s argument simply misconstrues both the
nature and extent of the equitable power of the Court to order disgorgement.

Id.
161. See Smith v. Fahnestock & Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3411, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2002) (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 50 n. 22 (2d Cir. 1978)).
162. Andrew Kull, Symposium: Private Law, Punishment and Disgorgement:
Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 18 (2003).
163. See Womack v. Maner, 301 S.W.2d 438, 439 (Ark. 1957).
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claims for such remedies. 164 Originally, the Supreme Court in Porter
justified jurisdiction for a restitutionary claim on the basis that the
proposed remedy was not a damage award or penalty and would merely
restore the parties to their original position. Orders for the disgorgement
of revenue rarely restore any parties to their original position and the
plaintiff may be restored to a position superior to ex ante, especially if
the plaintiff received some services or was allowed to retain an asset of
some significant value without offset or counter-restitution.
4. Personal Liability
There are few examples of specific holdings against a remedy on
the basis of personal liability. 165 In holding that Great-West sought legal
restitution, the majority contrasted imposition of personal liability on the
defendant, which it said was more typical of a legal remedy, with
imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular property
held by the defendant, which it said was an equitable remedy. 166
According to Great-West, a restitution claim was considered legal
when a plaintiff “could not assert title or right to possession of particular
property, but in which nevertheless he might be able to show just
grounds for recovering money to pay for some benefit the defendant had
received from him.” 167 In such a case, the plaintiff sought “to obtain a

164. See Kull, supra note 162, at 29 (“The result of this approach is that the claimant
obtains profits without deduction of the expense of producing them, and the defendant
is liable in excess of net enrichment. Such an outcome is punitive.”).
165. But see Coop. Benefit Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir.
2004).
As noted, CBA’s complaint alleged two alternative bases for jurisdiction: (1) a
statutory claim for equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), and (2) a federal common law
claim of unjust enrichment. As CBA conceded that it could not maintain its claim for
equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), we need not address it except to note that, in
seeking to impose personal liability on Ogden to enforce her ‘contractual
reimbursement obligation under the LTD Plan and the Reimbursement Agreement,’
CBA was requesting precisely the kind of ‘legal’ remedy that the Supreme Court has
held to be beyond § 502(a)(3)’s jurisdictional grant.

Id.
166. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)
(quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 4.2(1), at 571 (2d ED. 1993)). This
position should not be mistaken for the statement that there can be no personal liability
for a defendant in a claim in equity. Personal liability for the defendant can arise from a
claim of breach of fiduciary duty vis-à-vis an express or constructive trust.
167. Id.
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judgment imposing a merely personal liability upon the defendant to pay
a sum of money,” which is “essentially [an] action[] at law for breach of
contract (whether the contract was actual or implied).” 168 Where money
or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff
could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s
possession, however, plaintiff could seek restitution in equity—
ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien.
In the process of considering the relationship between personal
liability and a remedy in equity, it may be useful to consider the nature
of the personal liability that the agencies seek. The FTC has asserted
and courts have affirmed that (a) the defendant’s personal liability was
not dischargeable in bankruptcy 169 and (b) personal liability could attach
to the defendant’s estate and survive his demise. 170 The court’s logic in
the latter case seems particularly strained and at odds with Grupo and
Great-West:
In this case, the FTC alleges that Defendants failed to take written
applications or collect required information, thus making it more
difficult for it to determine whether Capital City was discriminating
against credit applicants based on their race, national origin, sex,
marital status, or age. By failing to provide credit applicants with
notice of adverse action and/or by providing inaccurate notices, as
alleged, Defendants also ensured that rejected loan applicants were
not properly informed of their rights under the ECOA and did not
learn which federal agency to contact for assistance if they suspected
a violation of those rights. Thus, Defendants’ alleged violations
clearly present the harm of permitting discriminatory conduct against
individual consumers to go undetected and unremedied. Defendants
should not avoid liability for such violations. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that the ECOA civil penalties sought by the FTC are
remedial in nature and thus may be pursued against the Relief
Defendants. . . . Permitting the beneficiaries of the Nash Estate to
168. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Compare RESTATEMENT FIRST:
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160(i) (1937) (“A constructive trust does not arise
unless there is property on which the constructive trust can be fastened, and such
property is held by the person to be charged as constructive trustee.”), and
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 160, at 642 (1937) (noting that the chief difference
between quasi contract and constructive trust is that, “the plaintiff in bringing an action
to enforce a quasi-contractual obligation seeks to obtain a judgment imposing a merely
personal liability upon the defendant to pay a sum of money, whereas the plaintiff in
bringing a suit to enforce a constructive trust seeks to recover specific property”).
169. See FTC v. Porcelli (In re Porcelli), 325 B.R. 868 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005).
170. FTC v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004).
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retain the profits of Nash’s allegedly illegal activity would “utterly
171
frustrate” the purposes of the ECOA.

In the Capital City Mortgage case, the causal relationship between the
defendant’s unjust act—failing to comply with various notification
requirements—and identifiable assets in the defendant’s estate seems
insufficient to justify a constructive trust. The defendant did not
misappropriate any specific assets or segregated cash accounts. There
was no evidence presented that the corporation made large cash
dividends or paid cash bonuses to the defendant. The mere allegation
that he may have benefited was deemed sufficient to justify the
preliminary injunction. Even though there is no specific proof that the
defendant’s unjust actions actually resulted in any additional assets in
the defendant’s estate, the court granted the petition for a preliminary
petition to freeze the assets of the deceased defendant’s estate pending
the litigation against the corporate co-defendant and the estate as a codefendant. Without identifiable assets, the presumption of benefit seems
insufficient to warrant a claim in equity, but none of these issues were
raised in the opinion. Also overlooked is the fact that the FTC has no
claim for injunctive relief against the deceased or his estate relating to
any future violations of the ECOA, further attenuating the FTC’s claim
to implied jurisdiction.
E. Response from Non-ERISA Cases
Outside of ERISA cases, the court’s opinion in Great-West is
acknowledged but few opinions attempt to analyze the equitable nature
of a proposed remedy. The opinion in SEC v. Buntrock affirmed the
SEC’s jurisdiction to claim a remedy for disgorgement and specifically
held that generic ‘disgorgement’ is an equitable remedy. 172 The SEC’s
claims in this case were for the defendants’ ill gotten gains and statutory
penalties equal to three times those gains.
Given this analytical framework, we agree with the SEC that the
disgorgement remedy it seeks is equitable in nature and, therefore, an
acceptable form of relief. As the SEC has accurately stated,
disgorgement has historically been viewed as an equitable remedy
employed against those who profit by abusing positions of trust. In
171.
172.

2004).

Id. at 23 n. 5 (internal citation omitted).
SEC v. Buntrock, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. May 25,
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essence, it deprives a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains. Compensation
is not an element of the claim. In fact, the Supreme Court has held,
in the ERISA context, that disgorgement is a viable equitable remedy
173
to recover improperly received profits.

This and other unjustified, broad statements about disgorgement are
surprising in light of Buntrock’s acknowledgement not only of the
Great-West opinion but also of the key concept that remedies can be
either legal or equitable:
The key to the Court’s holding was a discussion regarding the legal
and equitable nature of the restitution remedy. If the remedy sought
under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA was one that was traditionally
available in equity, then it was permissible. Great-W. Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002). However, if the
remedy sought was essentially legal in nature, then it fell outside the
174
scope of Section 502(a)(3).

The best example of the opinion’s tendency to make unjustified
generalizations is the following:
Furthermore, virtually every federal court of appeals has recognized
disgorgement as an appropriate equitable remedy under the securities
laws. See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2002);
SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2000); SEC v. Rind,
991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec.,
175
Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).

The Seventh Circuit opinion in Lipson is the most relevant precedent on
the list as it is the only decision handed down after Great-West.
Seemingly, Lipson contradicts Buntrock:

173.
174.
175.

Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *7 (internal citation edited).
Id. at *8. This statement represents semantic juxtaposition that is regrettably
commonplace in case law relating to restitution and unjust enrichment. The opinion
asserts that “disgorgement has historically been viewed as an equitable remedy.” Id. at
*7. There are only eleven cases in federal and state case law that were published
between 1800 and 1960 that use the term ‘disgorgement’ in any context. Since
disgorgement can be just another term for restitution, any historical analysis in this case
was conducted on cases claiming restitution which does have extensive history. Yet,
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Great-West literally precludes such a blanket statement
on restitution and requires that a court determine whether the remedy is restitution in
equity or at law.
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Disgorgement is another name for restitution, as Judge Friendly
noted in SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95
(2d Cir. 1978) and restitution, as we have noted in several non-SEC
cases, is both a legal and an equitable remedy. Clair v. Harris Trust
& Savings Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1999); Health Cost
Controls of Illinois, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 710 (7th Cir.
1999); Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir.
176
1994).

Buntrock ignores the Seventh Circuit’s implied conclusion that, like
restitution, disgorgement can be either a remedy at law or in equity.
In essence the Northern District of Illinois identified three different
types of remedies: restitution in equity, restitution at law and
disgorgement. Rather than define the exact nature of disgorgement and
identify the key characteristics of disgorgement that qualify it as a
remedy in equity, the opinion attaches a label and effectively assumes
away the issue. 177
The Northern District also leaves the issue of the claimed statutory
penalties unexplored. The court’s opinion in Lipson clearly states that it
is error to hold that civil penalties in SEC cases are not a form of legal
relief. 178 Given that the civil penalties in Buntrock can be as much as
three times the amount of the disgorgement remedy, the civil penalty is
directly determined by the amount of the disgorgement remedy, and that
disgorgement remedies are not necessarily remedies in equity, it would
seem that the equitable nature of the SEC’s claim would require some
further explanation and discussion.
This criticism of the process or substance of the Buntrock opinion
does not necessarily mean that the final opinion was wrong, only that the
court failed to undertake the analysis established in Great-West. Given
the absence of any significant analysis or discussion of the SEC’s
proposed disgorgement and of any explanation of why the legal claim
for statutory penalties does not overwhelm the claim for disgorgement,
one is left with the impression that the opinion is based on generalized
notions of the remedies and fails to examine the substance underneath
the labels, flouting the Supreme Court’s message in Great-West.

176.
177.
178.

SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation edited).
See Buntrock, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495.
Lipson, 278 F.3d at 662 (“SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1990),
assumed, but without discussion, and we think erroneously, that civil penalties in SEC
cases are not a form of legal relief.”).
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VI. WHICH DISGORGEMENT?
“Restitution does not generally impose forfeitures.” 179
At most, the term ‘disgorgement’ is a synonym for the civil remedy
of restitution. While it adds little to the analysis of restitution, it could
perform a useful role if it helps avoid the mistaken juxtaposition of civil
and criminal restitution. So far, however, the synonym has increased,
rather than reduced, confusion because some courts have been misled to
conclude that disgorgement is somehow different from that of civil
restitution.
As applied in any context, ‘disgorgement’ was used in less than a
dozen federal or state case opinions from 1800 to 1960. Perhaps more
startling is the fact that the term was used so often between 1960 and
2000 even though the first proposed definitions only began to appear
around 2000. The term was not used or defined in the Restatement First
and was only defined in a draft of the Restatement Third as of 2000.
Black’s Law Dictionary only offered a definition after 2000 and, while
many of the foundation articles on restitutionary remedies have
mentioned the term, few ascribe any consensus to its meaning.
Presumably, the term evolved from the verb form which has been
used in American case law for the last 100 years as an alternative
superior to ‘make restitution,’’give up,’ and, especially, to ‘cough up.’
Increasingly after 1960, courts began to refer to disgorgement as the
object of the verb: literally, disgorgement was what was disgorged. So
far, however, the term has not added any additional or new meaning to
the body of law of restitution or unjust enrichment.
None of this necessarily means that the term is meaningless.
‘Disgorgement’ is simply a new name for an old remedy but, until

179. Kull, supra note 162, at 27.
Restitution does not generally impose forfeitures. Even within the context of
restitution for wrongs - where the defendants are malefactors by definition - standard
remedies in restitution devote considerable effort to measuring the extent of the
defendant’s enrichment at the claimant’s expense. Where the defendant’s enrichment
derives from multiple sources - partly from an unlicensed interference with the
claimant’s interests, partly from the defendant’s own contributions - the ordinary
methods of restitution include an accounting designed to identify that portion of the
disputed assets constituting net unjust enrichment. An accounting that omitted an
item from the defendant’s side of the ledger would overstate net enrichment, resulting
in a liability that, to the extent of the excess, might fairly be described as punitive.

Id.
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recently, no one has offered to say which old remedy. The Restatement
Third defines disgorgement as a specific kind of restitution: “a remedy
against a willful or knowing defendant whose benefit or advantage
exceeds the plaintiff’s loss or damages.” 180 Many authorities such as
Judge Posner 181 and Professor Murphy 182 equate it to restitution.
Disgorgement is currently being used in at least five different
contexts:
(1) Disgorgement of profits; 183
(2) Disgorgement of legal fees; 184
(3) Disgorgement of revenues; 185
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT, § 3 cmt. b
(Discussion Draft 2000). (The discussion draft defines disgorgement:
Where the defendant has acted in conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, the whole
of any resulting gain is treated as unjust enrichment, even though the defendant’s gain
may exceed both (i) the measurable injury to the plaintiff, and (ii) the reasonable value
of a license authorizing the defendant’s conduct.
Id.
181. Lipson, 278 F.3d at 663.
182. Murphy, supra note 27, at 1625.
183. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
184. Brown v. Luker (In re Zepecki), 277 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding that bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 329,
to act sua sponte to take jurisdiction to order disgorgement of attorney’s fees and did
not abuse its discretion by ordering disgorgement of portion of fees).
185. See Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987);
A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554 (1977). In addition, a number of
agency cases hold that disgorgement of revenues is a remedy in equity. See Buntrock,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495 at *7-9 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think
Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (“In determining the
amount of equitable monetary relief, the amount of restitution equals the amount paid
by the consumer victims of an illegal scheme, less any amounts previously returned to
the victims.”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. 89-3818 RSWL(GX),
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20452 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Silueta
Distribs., Inc., No. C 93-4141 SBA, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22254, at *17-18 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (“Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, plaintiff requests a permanent injunction,
restitution and disgorgement. With regard to the amount of restitution, plaintiff
requests $169,339.35, as 3,853 consumers paid $43.95 for the product.”); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Peoples Credit First, LLC, No. 8:03-cv-2353-T-TBM, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38545 at *28 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
Although Section 13(b) does not expressly authorize courts to award monetary
equitable relief, the unqualified grant of statutory authority to issue an injunction
thereunder carries with it the full range of equitable remedies, including the power to
order equitable monetary relief for redress through remedies such as restitution or
disgorgement.
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(4) Restitutional disgorgement under Section 17203 of the
California Business and Professional Code; 186 and
(5) Generic disgorgement (and any or all of the above).
In the context of revenue disgorgement and generic disgorgement,
the term ‘disgorgement’ adds the most confusion. The generic term as a
noun causes confusion when it misleads a court into believing that
revenue disgorgement is as customary and traditional a remedy as profit
disgorgement because in both contexts, the practice is just referred to as
‘disgorgement.’
Revenue disgorgement is somewhat more complicated because
revenue disgorgement is not a traditional remedy in equity. 187 The
award of revenue disgorgement is the same as for the award of
restitution or unjust enrichment when the award is made without
crediting the defendant for any normal offsets or other forms of counterrestitution. There are some isolated causes of action or specific
circumstances that justify such a harsh remedy but most of them relate to
courts at law rather than courts in equity. However, there are a limited
number of scenarios in which the net effect of a restitutionary remedy
might give the appearance of revenue disgorgement.
These
circumstances can be grouped into five categories:
CATEGORY I: Specific Restitution. This group includes claims in
which the plaintiff seeks the return of his real assets or personal property
Id. (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468-70 (11th Cir.
1996)); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 335 F. Supp. 2d 479, 501 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“The appropriate monetary relief is the full amount lost by consumers. The FTC
seeks disgorgement from defendants in the amount of $16 million for payments made
during the AT&T Period.”); see also United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d
219, 229 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The court went on to find that ‘even accepting the references
to legislative concerns . . . these concerns are far from a clear statement of Congress’s
intent to exclude restitution, recalls, disgorgement, or any other traditional form of
equitable relief.’” (quoting United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., 191 F.3d 750, 762
(6th Cir. 1999))).
186. Watson Lab., Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1099,
1121 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
187. According to Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages–Equity–
Restitution, § 4.1(4), at 379-80 (2d ED. 1993), there are five main options for the
measurement of the defendant’s benefit in unjust enrichment, none of which approach
restitution of revenues: (1) the defendant’s increased assets; (2) the market value of
goods or services provided to the defendant; (3) the use value of goods or services
provided to the defendant; (4) the gains realized by the defendant upon sale of an asset
received by the defendant; or (5) collateral or secondary profits earned by the defendant
from the use of the plaintiff’s asset.
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(including detachable minerals) and pursuant to which the knowing or
willful defendant may be denied counter-restitution against the rightful
owner of land or minerals for improvements or operating costs. 188 In
none of these cases does the case law call for the per se revenue
disgorgement of the defendant.
CATEGORY II: Unjust Enrichment of Fiduciaries. This group
includes cases in which a fiduciary is required to disgorge all of his fees
and compensation without any credit or offset for individual
contribution or incidental expenses. A special type of this general case
includes the disgorgement required of public officials for accepting
bribes. Frequently this type of remedy is unrelated to the plaintiff’s loss
or damages, if any.
CATEGORY III: Revenue Disgorgement By Procedural Default.
This category includes those cases in which the defendant fails or
refuses to meet her burden of proof to substantiate appropriate offsets or
apportionments. In such circumstances, the court has authority to deny
any offsets. 189 Some courts have also awarded revenue disgorgement
against a defendant that violates a court order, although many courts
have held that such a sanction should include only profits, but the great
weight of case law opinion limits sanctions to the disgorgement of
profits. 190 Restitution’s ‘Outlaws,’ as defined by Kull, 191 could also be
included in this category as well as some miscellaneous holdings that
awarded restitution of revenues as sanctions.
CATEGORY IV: Government Disgorgement Orders.
These
government claims depend on the federal jurisdiction attributed to
traditional equitable remedies. The government claims, frequently
referred to as disgorgement orders, sometimes specifically assert the
right to revenue disgorgement directly (like the SEC) or indirectly (like
188. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 158 cmts. b
and c (1937).
189. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
190. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 765 (10th Cir. 2004);
Bailey v. Outdoor Media Group, No. E030836, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 11364, at *20
(2002). But see Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 456 (1932)
(holding that a remedy measured in the form of unjust enrichment of profits is
appropriate in a court in equity as an alternative to a sanction); Manhattan Indus., Inc. v.
Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 885 F.2d 1, 15 (2d Cir. 1989); Connolly v. J.T. Ventures,
851 F.2d 930, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1988); Lindy Pen Co., v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400,
1407 (9th Cir. 1993); Howard Johnson Co. v. Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir.
1990); and Nat’l Merch. Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771, 775-76 (Mass. 1976).
191. Kull, supra note 161.
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the FTC). The FTC’s claims for disgorgement based on fraud frequently
exclude any consideration for any value of the subject product.
CATEGORY V: Exceptional or Outlying Cases. This group of state
cases, though few in number, is frequently cited as justification for the
existence of revenue disgorgement. By and large, they are justified with
Category I cases which are applied well outside of any comparable
substantive law. It would also be fair to observe that in each of the two
principal cases in this category, the court appears to have been upset
about the defendant’s litigation tactics and demeanor and wanted to
apply an additional degree of deterrence on the defendant.
CATEGORY I
Category I includes three separate areas of substantive law:
mistaken improvements, conversion of personal property, trespass to
minerals and some miscellaneous cases.
MISTAKEN IMPROVEMENTS. It is a traditional remedy of courts in
equity to order the transfer of title as well as, or in addition to, control of
real property to its rightful owner. 192 If the defendant has made
improvements to the land when she was aware or should have been
aware that someone else was the rightful owner of the land, the
defendant can be denied the right to receive or even seek compensation
or restitution for the expenditures that contributed to the improvements.
Subject to the specific provisions of various state ‘betterment’ statutes,
however, the defendant is normally entitled to reimbursement or
restitution for reasonable repairs and tax payments made on the
property. 193
If the plaintiff has retained legal title to the real property, she could
alternatively sue in a court at law for ejectment. Mr. McCorkle’s treatise
on mistaken improvements concludes that the defendant is more likely
to be awarded offset or counter-restitution in an action in equity as
compared to an action at law. Subject to a number of qualifications and
conditions, he compares the two sources of relief:

192. C. R. McCorkle, Annotation, Compensation For Improvements Made or
Placed On Premises of Another by Mistake, 57 A.L.R.2d 263 (1958).
193. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 158, cmts. b
and c (1937).
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At common law, emphasis is placed upon the right of the owner of
land to control and use it as he sees fit, and it is considered that he is
under no obligation, either legal or moral, to pay for improvements
made or placed thereon without his knowledge or consent, even
though he may derive benefit therefrom [versus] [i]n equity, the
mistaken improver may be entitled to relief by way of compensation
under the rule or maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity, or
194
under the doctrines of unjust enrichment or estoppel.

CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. According to property law,
the tortious conversion of personal property does not transfer title either
to the tortfeasor or any subsequent transferees. Hence, the remedy for
such a tort does not allow for any offsets or counter-restitution on either
or both of the following: the basis that the defendant has no right to the
property or the defendant has unclean hands and therefore the court has
no jurisdiction to hear his claim. If the property has been sold and is not
available for specific restitution, the tortfeasor or a subsequent transferee
with knowledge is generally held liable for the greater of the value of
property at the time of the conversion or upon the sale even if the
property has been improved by the tortfeasor. 195 The result is the same
under Section 40 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
Enrichment (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 8, 2005). Subsection (2)(a),
“Trespass and Conversion,” states that “A conscious wrongdoer, or one
who acts despite a known risk that the conduct in question violates the
rights of the claimant, will be required to disgorge all gains (including
consequential gains) derived from the wrongful transaction.” 196
Similarly, Section 128 of the Restatement (First) of Restitution,
“Conversion and Other Tortious Dealings with Chattels,” shows that the
same approximate results occur under either actions at law for assumpsit
or actions in equity for a constructive trust. Remedies for specific
194. McCorkle, supra note 192, at *2.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927(2)(a) (1979). See also id. cmt. b.
The rule stated in this Section applies in all actions at law, whether the action is one
primarily seeking damages, as the action for trespass or conversion, or is one that
primarily seeks a return of the subject matter, as the actions of replevin or detinue, if
damages are given as an alternative to specific restitution. It also applies to
proceedings in equity in which damages are given in lieu of specific restitution.

Id.
196. For an example of a result that resembles revenue disgorgement, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40, cmt. d, illus. 11
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (noting that illustration 11 is based on Welch v. Kosasky,
24 Mass. App. Ct. 402 (1987)).
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restitution or approximating specific restitution have evolved from
property law, tort law and the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.
Those remedies resemble the same effect as revenue disgorgement.
TRESPASS TO MINERALS. One explanation for the remedy for
trespass to minerals traces the remedy to claims in equity for stolen
goods. The Supreme Court’s 1882 opinion in Wooden-Ware, a
landmark opinion with respect to willful trespass to minerals, justifies its
holding by referring to English case law:
The doctrine of the English courts on this subject is probably as well
stated by Lord Hatherley in the House of Lords, in the case of
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25, as anywhere
else. He said: “There is no doubt that if a man furtively, and in bad
faith, robs his neighbor of his property, and because it is
underground is probably for some little time not detected, the court
of equity in this country will struggle, or, I would rather say, will
assert its authority to punish the fraud by fixing the person with the
value of the whole of the property which he has so furtively taken,
and making him no allowance in respect of what he has so done, as
would have been justly made to him if the parties had been working
197
by agreement.”

Based on this and similar rationale, state courts have ordered defendants
to disgorge any minerals that the defendant knowingly misappropriated
from the rightful owner as a form of specific restitution. The exact
definition of the applicable minerals can vary by state but it generally
includes oil, natural gas, timber, coal and sometimes other mineral
deposits like gravel and topsoil. The defendant is generally ordered to
disgorge the actual minerals or their monetary equivalent value at a

197. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434 (1882) (citing
Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25 (1880)). See also United States v.
Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 458 (1946).
An agreed premise is found in the rule that one who ‘willfully’ or ‘in bad faith’
trespasses on the land of another, and removes minerals, is liable to the owner for
their full value computed as of the time the trespasser converted them to his own use,
by sale or otherwise, but that an ‘innocent’ trespasser, who has acted ‘in good faith,’
may deduct from such value the expenses of extraction. It is also clear that when suit
is brought for the value of minerals wrongfully removed from the plaintiff’s land, and
the trespass and conversion are established, the burden of pleading and proving good
faith is on the defendant. The ‘good faith’ contemplated by these rules is something
more than the trespasser’s assertion of a colorable claim to the converted minerals.

Id. (Citations omitted)
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specified point in the production or refining process that varies by state
and can include the time when the minerals are brought to surface, when
the minerals are sold or when the minerals are consumed for the
defendant’s own use. 198 If the defendant’s trespass is conducted with
knowledge, she is generally not entitled to any offsetting credits for the
costs of developing, marketing or shipping the minerals. If the
defendant acted without knowledge, the defendant is generally entitled
to some form of offsetting credit or the remedy is limited to the value of
the minerals in situ (still in the ground). From the perspective of the
knowing defendant that has sold the minerals, the value of the minerals
as assets and the revenues from their sale will generally be
approximately the same amount. Confusing the specific restitution of
the assets with perceived disgorgement of revenue has lead some courts
to justify applying the remedy in such non-similar cases as
misappropriation of intellectual property or minority shareholder
oppression.
Attempts have been made to compare this remedy to claims relating
to misappropriation or conversion of property, especially intangibles.
Such analyses suffer from the fact that the common law does not
generally treat tangible and intangible property in a similar manner. 199
Furthermore, the remedy for trespass to minerals is strongly rooted in
property law which frequently leads the common law to hold that
trespass to the landholder’s precious minerals like coal, oil or timber
warrant a different measure of remedy than the same trespass to one’s
gravel, top-soil or other less detachable mineral. 200
The claim for intentional trespass to minerals also suffers as a

198. R. A. Vinluan, Measure of Damages For Wrongful Removal of Earth, Sand, or
Gravel From Land, 1 A.L.R.3d 801; V. Woerner, Right of Trespasser to Credit for
Expenditures in Producing, As Against His Liability For Value of , Oil or Minerals, 21
A.L.R.2d 380.
199. HM A-G v. Blake, [2000] E.M.L.R. 949 (H.L.). Lord Nicholls concluded that
the difference in remedies for intellectual property and tangible property is a
happenstance of history:
Considered as a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why equity required the
wrongdoer to account for all his profits in these cases, whereas the common law’s
response was to require a wrongdoer merely to pay a reasonable fee for use of
another’s land or goods. In all these cases rights of property were infringed. This
difference in remedial response appears to have arisen simply as an accident of
history.

Id. at 960.
200. See generally 53A Am. Jur. 2d § 7 Mines & Minerals (2006).
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precedent for traditional equitable remedies because the nature of the
unjust enrichment remedy can vary with the source of that cause of
action’s source of jurisdiction. A successful plaintiff can be awarded
unjust enrichment by at least five different routes: 201 by statute; 202 a
cause in action for assumpsit; 203 a cause in action for the tort of
conversion or trespass but in which the plaintiff waives the tort and sues
in assumpsit; 204 ancillary jurisdiction for a matter that justifies
jurisdiction in a court of equity under the clean-up doctrine; 205 and a
cause of action for conversion (among other causes of action) in a court
sitting in equity. 206 Of all five options, only those opinions from the
fifth option necessarily reflect remedies in equity while opinions from
the fourth option may reflect remedies at law or in equity.
CATEGORY II
BREACH

OF

FIDUCIARY DUTY. 207 Many state courts hold that the

201. Woerner, supra note 197, at 1.
The question dealt with in this annotation has arisen in actions for ejectment, of
trespass to try title, for conversion of minerals produced by the trespasser, for an
injunction to restrain continuing trespass and production of minerals in connection
with which an accounting was sought for the value of minerals previously produced,
and in separate actions for an accounting for the value of such minerals produced by
trespasser, in addition to actions in trespass.

Id.
202. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 21 F. Supp. 645 (D. Cal. 1937); Strathmore
Coal Mining Co. v. Bayard Coal & Coke Co., 116 A. 570 (Md. 1921).
203. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 128 cmt. 1 (1937).
204. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1957) (relating
to geophysical data).
205. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 558 (1923).
206. Pan Am. Petroleum and Transp. Co. v. U.S., 273 U.S. 456, 506 (1927); See
also United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 440 (1947).
207. Frank Snepp, Irreparable Harm 357 (U. Kan. Press) (1999). At times the
Snepp case is treated as an outlier or even as an ‘outlaw’ type of case, more suitable for
Category V, because it is said that Frank Snepp was forced to disgorge all of his book
royalties for his breach of fiduciary duty. In fact, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the district court to supervise a constructive trust. In his book on the litigation, Snepp
reveals that the district court did allow him to offset his federal income taxes
(approximately $56,000 of the $200,000 in total royalties) which is unusual given that
that expense is generally the most likely expense for a defendant to lose as an offset.
See United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1978); aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979); rev’d, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that state taxes
and expenses were not allowed to be offset). Accounting for a defendant’s unjust

58

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XII

remedy against an unfaithful or disloyal fiduciary agent is for the agent
to disgorge all agency fees received since the agent betrayed her duty.
The order for an agent to disgorge her fees can be mistaken for revenue
disgorgement. 208 However, the Restatement First has many provisions
which ensure that even a disloyal agent is reimbursed for necessary
expenditures. An agent who buys an asset in violation of the agent’s
duty to buy the asset on behalf of her principal is specifically allowed
reimbursement for purchase of the asset. 209 An agent that usurps a
corporate opportunity and leases an asset for herself is specifically
allowed reimbursement for her lease payment. 210
In addition, there are two corollaries to this doctrine that have been
misunderstood and misstated. The Second Circuit’s opinion in Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn, a highly regarded foundation case for calculating
unjust enrichment remedies, states that comment d to Section 158 of the
Restatement (First) of Restitution shows that a willful tortfeasor, as
constructive trustee, is often denied credit for his expenses.
Indeed a constructive trustee, who consciously misappropriates the
property of another, is often refused allowance even of his actual
expenses and although this harsh rule, which would charge the
defendants with the whole gross receipts, has been softened, a
plagiarist may not charge for his labor in exploiting what he has
taken. A fortiori he should not be allowed for the currency which his

enrichment presents a court with an interesting conundrum when the plaintiff is the U.S.
government, i.e., representing itself. Against any other plaintiff, the court might refuse
to offset the income tax payments on the basis that the plaintiff did not necessarily
benefit from the defendant’s expenditures. In the unusual case of the U.S. government
as plaintiff, the plaintiff in its IRS persona received the tax payments directly from the
defendant and therefore the defendant has a strong argument that he was not unjustly
enriched by the income tax payment. This may or may not have been the logic of the
district court’s decision in allowing Snepp’s federal income tax payments for offset but
denying offset for state income taxes paid.
208. Ellison v. Alley, 842 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1992); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d
229, 238 (Tex. 1999) (“It is the agent’s disloyalty, not any resulting harm, that violates
the fiduciary relationship and thus impairs the basis for compensation.”). But see
Boston Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Bernardo Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d 429, 435 (1st.
Cir. 1996) (noting that courts have the discretion to allow the agent to retain a portion of
her compensation if the agent can show that their conduct was not egregious and they
have met their burden of establishing the value of the agent’s services rendered).
209. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 194 cmt. b (1937).
210. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 195 cmt. e (1937).
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211

On the other hand, comment d to Section 158, “Improvements and
Additions,” states:
The common law rules with reference to the conversion of chattels,
however, made no allowance to the willful converter for additions
made, while protecting the innocent converter. Where the conduct of
the recipient was tortious although not intentionally wrongful,
normally would be entitled to restitution of his expenditures to the
extent that they increased the value of the subject matter if this is
land.

The Second Circuit opinion confuses expenditures with expenses.
Comments b and c of this section of the Restatement First state that even
an intentionally fraudulent defendant is entitled to compensation for
payment of real estate taxes and necessary repairs except under
extraordinary circumstances that ‘require the imposition of a penalty.’
Therefore, even the intentional defendant is entitled to credit for his
necessary expenses unless the court wishes to impose a penalty that case
law and statutes generally forbid as a part of remedies in equity. 212 By
confusing operating expenses with expenditures for improvements, the
Second Circuit strengthened the myth that revenue disgorgement is
some times applicable as a remedy in equity.
On the other hand, there is a provision in the Restatement (Second)
of Agency that specifically provides for the disgorgement of a
defendant’s revenues which most courts have chosen to ignore. 213
Section 403, comment c, provides that a disloyal agent who profits
improperly may not deduct the amount of any expenses that the agent

211. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939) aff’d,
309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940). See Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Commc’ns, 891
F. Supp. 935, 941-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Kamar Int’l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d
1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984); ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1169
(W.D. Wash. 1999); and Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852
(Okla. 1987) (“A constructive trustee who consciously misappropriates the property of
another is often refused allowance even of his actual expenses.”) (quoting misstatement
favorably).
212. Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. 1998) (“[T]he remedy of
disgorgement, much like that of a constructive trust, is meant ‘to provide just
compensation for the wrong, not to impose a penalty.’” (quoting Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940)).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 403 cmt. c (1958).
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incurred in acquiring the profit:
An agent who receives a bribe or otherwise profits improperly
cannot, in an action by the principal to recover it or its value, deduct
the amount of expense to which he has been put in acquiring it . . .
[l]ikewise, if an agent is one of a group of conspirators which
receives a profit as a result of a violation of the agent’s duty of
loyalty, he is subject to liability for the entire amount although he
receives none or only a portion of it.

This suggested rule has been widely followed in bribery cases,
particularly the bribery of government officials. 214 Otherwise, most
courts have chosen to allow offsets because revenue disgorgement
appears too harsh and a penalty rather than an equitable remedy:
But we think that save in exceptional cases such a rule is top harsh: it
imposes a naked penalty, based more on retribution than on the
equities of the situation. Stern though the law is in requiring an
agent to repay secret profits, it is not as harsh as to say that a
principal may recover more than the agent has profited. This is the
reasoning of a number of cases which declare that the net rather than
the gross profit realized by an agent should be the measure of
215
recovery. That is the reasoning we think we should adopt here.

CATEGORY III
Courts commonly hold that, in a claim for restitution or unjust
enrichment, the plaintiff has the duty to establish the defendant’s benefit
214. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201 (N.J. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952); S. T. Grand, Inc. v. New York, 298 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1973). But see Williams Elecs. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F.3d 569, 576 (7th. Cir.
2004) (“The victim of commercial bribery can obtain either his damages or the profits
that the bribe yielded. The total profits equal the amount of the bribe plus the revenues
generated by the bribe minus the cost of goods sold any other variable costs incurred in
making the sales.”).
215. Jay v. Gen. Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752, 755 (D.C. 1946) (citing Anderson
Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 20 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 1942); Sawyer v. Issenhuth, 141
N.W. 378 (S.D. 1913); Willis v. Van Woy, 20 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1945); Schwarting v.
Artel, 105 P.2d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940); Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312 (N.Y. 1873);
Judevine v. Hardwick, 49 Vt. 180 (Vt. 1876); see also United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d
193, 197 (4th Cir. 1987); Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 330 N.W.2d
192 (Wis. 1983). But see Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Surety Co., 290 N.W.
231 (Minn. 1940) (agreeing with Restatement (First) of Agency and disallowing truck
operating costs but allowing the cost of grain in grain sale revenue).
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or revenues related to the unjust act and the defendant must at least
initially carry the burden of establishing either apportionment, offsetting
expenses that should be debited against the revenue credits, or, if
applicable, both. Federal statutes relating to misappropriation or misuse
of copyrights or trademarks specifically maintain this schema for the
burden of proof.
Should the defendant fail to meet this burden, the court is entitled to
deny the defendant any offsets against the revenues established by the
plaintiff. Only the Second Circuit has specifically held that even when
the defendant fails to meet her burden of proof, the court should still
attempt to estimate the defendant’s costs of goods sold to reduce the
revenues. 216 Out of approximately 116 opinions, the court held the
defendant in default and ordered her to disgorge her revenues in 73
opinions. 217 In the remaining 43 opinions, 218 the court acknowledged
the default rule but approved an alternative estimate or rule of thumb to
establish the defendant’s benefit, generally measured by an estimate of
the defendant’s gross profit.
Category III can also include Professor Kull’s Restitution
Outlaws—generally defendants with unclean hands who have no right
for offsets or counter-restitution. In some cases, the net effect of the
monetary equivalent of rescission could also resemble revenue
disgorgement. In a fact situation wherein the defendant has fraudulently
sold a worthless product or service, the process of equitable rescission
would resemble that of a mass refund or revenue disgorgement. As the
asset is worthless and the plaintiff received no benefit, the plaintiff owes
no counter-restitution to the defendant and a defendant is not allowed to
offset any of her expenses of production against the sales revenues.

216. Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1989).
217. Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Am.
Honda Motor Co. v. Two Wheel Corp., 918 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1990); Alameda Films
v. Authors Rights Restoration Corp., 331 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2003) (These cases are
examples of typical federal appellate court opinions.).
218. Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341 (1st Cir. 1942); Murphy Door Bed Co.
Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v.
Renosky, 399 F.3d 168 (3d Cir., 2005) (typical opinions from federal appellate courts).
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CATEGORY IV
Disgorgement orders will be addressed in Part VII.
CATEGORY V
This group of case opinions is a group of disparate claims decided
generally in state courts. At times, discussion of the two principal cases
of Warren v. Century Bankcorporation and A & M Records is
accompanied by discussion of Berg Lumber. 219 Of the three cases, only
A & M Records has spawned a line of related cases (state claims for
misappropriation of intellectual property).
Part of the unusual nature of these cases may be due to the court’s
clear disapproval of the defendant’s actions. The court in A & M
Records condemns some of the defendant’s trial tactics and his repeated
breach of the court’s injunction; the language in Berg Lumber
approaches the level of bombast 220 and the calculation of the remedy
represents double and possibly triple counting for measuring
damages. 221 The court in Warren v. Century Bankcorporation also
seems offended by the defendant’s underlying acts. 222
Warren was a derivative action by minority shareholders for breach
of fiduciary duty and shareholder oppression. The opinion states in bold
capitalized capital letters that “[t]he award of damages in an amount
equal to ‘all income’ from the diverted loan business was neither clearly
contrary to the weight of the evidence nor to the applicable principles of
219.
220.

Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922 (Wyo. 2000).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40, illus. 15
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“Measurement of the grader’s use value at $75,000 is a
response to egregious misconduct; a more restricted measure of use value would be
appropriate against a less culpable defendant.”).
221. Cross, 7 P.3d at 935-36 (quoting Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741
P.2d 846, 852 (Okla. 1987)) (“The remedy in restitution rests on the ancient principle of
disgorgement. Beneath the cloak of restitution lies the dagger that compels the
conscious wrongdoer to ‘disgorge’ his gains.”). The remedy included applying a high
monthly rental rate for an extended period of twenty-seven months for a road grader.
The road grader was ordered to be returned to the plaintiff and all deferred maintenance
was to be funded by the defendant despite the high monthly rate that generally included
wear and tear. In all, the defendant paid $78,800 of unjust enrichment and returned the
road grader when the court acknowledged that the machine was initially purchased for
$19,700.
222. Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846 (Okla. 1987).
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equity jurisprudence.” 223 Thus the award of revenue disgorgement was
intentional but ill-conceived as the court stated that the object of
restitution “is to put the parties back into the position in which they were
before the tainted transaction occurred.” 224 After this remedy, the
position of the plaintiffs was enhanced and the position of the
defendants was clearly inferior to its position ex ante. 225
Warren cites a number of authorities which are either not on point
or whose support is equivocal. For example, the opinion in Tull
supports disgorgement of profits, not revenues. 226 Similarly, the support
from Porter is equivocal as the excess rents were not identified as the
defendant’s revenues. 227 The Oklahoma Supreme Court also repeats the
error made in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Sheldon regarding Section
158 of Restatement (First) of Restitution that has been previously
discussed. The Warren opinion also cites the bribery case opinion of
Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co. 228
Perhaps the weakest part of the Warren opinion occurred when the
court stated that “[t]his is not an action at law for conversion. Rather, it
was an equity suit for restitution to minority shareholders who sought
‘disgorgement’ of their ill-gotten gains made through the diverted loan
business.” 229 The opinion then proceeds to mix up its discussion of
disgorgement of profits with disgorgement of revenues. The court’s
most important justification appears to be that “[w]here a wrongdoer is
shown to have been a conscious, deliberate misappropriator of another’s
commercial values, gross profits are recoverable through a restitutionary
remedy.” 230 This rationale has two deficiencies: generally defendants do
not even disgorge their profits unless the plaintiff can prove that the
defendant’s acts were willful and intentional. 231 The consciousness or
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id. at 851-52.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 423 (1987), rev’g, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.

1985).
227. See infra Part V.A.
228. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 233-34 (N.J. 1952).
229. Warren, 741 P.2d at 852.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2,
cmt. d (Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000) (“Restitution in a proper case may strip a
defendant of all profits gained in a transaction with the plaintiff . . . . Such a result is
permissible only against a defendant whom the law treats as a conscious wrongdoer.”);
Id. at § 3, cmt. c (“Liability to disgorge profits is ordinarily limited to instances of
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deliberateness of a defendant’s actions does not trigger the right to
escalate the remedy from restitution of profits to restitution of revenue.
Second, the misappropriation of some forms of real property may be
afforded the extra deterrence of denying the defendant any offsets or
counter-restitution, an historical oddity that does not necessarily apply to
commercial intangible assets.
The Oklahoma court’s discussion of case law regarding intentional
trespass to minerals is accurate:
When a bad-faith trespasser enters upon the land of another in the
willful disregard of the rights of others and produces and takes oil
and gas from the premises, the measure of damage is the full value of
the property at the time of the conversion without deduction for the
232
cost of drilling and development.

The intentional trespass to minerals, largely remedied with specific
restitution for converted property, is not relevant to a claim for
shareholder oppression.
The opinion in A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman 233 was also cited in
Warren v. Century Bankcorporation. The defendant and his company
sold more than $4.3 million worth of tapes that were copied from pirated
recorded performances. It was established that the unauthorized copies
generated at least $729,337 in revenue attributable to performances
pirated from A & M Records.
The claim was brought for conversion in a state court because the
copyright act did not apply to these particular recordings. The plaintiff’s
claim of conversion was endorsed by the court, treating the conversion
of intangible assets as though it were the same as conversion of minerals
or a knowing improvement to someone else’s land:
On this basis the trial court entered judgment against Heilman in an
amount equal to the gross proceeds attributable to the sale of
recorded performances which were the property of A & M Records.
One who misappropriates the property of another is not entitled to
deduct any of the costs of the transactions by which he accomplished
his wrongful conduct. When one acquires proceeds from the sale of
property belonging to another the imposition of a constructive trust
conscious wrongdoing . . . . As an exception to this general rule, trustees and other
fiduciaries may be made liable for profits realized even as the result of an unintentional
breach of fiduciary duty.”).
232. Warren, 741 P.2d at 846.
233. A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554 (1977).

2007]

A DEFAULT RULE OF OMNIPOTENCE
on the proceeds is a proper remedy.

65

234

The opinion’s key assertion is that “[o]ne who misappropriates the
property of another is not entitled to deduct any of the costs of the
transactions by which he accomplished his wrongful conduct.” The
opinion’s citation to Ward v. Taggert is inapposite since that opinion
does not stand for disallowing all expenses, but rather only those
expenses directly related to the illegal or wrongful activity as some
expenses in that case were disallowed on the basis that the defendant had
not adequately substantiated the expenditures. 235 For example, if the
defendant violated the plaintiff’s copyright or trademark in a volume of
the defendant’s magazine, only the costs of actually misappropriating
the trademark or copyright would be disallowed, not the normal out-ofpocket expenses of editing, printing and distributing the magazine. 236
The Category I case law to which the opinion loosely refers is also better
explained by the application of specific restitution or property law rather
than revenue disgorgement.
It is problematic that the remedy in Ward was made on the theory
of quasi-contract. The plaintiff in that case claimed a tort, but the
California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s failure to prove
damages precluded a remedy on that theory. Then, the Court held that
on the basis of Section 2224 of the state Civil Code (as well as, or in
addition to, common law), the defendant would not be allowed to be
unjustly enriched from his misdeeds.
However structured or
rationalized, the claim and remedy remained in the court at law.
In direct contrast, however, A & M Records sought injunctive relief
and was awarded the remedy of a constructive trust from the trial court
sitting as a court in equity. The defendant was found liable for having
competed unfairly with A & M Records (under Section 3369 of
234.
235.

Id. at 570 (internal citations omitted).
Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959). The case of Ward v. Taggart
involves a real estate agent who obtained a secret profit from the sale of his clients’
property. In response to the defendant’s particular concerns about offsetting expenses,
the court indicated that the defendant had failed to satisfactorily substantiate the need
for them in the absence of his otherwise fraudulent actions. Id.
Since it is entirely speculative whether the commissions paid to Thomsen and Dawson
and the cost of the second escrow would have been paid by plaintiffs or Sunset had
the transaction been a legitimate one, it would be inequitable to permit Taggart to
deduct any of these expenses from plaintiffs’ recovery.

Id. at 539:
236. Id.
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California Civil Code) and was assessed damages. The court in equity
measured the constructive trust remedy to include both damages and
punitive damages. While it is true that a court in equity has jurisdiction
to award damages for claims ancillary to injunctive relief, such a remedy
would not constitute a constructive trust. Ignoring the issue of the
constructive trust, however, the opinion—shaky at best—would reflect a
holding at law on an ancillary matter before a court in equity that relies
on precedent from opinions of other courts at law.
This interpretation, which ignores the issue of the constructive trust,
offers no precedent for remedies in equity. The specific holding of
measuring the remedy as the defendant’s revenues without offset for
expenses is further undercut by the defendant’s failure to meet his
burden of proof of establishing expenses for offset:
Since the court found that defendants “failed to carry their burden of
proof with respect to such costs and expenses,” such costs and
expenses would be entirely speculative. It would therefore be
inequitable on this basis as well to permit Heilman to deduct them
237
from A & M Records’ recovery.

In light of this statement, the holding in A & M Records should be
restricted to the case facts.
Citation to the opinion in Church v. Bailey 238 also lends little
support as it largely provided an analysis of the liability of a constructive
trustee and the consequences of a trustee intermingling his property with
that of his trust. 239 Neither opinion provided any support for the implicit
theory that the common law treats the misappropriation of intangible
assets in the same manner as stolen goods or willful trespass to minerals.
Finally, A & M Records offers no precedential value because of the
defendant’s litigation tactics. The opinion mentions that one of the two
principal reasons for denying the defendant any offsetting credits was
the defendant’s failure to produce sufficient supporting evidence. 240
Furthermore, the court details the specific violations of the defendant in
his litigation demeanor:
The evidence in this case shows a continuous and intentional pattern
of misappropriation of property owned by others. (Compare Pen.
237.
238.
239.
240.

A & M Records, 75 Cal. App. 3d. at 569.
Church v. Bailey, 90 Cal. App. 2d 501 (1949).
Id. at 504-05.
A & M Records, 75 Cal. App. 3d. at 570 n.11.
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Code, 653h.) It also shows contempt of court, hindered discovery,
and an attempt to evade the injunctions of courts of this state as well
as those issued by courts of Wisconsin. Under such circumstances a
241
grant of punitive damages is clearly proper.

The award of punitive damages does not necessarily mean that
revenue disgorgement was awarded as a part of the punitive damages or
that the two decisions were entirely separate. However, the defendant’s
default in failing to produce documents or data and its violations of the
court’s injunctions are sufficient to eliminate any precedential value for
this opinion.
There have been subsequent cases in California state courts and the
Ninth Circuit that have affirmed the claim of misappropriation of
intangible assets for intellectual property outside the protection of
federal statutes, citing A & M Records favorably. One such subsequent
case, Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 242 granted
the remedy of revenue disgorgement because the defendant failed to
contest the remedy.
VII. AGENCY CLAIMS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
“‘Plaintiff,’ the tobacco companies protested, ‘apparently believes
that the more confusing he makes the law of restitution and indemnity
appear, the higher his likelihood of success.’” 243
The principal focus of this section on agency claims (SEC, CFTC,
DOE, FTC and FDA) for unjust enrichment is on the issue of whether
certain items are allowed to be offset. The article will not specifically
address issues relating to how the defendant’s revenue or credits should
be calculated. Given this distinction, two general issues are prominent.
(1) Inconsistency With Other Remedies In Equity
A district court’s jurisdiction is limited to traditional remedies in
equity for federal agency claims of unjust enrichment. Yet when the

241.
242.

Id. at 571.
Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio, Corp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.

1984).
243. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 868 (1999).
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opinions that discuss how the defendant’s unjust enrichment should be
measured, there is little to no mention of the abundant case law that is
available in other areas of the substantive law. Largely ignored is the
body of case law for claims relating to trade secrets, breaches of
fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud and misappropriation that can offer
helpful analogies for remedies in equity and as well as mixed claims for
violations of trademarks 244 or copyrights. 245 Totally ignored is the body
of case law for claims and remedies at law relating to claims for torts
and quasi-contrast which offer useful contrasts to analyze whether either
the claim, remedy, or both, would be more appropriate for a court at law
or a court in equity.
Only by ignoring this comparable case law could courts render
some of the existing opinions on measuring unjust enrichment in equity.
By restricting their attention only to cases relating to the implied claims
of federal agencies, some courts now regularly reject any offsets or
counter-restitution for the defendant when measuring unjust enrichment.
Other than the AVCO opinion in the Second Circuit and the Southern
District of New York, 246 most of the remaining opinions only grudgingly
allow the defendant to offset some incidental direct costs to measure the
defendant’s profit to be disgorged to the agency plaintiff.
Administrative costs and variable or fixed overhead are not allowed for
defendants against claims from the SEC and most other agencies. No
other body of case law exaggerates unjust enrichment in such a manner,
especially as interpreted by a court in equity.
To date, more than 240 federal and state cases (from both courts at
law and in equity) have been surveyed, comparing case opinions on the
deductibility of a proposed expense for the measurement of the
defendant’s unjust enrichment. Within the total group, 130 cases held
that one or more type of expense was deductible, 61 cases held that

244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3, cmt. d
(Discussion Draft, Mar. 31. 2000) (offering two illustrations for disgorgement,
including a copyright case, Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983)).
245. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (stating clearly that in regards to the violation of
trademarks the award of profits or damages is “subject to the principles of equity.” See
also Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000). For a
discussion of equitable foundations of copyright and patent law, see Root v. Ry. Co.,
105 U.S. 189 (1882) and Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390
(1940).
246. CFTC v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
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certain items were not deductible and 50 cases held that some items
were deductible and others were not deductible. 247
The following three tables confirm that a large body of case
opinions has accumulated for a variety of jurisdictions and covering a
variety of issues that allow the deduction or offset of most expenses for
production and administration. A significant number of cases have even
supported the minority position for deducting infringing expenses and
income taxes.
TABLE 1
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES RELATING TO OFFSETS FOR DEFENDANT’S
BENEFIT
COURT

DEDUCTIBLE

NON-DEDUCTIBLE

1st Circuit

11

5

2d Circuit

46

32

3d Circuit

19

14

4th Circuit

7

3

5th Circuit

15

3

6th Circuit

8

6

7th Circuit

14

8

8th Circuit

11

6

9th Circuit

29

20

10th Circuit

11

7

11th Circuit

3

5

Fed. Circuit

4

4

Supreme Court

7

5

185

118

Total

247. At best the sampling methods were informal. No claim is made that the group
of cases is necessarily representative of any particular group or sub-group.
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Table 2 shows the distribution of cases that allow or reject the
deduction of various types of expenses by category of expense:
TABLE 2
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES THAT ALLOW OR REJECT DEDUCTION OF
EXPENSES
CATEGORY OF EXPENSE
Administrative
Bad Debt
Depreciation
Distribution

DEDUCTIBLE

NON-DEDUCTIBLE

38

17

7

8

11

6

2

10

Infringing

13

22

Interest

22

3

Losses

6

11

Overhead

63

50

Production

97

19

Income Tax

31

24

Finally, Table 3 summarizes the number of state and federal cases
in the geographical confines of the Second Circuit that have approved or
rejected the deduction of various categories of expense. A second data
field shows the year of the most recent opinion in that group:
TABLE 3
FEDERAL & STATE CASES IN THE 2D CIRCUIT THAT APPROVE OR REJECT
EXPENSE DEDUCTIONS
CATEGORY
OF EXPENSE
Administrative
Bad Debt
Depreciation
Infringing
Interest
Overhead
Production
Income Tax

DEDUCTIBLE
Last Opinion
2003
1987
1944
1981
1944
2003
1998
1994

DEDUCTIBLE
Opinions
16
2
2
2
4
26
18
9

NONDEDUCTIBLE
Last Opinion
1985
1949
1985
1996
1944
1995
1990
1989

NONDEDUCTIBLE
Opinions
3
2
1
8
2
16
3
7
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At present, most opinions that address the issue of measuring the
defendant’s unjust enrichment approve the deduction of all direct or
variable costs that are related to the relevant revenue. There are
disagreements among some courts and the federal circuits are somewhat
split over whether (a) fixed overhead can be allocated, (b) both willful
and non-willful defendants can offset some form of overhead or
administrative costs, and (c) the defendant’s income taxes should be
deductible. The overall point, of course, is that most courts, including
the same courts that have heard most of the relevant federal agency
cases, permit the deduction of most of the defendant’s operating
expenses in measuring a defendant’s unjust enrichment.
For example, the Second Circuit is among the most liberal circuits
in allowing expenses to be deducted to measure unjust enrichment. The
Second Circuit has been a leading advocate of the deductibility of
income taxes 248 and of allocating fixed overhead. 249 The Second Circuit
is unique among the circuits in advocating that a court should estimate
the defendant’s gross profit if the defendant fails or is unable to produce
relevant accounting data rather than hold the defendant in default and
award the defendant’s revenues as unjust enrichment. 250 Yet the Second
248. For cases affirming the deduction of the defendant’s income taxes, see
Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith Detroit Corp., 73 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.1934),
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (C.D.N.Y. 1952), W.E.
Bassett Co v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970), Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v.
Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989), and In Design v. K Mart
Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994). For opinions denying the deduction of
the defendant’s income taxes, see Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 103 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp 586, 592 (C.D.N.Y.
1944), McNamara v. Powell, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 515 (Sup. 1944), Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951), Stuart v. Collins, 489 F. Supp.
827 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and Mfr. Tech., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 75, 84 (D. Conn.
1989).
249. Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Sheldon’s approach
has been consistently applied by this Court. In subsequent cases, we have assumed that
general overhead expenses were deductible and reviewed only the sufficiency of the
nexus between the expense and the infringing product . . . .”); U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde
Entm’t, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10985, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Fixed and other
overhead may be counted as a deductible expense provided that it ‘actually contributed
to’ supplying the product, even if the expense would still have been borne by the
defendant absent the infringement.”).
250. See Murphy Door Bed, 874 F.2d at 103 (“Even if Zarcone does not offer
evidence of his costs (as he has not heretofore), the court should estimate them based on
the evidence before it.”).
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Circuit denies these deductions to defendants for agency claims over the
same time period according to traditional remedies in equity.
State court opinions also have precedential or persuasive authority.
In a case filed by the Consumer Protection Division of Maryland against
three individuals, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held the following:
The Division also should deduct the payments Shpritz made to the
purchasers, albeit those payments were not in accordance with the
law. In so ruling, we do not condone the unlawful transactions, but
instead apply the rules for restitution rather than impose civil or
criminal penalties. By seeking to compel Shpritz to pay these
amounts again, the Division forsakes unjust enrichment for what are
in effect punitive damages . . . [a]ccordingly, the Division must
recalculate its restitution order to exclude the actual costs incurred by
251
Shpritz.

Agency remedies are also inconsistent between the different
agencies. The five agencies can be sorted into two groups: claims
against one or a series of transactions and claims against an ongoing
business operation.
The transactional group includes claims made by the SEC, CFTC
and Department of Energy that various defendants engaged in
transactions or a series of transactions that violated their statutes. With a
minimum of dispute all such agencies allow the most important offset:
the purchase price of the securities, commodity investment or
hydrocarbon that the defendant resold in an unjust manner. It is a given
that the agencies seek at most the defendants’ gross profit, not their
literal revenue or cash inflow. Various defendants sought to offset
smaller, related transaction costs and various forms of administrative
expenses but were generally denied all but some ancillary transactional
costs. In contrast, agencies like the FTC and the FDA generally seek the
equivalent of the defendants’ gross revenue and oppose any proposed
offsets requested by the defendants.
One possible explanation for the differences among agencies is that
the case law for each agency may follow a form of a ‘learning curve.’
Thus it appears that courts begin to narrow the definition of the
plaintiff’s remedy only after a significant number of cases have passed
that establish the agency’s basic right to implied jurisdiction. This may
be true for the legal staff of the agency and even for the firms that
represent various defendants against the agencies but a court’s
251.

Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 171 (Ct. App. Md. 2005).
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experience in one area of the substantive law should be cumulative with
the rest. The overall explanation may also lie with the fact that as long
as the defendant disputes the agency’s fundamental right to a claim for
implied jurisdiction, the court and the process is distracted from the
cumulative case law. Defense counsel has limited time and credibility
with the court; if counsel pursues the basic jurisdiction for the agency
(which in the last five years has been a consistently losing position
except in relation to RICO and RCRA), she may have insufficient time
or credibility to dispute the agency’s measure of restitution.
(2) Jurisdiction in Equity
The court sits in equity to hear an agency’s claim, but it appears
that sometime during the trial, the agency enlists the aide and sympathy
of the court to join the agency in achieving the goals of the agency’s
statutory scheme. Reading the case opinions in the FTC and FDA cases
seem to indicate an increasing inclination of the court to devise
remedies, equitable or not, that will help the deceived consumer the
most.
The main purpose of the agency’s statutes in implied jurisdiction is
to determine whether Congress limited the agency’s implied jurisdiction
to only certain remedies and to provide a basis to determine whether the
defendant’s enrichment was unjust.
The essential contradiction in most of the case law relating to
implied jurisdiction is that the agencies opt for the advantages of
jurisdiction in equity, but resist the concomitant obligation to conform
their remedies to traditional remedies in equity. In their discussion of
the appropriate measure of a defendant’s benefit or profit, the courts
frequently forget that a plaintiff is not even entitled to a defendant’s
unjust enrichment unless the plaintiff can establish that the unjust acts
were conducted willfully or knowingly. In the absence of establishing
such intent, the plaintiff would be entitled to, at most, a market rate of
rent or interest for the use of her asset. Similarly, the right of the
defendant to offset expenses or to claim counter-restitution is not
conditioned by the nature of the defendant’s unjust actions.
Perhaps the increasing awareness of the need to distinguish
restitution at law from restitution in equity will reverse this pattern as
courts are forced to conform to the Supreme Court’s opinions in Grupo
and Great-West. Claims filed by the SEC, CFTC and the DOE largely
seek disgorgement of un-segregated cash; these claims are increasingly
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likely to be challenged for failing to meet the standard set in Great-West
for identifiable or segregated assets or funds of cash. Furthermore, the
agency’s claim will be evaluated as a whole such that if the agency
seeks personal liability for the defendant or proposes to calculate the
restitution in a manner suggesting punitive relief, the claim is even less
likely to found compatible with traditional restitution in equity.
The agencies can still claim that their claims are merely ancillary to
the requested injunctive relief and that the clean-up doctrine would
allow jurisdictions to provide complete relief. However, the previous
parts of the article have shown that courts are increasingly willing to
challenge the appropriateness of the injunctive relief and increasingly
unwilling to accept the labels asserted for causes of action at face value.
Another key issue will relate to the Supreme Court’s holding in Tull that
a claim for $22 million and other injunctive relief should be viewed as a
remedy at law for $22 million with the injunctive relief added merely for
cover. 252
Agencies like the FTC and FDA largely seek a different type of
remedy and they are likely to experience a similar but less intense set of
problems. While the FTC and FDA use a number of different labels for
their proposed remedies, they seek rescission which is less at odds with
the standard for equitable relief in Great-West. However, the FTC and
FDA have sought a version of rescission that omits the counterrestitution that is normally required in equitable rescission.
Implied jurisdiction claims do have some significantly positive
attributes. They offer class-action type relief that could take less time
and provide greater efficiency for consumers and investors who would
otherwise find little recourse for their legitimate claims of fraud and
misrepresentation. Over time, it will be interesting to see if agency
lawyers avoid the inherent dangers of conflicts-of-interest in such a
setting or if they just end up straddling other types of conflicts between
the interest of the consumer and the interest of the government or
agency.
A. Securities and Exchange Commission
While the courts probably consider as many or more ERISA cases
than SEC cases, the SEC seems to be regarded as the “trail blazer” for

252. See also King Mechanism & Eng’g Co. v. W. Wheeled Scrapper Co., 59 F.2d
546, 547 (7th Cir. 1932).
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agencies in the area of implied jurisdiction. 253 Much of this image may
be owed to the early SEC cases relating to Texas Gulf Sulphur and its
progeny that first established a federal district court’s jurisdiction for
securities claims. 254 Cases relating to implied jurisdiction for the SEC
have frequently been cited for other agencies.
The SEC is a powerful advocate for its view of the law in equity as
it ‘prosecutes’ a large number of cases each year that relate to
restitution/unjust enrichment. Given the confusion that prevails about
the subject, this voice is likely to gain influence, regardless of the
accuracy of its message. Consider the following description of the
SEC’s litigation tactics from the Securities Enforcement Manual from
the A.B.A. Business Law Section that was quoted by the Southern
District of New York:
The SEC often takes a broad view as to what constitutes illicit
profits. Thus, in negotiating a disgorgement remedy with the staff,
counsel may find that the staff argues for a very broad loss causation
concept, refuses to recognize the fairness of netting profits and losses
from allegedly illegal transactions, and resists the deductibility of
various expenses. In contrast, the courts tend to take a more realistic
approach as to what constitutes ‘illegal’ profits, and have accepted
255
the propriety of netting gains against losses.

253. CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, n.9 (3d Cir. 1993).
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act grants the courts equitable powers to
enforce that Act. Though the Commodity Exchange Act has no provision similar to
Section 27, courts have found support for disgorgement in CFTC actions by relying
on the general equity power of the federal courts. Moreover, the rationale supporting
disgorgement in actions under the securities laws - that allowing a violator to retain
the profits from his violations would frustrate the purposes of the regulatory scheme,
see e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971)—holds true in the context of the Commodity Exchange
Act.

Id.
254. Texas Gulf Sulpher, 446 F.2d at 1307 (“[E]ven though no specific statutory
authority exists” which granted the SEC the power to authorize the appointment of
receivers under the Exchange Act, the courts of appeals have nonetheless upheld the
exercise of such equity power by the district courts.”). See also SEC v. Dibella, 409 F.
Supp. 2d. 122, 130-31 (2d. Cir. 2006) (noting that despite amending the securities laws
significantly in 1995 and 2002, Congress nevertheless declined to limit or eliminate the
SEC’s exercise of implied jurisdiction in seeking and obtaining disgorgement orders. In
fact, Congress recognized the practice as both necessary and important.)
255. SEC v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *24 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing The Securities Enforcement Manual, A.B.A. Business Law Section at 197
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Like the CFTC and the DOE, the SEC generally does not claim
revenue disgorgement as it measures the defendant’s benefit or profit net
of the cost of the securities sold. For example, suppose a defendant
bought 1,000 shares of stock for $10 per share and thereafter committed
acts that violated the securities statutes which resulted in the sale of
those same shares for $50 per share or $50,000. The SEC would claim
unjust profits of about $40,000, not $50,000.
In 1990, the Western District of New York’s opinion in SEC v.
Thomas James Associates, Inc. attempted to clarify the central issue of
the limits to the court’s jurisdiction or authority:
In fixing the measure and amount of disgorgement, I may not invoke
the equitable power of the court in order to inflict a penalty or effect
forfeiture; the amount to be disgorged must be “causally related to
the wrongdoing.” Such amount, however, need not be figured with
perfect precision; “disgorgement need only be a reasonable
256
approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.”
The SEC further argues, however, that the amount to be disgorged
by defendants is the entire amount of excessive markups, because the
measure of disgorgement is the injury to the market, and because
only the gross profits, unadjusted for expenses, adequately reflect
such injury. The SEC’s argument simply misconstrues both the
nature and extent of the equitable power of the Court to order
257
disgorgement.

The court held that it has the discretion to allow some types of
expenses to be deducted or offset in the unjust enrichment calculation.
Compared to the Second Circuit’s holding in Murphy Door Bed, this

(1997)).
256. 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (quoting SEC v. First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d 1215,
1230 (1989)).
257. In re Alpha Telecom, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at *26-27 (D. Or.
2004) (citing Thomas James, 738 F. Supp. at 92-94 (“Disgorgement may not
exceed the amount by which the agent was unjustly enriched, plus interest.”));
Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp.
846, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Any further sum would constitute a penalty
assessment.”); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“To the extent an
agent necessarily and reasonably incurred expenses to earn the commissions he
must now disgorge, a setoff may be appropriate in some instances. Otherwise,
disgorgement might exceed the amount by which the agent was unjustly
enriched.”).
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opinion seems a tame statement of the law. 258
Perhaps with the encouragement of the SEC, a couple of subsequent
opinions took strong objection to the Southern District’s statement:
In support of this proposition, Defendants rely primarily on SEC v.
Thomas James Associates, Inc., in which the court held that a court
ordering disgorgement “may consider as an offset the expenses
incurred by defendant in garnering such unjust enrichment.” The
Court agrees with the SEC that this case does not reflect the
“overwhelming weight of authority holding that securities law
violators may not offset their disgorgement liability with business
259
expenses.”

Even though the SEC gained the support of the District Court of the
District of Columbia and the Fifth Circuit 260 for the position that no
direct incidental expense should offset the measure of defendant’s
profits, it appears that the trend has turned against the view recently. In
2002, the Southern District handed down two opinions that may settle
this. First, the Southern District disputed the SEC’s assertion about the
“overwhelming weight of authority,” at least within the Southern
District, as “[c]ourts in this Circuit consistently hold that a court may, in
its discretion, deduct from the disgorgement amount any direct
transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions that plainly reduce the
wrongdoer’s actual profit.” 261 Later in 2002, the SEC conceded that its
authority is not overwhelming.
Seemingly in response to the
defendant’s claims for a larger number of offsets, the SEC claimed that
it was widely acknowledged that only certain kinds of expenses could be
offset, as “[t]he SEC cit[ed] a number of cases for the proposition that in
disgorgement cases (as opposed to civil penalty cases) only certain
expenses, such as brokerage commissions, may be deducted from the
amount to be disgorged.” 262
The impact of this opinion still only relates to direct incidental
expenses and specifically proscribes administrative expenses or any

258. Murphy Door Bed Co. Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1989).
259. SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 1998) (internal
citations omitted).
260. SEC v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 Fed. Appx. 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2004).
261. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *14.
262. SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
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allocations of overhead. This position of the Southern District is at odds
with other Southern District opinions for other areas of the law that
litigate the definition of “profit” for the purposes of calculating unjust
enrichment. 263 Only two years later, the same jurisdiction ruled that the
CFTC’s measure of the defendant’s unjust enrichment should include
administrative and overhead expenses. 264
As plaintiffs for unjust enrichment, the agencies, especially the
SEC, FTC and FDA, secure profit definitions that are much more
favorable to the plaintiff than would be found in other areas of the
substantive law. Three main issues, however, remain to restrain the
agencies’ restrictive measures:
(1) The district courts enjoy wide discretion in how unjust
enrichment or benefits or profits should be defined; 265
(2) Courts acknowledge the need to distinguish between legally
and illegally obtained profits; 266
(3) Disgorgement awards should not be punitive. 267
263. Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999).
Sheldon’s approach has been consistently applied by this Court. In subsequent cases,
we have assumed that general overhead expenses were deductible and reviewed only
the sufficiency of the nexus between the expense and the infringing product . . . . In
Design v. K Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994), for example,
concerned a copyright holder’s challenge to the district court’s conclusion that certain
overhead expenses (including rent, advertising, payroll, shipping, and store supplies)
were deductible from gross profits.”).

Id. (internal citations added).
264. CFTC v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
265. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 812 (1997) (“The district court has broad discretion not only in determining
whether or not to order disgorgement but also in calculating the amount to be
disgorged.”).
266. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Since
disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may exercise its
equitable power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing.”); SEC v.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d
1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 121 (D.D.C. 1993) (“‘The
court may exercise its equitable power only over property causally related to the
wrongdoing.’ First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1231. As such, ‘the loss complained of must
proceed directly and proximately from the violation claimed and not be attributable to
some supervening cause.’”); SEC v. Sekhri, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13289 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
267. First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1230 (“In fixing the measure and amount of
disgorgement, I may not invoke the equitable power of the court in order to inflict a
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For cases of implied jurisdiction, the offsets that the SEC has
objected to on an individual basis include the following:
(1) TRANSACTION COSTS. Until recently, the SEC objected to
even incidental transaction costs underlying the unjust
activities, including broker fees and transfer taxes. In
disputes, this item is the most likely for courts to approve as
an offset. 268
penalty or effect a forfeiture; the amount to be disgorged must be ‘causally related to
the wrongdoing.’”); SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Disgorgement
is remedial and not punitive. The court’s power to order disgorgement extends only to
the amount with interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing. Any
further sum would constitute a penalty assessment.”); SEC v. World Gambling Corp.,
555 F. Supp. 930, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Sroka properly argues that disgorgement serves somewhat different purposes from
those served by joint-tortfeasor liability. While disgorgement functions primarily to
prevent a party’s unjust enrichment and thereby to deter improper conduct, joint
liability serves primarily to make whole the injured party, and in the process to punish
if necessary any one legally responsible. To the extent that joint liability requires
payment of a sum greater than the profits unlawfully gained by the fraudulent
transactions, it is a penalty and is therefore improper.

Id.; See also Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992); SEC v. Shah,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Allowing a deduction for reasonable brokers’ commissions incurred in making insider
trades is consistent with the view in the Second Circuit that disgorgement is not a
penalty assessment, but merely a means of divesting a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.
[Defendant] has already paid the commissions to his broker. Requiring him now to
disgorge an amount equal to those commissions would penalize him by compelling
him to pay the commissions twice.

Id.
268. Herrmann v. Steinberg, 812 F.2d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that incidental
transaction expenses incurred in purchasing stock are deductible from defendant’s
disgorgement of short-swing profits under Section 16(b)); Oliff v. Exch. Int’l Corp.,
669 F.2d 1162, 1168 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 915 (1981); SEC v.
Alliance Leasing Corp., 28 Fed. App’x 648 (9th Cir. 2001); Litton Indus., 734 F. Supp.
at 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 967 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1992) (“To
require disgorgement of all fees and commissions without permitting a reduction for
associate expenses and costs constitutes a penalty assessment and goes beyond the
restitutionary purpose of the disgorgement doctrine.”); Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10347, at *14; SEC v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *14 (“Courts in this
Circuit consistently hold that a court may, in its discretion, deduct from the
disgorgement amount any direct transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions, that
plainly reduce the wrongdoer’s actual profit.”); SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc.,
738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); Alpha Telcom, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20002, at *18 (D. Or. 2002). But see SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp.
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(2) OTHER DIRECT EXPENSES. This category is meant to include
other direct costs of production underlying the unjust
activities. The SEC continues to object to these expenses
generally on the basis that they should be regarded as
infringing expenditures and as such should not be offset as a
matter of public policy. 269
(3) INFRINGING EXPENSES. While there is a line of cases that
hold that certain items of infringing expenses should not be
offset against revenues, that distinction has generally been
narrowly drawn and largely restricted to the compensation
of the business owners. To date, the agencies have
convinced the courts to broaden this category to most or all
of the proposed offsets in any one case. 270
(4) GENERAL BUSINESS EXPENSES. This category includes direct
or variable administrative expenses and allocated overhead.
Most courts do not measure profit in SEC cases by
deducting expenses for variable administrative expenses to
calculate unjust enrichment for other areas of the law and
some permit allocated overhead. 271
211, 214-15 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (rejecting deductions from the disgorgement amount for
overhead, commissions, and other expenses).
269. SEC v. Rosenfeld, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A
court may in its discretion, deduct from the gross profits certain expenses incurred
while garnering the illegal profits, including correspondence and related expenses and
transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions.”); SEC v. Bocchino, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22047, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that the court has discretion to deduct
certain expenses incurred while garnering the illegal profits, including correspondence
and related expenses, and transaction costs such as brokerage commissions).
270. SEC v. TLC Inv. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting
that defendant is not entitled to offset expenses in carrying out a fraudulent scheme);
SEC v. Cavanagh, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13372, at *102 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Defendants are not entitled to deduct costs associated with committing their illegal
acts.”).
271. SEC v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214-15 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(rejecting deductions from the disgorgement amount for overhead, commissions, and
other expenses; criticizing Thomas James for equating disgorgement with restitution);
SEC v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *16 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
(“Commissions should be distinguished from general business expenses, such as
overhead expenses, which should not reduce the disgorgement amount.”); SEC v.
World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (offsetting “transfer
taxes” but not overhead costs), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1112 (1984); SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *8
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(5) INCOME TAXES. Most courts do not permit this expense to be
offset. Outside of implied jurisdiction, the circuits have
split over this issue although recently the Federal Appeals
Circuit handed down an opinion against offsetting income
taxes that may resolve some of the dispute. 272
(6) SETTLEMENTS WITH OTHER PARTIES. Other than the purchase
price of stock sold, settlements with other parties may be the
largest single potential offset for any one case. The issue
can sometimes be confused with the fact question of
whether the proposed offset represents a settlement on the
existing unjust act or practice. Assuming that the settlement
is related, the majority opinion is that settlements can be
offset. 273
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002) (“Moreover, general business expenses may not be subtracted
from the amount to be disgorged.”).
272. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2002) (“Brandon finally argues that the $254,523.35 figure should be reduced by
$84,180.85 paid in taxes. This argument ignores the clear dictate of the statute that the
gross amount of pecuniary gain be paid and thus must be rejected.”); Alpha Telcom,
Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at *31 (“The agents request a setoff for taxes paid
on the income they are now being required to disgorge. That request is denied. It is a
matter between the agents and the IRS (or state officials). The court will not
interfere.”); see also Nike Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 138 F.3d 1437, 1448 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (citing Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1169-71 (6th Cir.
1980)).
273. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1450 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 812 (1997) (holding that a settlement in separate class action is offset for
calculation of unjust enrichment.); SEC v. Chem. Trust, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19786,
at *34 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“Likewise, funds that the FBI seized from ACC, $26,940.28,
pursuant to a seizure warrant issued in a parallel criminal investigation may inure at a
later time to the benefit of the defrauded investors herein. To the extent those funds do
inure to the benefit of investors, they should be credited against ACC’s accounting.”);
Alpha Telcom, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at*32-33 (“Many agents say they
are being sued by former clients, and contend they should not also be liable for
disgorgement. I disagree. The injuries sustained by the former clients are entirely
distinct from the commissions that the agent received. The agent can be liable for
both.”). But see Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1993). (“Appellants should
not be allowed to keep ill-gotten gains merely because the investors recovered some of
the money from Alliance in the bankruptcy proceeding.”); SEC v. Alliance Leasing
Corp., 28 Fed. App’x 648, 652 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Appellants argue that the district court
should have reduced the disgorgement by the amounts investors recovered from
Alliance in the bankruptcy proceeding. Disgorgement prevents unjust enrichment,
requires return of ill-gotten gains and is independent of other remedies.”); SEC v. Penn
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(7) UNPROVEN EXPENSES. Throughout litigation on remedies in
equity, there is almost unanimous agreement that the
plaintiff must carry the burden of proving the defendant’s
revenues (subject to the willingness of the defendant to
produce internal financial statements) and that the defendant
must first carry the burden of proving suitable offsets and
apportionments. Should the defendant default and fail to
substantiate the offsets, most jurisdictions award the
defendant’s revenues by default. Recently, the Second
Circuit has suggested a departure from this tradition to the
effect that the Court should still try to estimate the
defendant’s costs of goods sold. However, that remains a
minority position. 274
A number of precedents can be cited to support the view that
infringing expenditures should not be offset. One of the earlier opinions
in this area was in the Supreme Court opinion in Callaghan v. Myers, 275
in which the court held that the salaries of the two owners of the
company infringing a copyright should not be offset because of their
infringing activities. It should be noted that the opinion did not hold that
all salaries, or even all executive salaries, were ineligible. In other areas
Central Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 599 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (“It is analogous to a malpractice
claim against a surgeon. He may be required to refund the amount paid for the surgery
and also be liable for any injury sustained by the patient.”).
274. SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 122 n.16 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Defendant has
merely asserted a bald figure and has made no attempt to substantiate it.”); SEC v.
Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that a CEO who fraudulently
diverted corporate funds for personal use was ordered to disgorge the money he stole.
The court denied a setoff for expenses incurred in perpetrating the fraud, such as
payments made to co-conspirators. The CEO also argued that he should be required to
return only the money still in his possession; he had donated some to his favorite
charities, and spent some to expand his stamp collection. The court understandably
denied that request.); SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12580, at *78
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Such compensation is more appropriately considered as a general
business expense, than an indirect transactional expense incurred in connection with the
trading of USE securities.” The court also refused deduction of expenses insufficiently
substantiated); SEC v. Breed, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7336 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that
a court has discretion to deduct certain business expenses but the defendant in that case
failed to provide sufficient substantiation of the expenses under consideration).
275. 128 U.S. 617, 663-64 (1888); see also City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson
Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139 (1877) (showing that the case stands on a different
footing from that of the salaries of the managing officers of a corporation, as in Rubber
Company v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788 (1869)).
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of the substantive law, courts continue to deny infringing activities for
offset, but the infringing activities are generally defined narrowly and
largely relate to salaries for the key offending parties or the owners of
the defendant business. 276
For example, if a magazine violates the copyright by including a
protected photograph or series of photographs in a small portion of one
issue, not all production costs of that issue are regarded as infringing
activities. In one such case, Sygma Photo News, Inc. v High Society
Magazine, Inc., the Second Circuit held that only the costs of making the
copyright violation more difficult to discover should be disallowed as an
infringing expense. 277
276. For a case that approved the deduction of some or all of the defendant’s
infringing expenses, see Rubber Co., 76 U.S. at 803-804. See also Sammons v. Larkin,
38 F. Supp. 649 (C.D. Mass. 1940); John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 58
F. Supp. 586 (C.D.N.Y. 1944); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674,
678-79 (C.D.N.Y. 1952); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981); East &
West Coast Serv. Corp. v. Papahagis, 344 Pa. 183 (1942); Stromberg Motor Devices
Co. v. Detroit Trust Co., 44 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1930); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp
Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941); McGaffee v. McGaffee, 58 N.W.2d. 357 (Iowa
1953); Health Indus., Inc. v. European Health Spas, 489 F. Supp. 860, 869 (D.S.D.
1980); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P. C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252
(C.D. Neb. 1982); Luce v. Hanrahan, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 2775 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005);
and Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1983). But see City of
Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 142 (1877); Callaghan v.
Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); Sammons v. Larkin, 38 F. Supp. 649 (C.D. Mass. 1940);
Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); McNamara v. Powell, 52
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674
(C.D.N.Y. 1952); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970);
Elnicky Entert., Inc. v. Spotlight Presents, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.
1985); Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Project
Strategies Corp. v. Nat’l Commc’ns Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156. (E.D.N.Y.
1997); Duro Co. of Ohio v. Duro Co. of New Jersey, 56 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1932);
Dickinson v. O. & W. Thum Co., 8 F.2d 570. (6th Cir. 1925); Ellison v. Alley, 842
S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1992); Durbin Brass Works, Inc. v. Schuler, 532 F. Supp. 41 (E.D.
Mo. 1982); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); S. C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. v. Drop Dead Co., 210 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Aalba-Dent, Inc. v.
Certified Alloy Prods, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 326 (N.D. Cal 1979); Frank Music
Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985); Julius Hyman &
Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 233 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1951).
277. Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc’y Magazine, Inc., 778 F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d
Cir. 1985) (noting that the Second Circuit held that the trial court properly allowed an
expense deduction for the entire $42,882 spent on photograph separations). The court
said that of this amount, $1,280 was attributable to the cost of readying the infringing
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Overall, while there have been some opinions adverse to the court’s
discretion to allow deductions and those that have rejected proposed
deductions because of the particular nature of the expense, 278 the
majority of the opinions appear to be divided between those that hold
that the court has the discretion to allow deductions or that the court
must allow appropriate deductions. 279
Some cases have also allowed deductions or offsets for certain
other types of expenditures or payments. Most important to the
defendant is the issue of credit for payments or settlements made on the
same issue. Most disgorgement orders provide credit for payments or
reimbursements. While the District Court in Oregon did affirm similar
credit, it stated that such payments should generally be considered
separate from a calculation for unjust enrichment:

cover photo for publication in the infringer’s sex-oriented magazine, but that a similar
amount would have to have been spent to prepare any cover photo for reproduction.
The Second Circuit further held that the trial court erred in not allowing a deduction for
any portion of the retouching expenses, which totaled $20,266 for the entire magazine.
The court said that expenses incurred in order to make an infringement more difficult to
discover—as opposed to those that the infringer incurs in altering an original for some
other purpose but that have the incidental effect of concealing—are not reasonable
expenses and are therefore not deductible. Noting that the trial court apparently found
that the infringers retouched the background of the copyrighted photograph in order to
defeat the copyright owner’s rights, and that the record indicated that this was a finding
to which it was appropriate to defer, the appellate court concluded that it was therefore
proper to disallow 20% of retouching expenses. Id.
278. SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that in
Benson, a CEO who fraudulently diverted corporate funds for personal use was ordered
to disgorge the money he stole.) The court denied a setoff for expenses incurred in
perpetrating the fraud, such as payments made to co-conspirators. The CEO also
argued that he should be required to return only the money still in his possession; he
had donated some to his favorite charities, and spent some to expand his stamp
collection. The court understandably denied that request. Id. See also SEC v.
Cavanagh, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13372, at *102 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Defendants are
not entitled to deduct costs associated with committing their illegal acts.”); SEC v. TLC
Inv. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that defendant was
not entitled to offset expenses in carrying out a fraudulent scheme); Bilzerian, 814 F.
Supp. at 122 n.16 (“Defendant has merely asserted a bald figure and has made no
attempt to substantiate it.”).
279. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); SEC v. Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v.
McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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Many agents say they are being sued by former clients, and contend
they should not also be liable for disgorgement. I disagree. The
injuries sustained by the former clients are entirely distinct from the
commissions that the agent received. The agent can be liable for
both. It is analogous to a malpractice claim against a surgeon. He
may be required to refund the amount paid for the surgery, and also
280
be liable for any injury sustained by the patient.

The court’s point that a plaintiff’s damages and payments made to others
by the defendant are separate is sound, but disgorgement is not based on
damages, rather it is based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment.
There are numerous examples in which the Southern District of
New York makes different holdings in implied jurisdiction cases than it
has in most other opinions relating to equitable remedies. It has held
that income taxes would not be an appropriate offset 281 in implied
jurisdiction (contradicting its position in copyright or trademark
cases 282 ), and the McCaskey opinion distinguished transactional
expenses which were appropriate for deduction and general business
expenses, like overhead, which were not allowed 283 (contradicting its
280. In re Alpha Telcom, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20002, at *33 (D. Or. 2002)
(internal citations omitted).
281. SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 29, 2002).
282. For a case approving the deduction of the defendant’s income taxes, see
Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Zenith Detroit Corp., 73 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1934).
See also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 108 F. Supp. 674, 678-79 (C.D.N.Y.
1952); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970); Murphy Door
Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989); In Design v. K
Mart Apparel Corp., 13 F.3d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Macbeth Evans Glass Co.
v. L.E. Smith Glass Co., 23 F.2d 459, 463 (3d Cir. 1927); Harris v. Miller, 57 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Stetson Co., 58 F. Supp. at 592; McNamara v. Powell, 52
N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1944 ); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99, 106 (2d Cir. 1951); Stuart v. Collins, 489 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mfrs.
Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 75, 84 (D. Conn. 1989).
283. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *16 n.6 (“Commissions should be
distinguished from general business expenses, such as overhead expenses, which should
not reduce the disgorgement amount.”). See, e.g., SEC v. Rosenfeld, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1133-34; SEC v. World
Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (offsetting “transfer taxes” but not
overhead costs); Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *8 (“Moreover,
general business expenses may not be subtracted from the amount to be disgorged.”);
SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12580, at *78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Such
compensation is more appropriately considered as a general business expense, than an

86

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XII

position on allocating overhead as an offset for copyright or trademark
calculations for unjust enrichment). 284 The Southern District even
established a new form of expense or offset; the Court in SEC v. Credit
Bancorp, Ltd. distinguished expenditures and “pass throughs” which it
approved for deduction. 285
B. Department of Energy
Perhaps forgotten is the considerable success that the Department of
Energy enjoyed in asserting claims for unjust enrichment relating to
violations of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. In fact, the very
success of that campaign has lead to its greatest problem: how to
distribute the large amount of awards and settlements that the defendants
disgorged. The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (“ESA”) authorized
the President to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries, and to
establish priorities for use and allocation of petroleum products.286
Pursuant to this Act, the executive branch established a multi-tiered
structure for the pricing of oil, which provided a much higher price for
newly discovered oil than for proven reserves. The gap between the two
prices provided sufficient incentive for substantial cheating by
petroleum opportunists who increased the value of their holdings by
‘converting’ cheaper old oil into new oil.
The problem was that the litigation gained more in awards than
could be reasonably distributed in restitution to the consumers who
could be identified as deserving re-payment. First, Congress passed the
“Warner Amendment” 287 which gave the DOE authority to disburse
unclaimed funds to various state agencies. Thereafter, in 1986,
Congress passed another statute to distribute the excess accumulation:
indirect transactional expense incurred in connection with the trading of USE
securities.”). The . . . court also refused the deduction of expenses that were not
sufficiently substantiated. Id.
284. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
285. Credit Bancorp, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20597, at *6-7.
The other funds were never intended to pay Brandon, nor did he have any control over
those funds. He did not choose whether to pay the CBL employee’s salary, the CBL
rent or the expenses. Instead, CBL made those decisions and Brandon was a mere
conduit for paying CBL’s bills. As a result, these three categories cannot contribute to
Brandon’s gross pecuniary gain.

Id.
286.
287.

Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970).
Warner Amendment of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 155, 96 Stat. 1830 (1982).
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Reflecting the increasing accumulation of escrow funds, the Warner
Amendment was superseded by the Petroleum Overcharge
Distribution and Restitution Act of 1986 (“PODRA”). In enacting
PODRA, Congress referred to the billions of dollars that had
accumulated and for which restitution to the persons injured was not
possible. PODRA requires the DOE to reserve sufficient funds to
make restitution to those who suffered the actual losses, and to pay
288
the excess to federal and state treasuries “as indirect restitution”.

In turn, this led to the situation that a government agency was
collecting billions of dollars in unjust enrichment awards against
defendant oil companies even though less than twenty percent of the
awards were actually paid in restitution to the victims of the unjust acts.
The case of Texas American Oil Corp. v. United States Department
of Energy 289 involved a defendant that was found unjustly enriched for
having violated the pricing structure but that filed for bankruptcy
protection before the government was able to collect the award. The
specific case related to the priority of the unjust enrichment award in
relation to the debtor’s other creditors. The Federal Circuit held that any
form of restitution that either exceeds the plaintiff’s losses, flows to the
government rather than the victims of the unjust act, or does both, is
considered a penalty, not an equitable remedy, and therefore deserves a
lower priority in bankruptcy than the claims of creditors that actually
lost money. 290
This opinion is based on the fundamental and mistaken assumption
that the ‘restitution’ provided for in Section 209 of ESA was the same as
that for criminal restitution or compensating damages.291 It contradicts
the definition stated by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals:
“The central purpose of restitution is to determine the amount by which
the wrongdoer has been unjustly enriched and then to make him
disgorge that amount. No proof is required that the plaintiff was
damaged, much less the amount of any damage.” 292
288. Tex. Am. Oil Corp. v. U.S. DOE, 44 F.3d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal
citations omitted).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1571.
291. Id. at 1569. (“Restitution is an equitable remedy whereby the wrongdoer is
required to restore the injured person to the situation that prevailed before the wrong
was committed. There must be some relationship between the person injured and the
recipient of the recovery.”) (citations omitted).
292. United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 854 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 773
F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v.
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In passing, it is interesting to note the opinions in two cases on this
form of revenue disgorgement. First, unjust enrichment was calculated
on the basis of the defendant’s gross profit: revenues less the purchase
price for the oil. In a related area of natural gas regulation, the Fifth
Circuit held that disgorgement without offsetting the purchase price of
the natural gas sold would be an intolerable penalty:
We can see no way to characterize the “disgorgement” remedy in the
present case as anything other than a penalty. Refunding to FGT all
of the revenues from Coastal’s intrastate sales exceeds both the
injury to FGT’s interstate customers and the unjust enrichment of
Coastal. Coastal not only forfeits all of its profits, but it is also
denied any payment whatsoever for the gas, including the
293
recoupment of costs.

The second case relates to whether the DOE’s claim against the
defendant should be $711,352,450.17 or $210,736,532.92 and which
method of calculation would be appropriate: 294
As a result of the defendants’ crude oil purchase and sale policies
and practices of miscertification, profits were realized by the
defendants of $210,736,532.92. This sum of $210,736,532.92
allows the defendants credit for sales of uncontrolled (stripper or
foreign) crude oil as well as some other crude oil which defendants
sold for substantially less per barrel price than it paid, which was
295
brought about principally by the tier price averaging scheme . . . .

For the defendant Robert Sutton, who owned and controlled the
company, the bad news of the opinion was in the second issue of the
case, wherein he was held personally liable.
Congress passed additional legislation to create the Department of
Energy, which now specifically provides for the agency to file civil
actions for the defendants to make restitution. A recent case
demonstrates that confusion over the term ‘restitution’ allows the DOE
to combine the advantages of restitution at law and restitution in equity.
In Houston Oil & Refining, Inc. v. United States Federal Energy

Edwards, 669 F.2d 717, 722 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982)).
293. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 782 F.2d 1249, 1253 (5th Cir. 1986). See
also Cox v. FERC, 581 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1978); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
294.
295.

United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 1062-63.
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Regulatory Commission, 296 the Federal Circuit, sitting in place of the
defunct TECA, ruled that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial
because restitution is an equitable remedy. The statute does not specify
whether the agency is entitled to claim restitution at law or in equity, but
restitution in equity is probably most compatible with the other relief
authorized for the DOE. Yet the same court contradicted traditional case
law in equity by ruling that the DOE did not need to prove the specific
causation between the company’s alleged unjust enrichment and that of
the company’s owner and CEO to establish the personal liability of the
owner. The DOE claimed that the causation was self evident given the
defendant’s ownership of the co-defendant company. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the DOE’s assertion that the defendant owner had to
carry the burden of proof to show that the unjust enrichment that reached
the company did not enrich him. 297 This holding contradicts the GreatWest opinion that eschews personal liability and requires identifiable
funds or assets for remedies in equity.
One aspect of the DOE that has not received much attention is the
issue of the applicability of the clean-up doctrine. According to the
background provided by the Federal Circuit, the President’s authority
under the EPAA expired on September 30, 1981 although “savings
provision in the EPAA provided that expiration of the President’s
authority did not affect pending enforcement proceedings or
enforcement proceedings, such as in the present case, based upon acts
committed or liability incurred prior to the expiration date.” 298 It
therefore seems unlikely that any claim for injunctive relief would be
relevant unless that claim were filed prior to September 30, 1981. In
such event, the clean-up doctrine would not apply and any such claim by
the DOE would have to comply with the statutory provision for
296. Houston Oil & Ref., Inc. v. FERC, 95 F.3d 1126, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
297. Id. at 1138.
In sum, Imparato’s solely owned corporation collected almost $58 million in
overcharges, and there is no evidence as to where those funds went. The inescapable
inference is that Imparato personally benefited from the overcharges. If the
overcharges remained in the accounts of his wholly owned corporation, Imparato
would have directly benefited by the increased value of the corporation. On the other
hand, if the funds were distributed as salary or dividends to the sole shareholder,
Imparato also would have directly benefited. In the event that Imparato otherwise
distributed the funds, for example by directing them to other corporate employees in
the form of increased compensation or perhaps by making corporate charitable
contributions, Imparato would still have benefited, albeit indirectly.

Id.
298.

Id. at 1130.
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‘restitution’ or as a remedy in equity according to Great-West. 299
C. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
On the whole, case opinions relating to claims from the CFTC best
approximate the existing practice of measuring unjust enrichment. For
example, the opinion in CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., the Third
Circuit concluded that the majority position held that profits, not
proceeds, of the defendant should be disgorged. 300 In that opinion, the
Third Circuit remanded the case because the trial court awarded
customer losses as a proxy for the defendant’s unjust enrichment without
holding a hearing to determine the ease with which the defendant’s
profits might be calculated or compared to the customer losses:
Until the amount of unjust enrichment has been established by a
hearing, there will have been no showing of the relationship of all
the defendants’ gains to investor losses. The reason why this
relationship has to be established is because . . . in designing
remedies under the Commodity Exchange Act or the Securities
Exchange Act, the courts have considered disgorgement to serve
primarily to prevent unjust enrichment. For this reason a “court may
exercise its equitable power only over the property causally related
to the wrongdoing.” SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215,
1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In First City, the court pointed out that this
rule required the SEC to distinguish between “legally and illegally
obtained profits.” Id. We conclude this rule would similarly require
a correlation between investor losses and unlawful gains as long as
the former is to be used as the measure for disgorgement. This
determination is consistent with the concept that “disgorgement may
301
not be used punitively.”

The key point is that it is beyond the district court’s equitable powers to
award more than the defendants’ unjust profits.
The court re-emphasizes the distinction between cases in which the
losses are greater than or less than the defendant’s unjust enrichment:
299.
300.

See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.

301.

Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d at 79.

CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, n.10 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“Appellant argues that the measure of disgorgement should be unlawful ‘profits.’
Appellees argue that the measure should be unlawful ‘proceeds.’ The term most
frequently used in reported decisions appears to be ‘profits.’”). See, e.g., CFTC v.
Am. Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1242, 1252 (2d Cir. 1986); SEC v. First City Fin.
Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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On remand, the district court, in reconsidering disgorgement, should
also keep in mind that any reliance on the decision in Am. Bd. of
Trade, ordering disgorgement in the full amount of the investors’
losses, may present a problem in the present case which did not arise
in Am. Bd. of Trade. There, the customers’ losses were less than one
third of the CFTC’s “conservative” analysis of the defendants’
profits. Therefore, the amount of disgorgement measured by
investor profits did not exceed the amount of unlawful gains. Here,
however, according to the appellant’s calculations, the total losses
may be twenty times or more the amount of Maxwell’s unlawful
gains. Moreover, there is no indication in the record of the amount
of the unlawful gains of the other defendants nor is there any
indication that the district court considered whether there would be
difficulty in establishing that amount.
Maxwell argues that
computing the unjust enrichment is a prerequisite of any
disgorgement order. We agree that the district court must hold a
hearing either to determine the amount of unjust enrichment or to
302
establish that that amount cannot be reasonably approximated.

It was standard practice for the SEC or CFTC to use the victim’s losses
as a proxy for the defendant’s unjust enrichment in the absence of the
agency’s ability to reasonably estimate the defendant’s unjust
enrichment. In the opinion quoted above, the Third Circuit is only
saying that the district court erred by allowing the use of the victim’s
losses before the agency established its inability to measure the
defendant’s unjust enrichment. Therefore, the agencies may have been
entitled to implied jurisdiction but the disgorgement remedy, based on
losses, better resembles compensating damages and not a remedy in
equity.
In a separate case, the Southern District of New York opined that it
was more appropriate to order only the disgorgement of the defendant’s
profits, allowing various business expenses, including overhead, to be
offset:
While AVCO’s gross sales revenue from the Recurrence program
was $4,148,572, the evidence at trial indicated that AVCO incurred
substantial expense to generate the gross sales revenues. Those
expenses included large amounts of money in advertising, as well as
substantial overhead costs for rent, utilities, telephone systems,
postage, etc. AVCO’s and Vartuli’s 1993-1997 tax returns indicate
that combining AVCO’s taxable income with Vartuli’s taxable
income from AVCO shows that the cumulative profit generated by

302.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
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AVCO over the period was $701,534 . . . . Accordingly, keeping in
mind that disgorgement is a nonpunitive equitable remedy meant to
deprive wrongdoers of “ill-gotten gains,” the Court reduces the
amount of disgorgement for which Vartuli and AVCO are jointly and
303
severally liable to $701,534.

It remains unexplained why the Southern District would go so far in
allowing offsets for a claim of the CFTC but not for claims by the SEC.
D. Federal Trade Commission
“The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as an
excuse to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of
relief falls outside that remedies recognized parameters.” 304
The FTC’s application of implied jurisdiction is unusual for the
breadth of cases that it reaches. For example, even though the Federal
Reserve is considered the governing body for the Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”), the FTC is free to enforce those regulations under the FTC
umbrella. Perhaps because of this breadth of coverage, the FTC uses a
wider range of labels for its remedies against unjust enrichment:
consumer redress, reimbursement, refund, restitution and disgorgement.
The analysis of FTC disgorgement claims is complicated by the fact
that the FTC’s statutes include two key applicable provisions that have
been used to justify claims for disgorgement. Section 13(b) provides the
FTC with authority to secure injunctions and therefore relies on the
district court’s implied jurisdiction for traditional remedies in equity.
Section 19 authorizes the FTC to make more specific remedial claims,
including claims based on damages to the victims or customers of the
defendants. It appears that the FTC makes claims under Section 13(b)
more frequently and even for cases that would clearly relate to the
specific remedial system envisioned in Section 19. 305 Peter Ward makes
303. CFTC v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 20, 1998).
304. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71.
305. Inexplicably, a number of opinions about the FTC’s claims under Section 13(b)
are justified in part by citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in FTC v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d
595 (9th Cir. 1993), which was a case based on jurisdiction under Section 19. See FTC
v. Munoz, 17 Fed. App’x 624, 626 (9th Cir. 2001); FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6192, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2004); FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc.,
373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 564 (D. Md. 2005); FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F.
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a case that the FTC’s access to the full range of equitable remedies, as
implied by Section 13(b)’s authority to seek preliminary and permanent
injunctions, is limited and may be precluded by Section 19, which
resembles a Congressional remedial structure for the FTC and does not
include restitution. 306 This argument has been litigated and all courts
have found that specific exculpatory language in Section 19 avoids that
necessary conclusion. 307
Ward points out that claims under Section 13(b) are easier to make
because, otherwise, Section 19 would require the FTC to complete
administrative proceedings before initiating civil litigation and provide
the FTC with larger claims that it would otherwise be able to make
under Section 19 as a result of that section’s three year statute of
limitations. More importantly, Section 19 provides jurisdiction for the
FTC to seek remedies not otherwise available under the constraints of
traditional remedies in equity. Of course, the result has been for the
FTC to prefer litigation under Section 13(b) than a combination of
administrative law and litigation under Section 19. According to a FTC
statement on its website, most of the FTC’s consumer protection
enforcement activities are conducted in litigation rather than
administrative proceedings. 308
Preliminary data show that the FTC filed an average of roughly one
hundred new claims each year from 2001 to 2005 as compared with an
Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 2000); FTC v. Commonwealth Mktg. Group, Inc., 72 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 544 (W.D. Pa. 1999) and FTC v. Cyberspace.com, L.L.C., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25565 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2002).
306. Peter C. Ward, Restitution For Consumers Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
1139, 1191-92 (1992).
307. FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982).
However, § 19(e) provides: Remedies provided in this section are in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action provided by State or Federal law.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission
under any other provision of law. Thus, there is no necessary or inescapable
inference, or, indeed, any inference, that Congress intended to restrict the broad
equitable jurisdiction apparently granted to the district court by § 13(b).

Id.
308. FTC, Office of the Gen. Counsel, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s
Investigative
and
Law
Enforcement
Authority
(2002),
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.htm (last visited December 10, 2006) (“The courts
have uniformly accepted the Commission’s construction of Section 13(b), with the
result that most consumer protection enforcement is now conducted directly in court
under Section 13(b), rather than by means of administrative adjudication.”).
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average of about fifty between 1990 and 1995. Total new civil claims
filed in federal district courts increased 12.8% over the same period.
Interestingly, the pattern of FTC filings among the various federal
district courts offer some support for the theory that the FTC may be
selecting in which district court to file its complaints in a deliberate
manner (see the description of the preliminary data in Appendix B).
FTC cases mainly relate to claims of fraud. 309 After liability is
established, the key issue in such cases is whether the measure of the
remedy should include any of the defendant’s reasonable product
expenses and any credit for the asset or use value that the consumer
gained by using or owning the product. The FTC strongly urges a court
to award a refund of the purchase amount without offset or counterrestitution. Despite the FTC’s claim that such an approach is the only
appropriate measure for a claim of unjust enrichment, there is a
significant body of case law that requires counter-restitution.
The case law can be sorted into four groups of case circumstances
and actions of the court that affect this issue:
(1) The court grants an offset or allows for counter-restitution in
the amount of the approximate value of the consideration
received by the plaintiff; 310
309. Under the Act the FTC must establish that a “person, partnership, or
corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive
act or practice in or affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
310. See FTC v. Solomon Trading Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19696, at *16-17 (D.
Ariz. June 28, 1994); FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 572 n.7 (7th Cir.
1989).
It was unclear how many customers who actually took trips were dissatisfied with
their vacations. The difficulties involved in determining how much relief should be
given to dissatisfied customers prompted the magistrate to limit the relief to those
customers who received nothing of value for the price of the vacation passport.
Customers, satisfied or unsatisfied, who took trips were excluded from the
computation of relief and that decision is not at issue on this appeal.

Id. See also FTC v. Renaissance Fine Arts, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21040 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 10, 1995); FTC v. Spectrum Res. Group, Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 4077, at *56 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1997); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16137,
at *65 (S.D. Fla. July 10, 1987).
Also, the Court determines that the amounts invested by customers who won one or
more leases through the companies should be deducted from the companies’ liability,
since these customers realized returns on their investments through assets obtained
directly through success in the lottery, whether through lease sales or warranty
payment from the companies.

Id. FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991).
The monetary equivalent of rescission is the difference between the amount paid for
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(2) The court provides discussion that concludes that the
consideration received by the plaintiffs was worthless; 311
(3) Defendants procedurally default in their obligations to
produce evidence or to respond to filings made by the FTC
and the court finds the FTC’s evidence uncontroverted; 312
(4) The court makes no finding about the consideration received
by the plaintiff but orders the defendant to make payment in
the amount of the payment made by the plaintiff, i.e., a full
refund. 313
The key opinions in the group of cases that fully support the FTC
position include Febre 314 and Gem 315 that sometimes are cited alone as
sufficient justification for calculating disgorgement/restitution as
customer losses. 316 First, it is clear that none of these cases comply with
the process envisioned in Grupo or Great-West. No attempt is made to
determine if the proposed remedies are traditional remedies in equity
and no attempt is made to determine whether the proposed restitution is
at law or in equity. Whether the remedy is labeled as restitution, 317
disgorgement, 318 consumer redress, 319 refund, 320 or reimbursement, 321
the property and its current market value. To adhere to the model of true rescission,
where the property is returned on the judgment date, the monetary value of the
property should be determined as of the judgment date or the date of the disclosure of
the fraud.

Id.
311.
312.

See Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d at 570.
FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 536 (7th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Silueta Distribs., 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22254, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1995).
313. See FTC v. Slimamerica, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 1999); FTC
v. Figgie Int’l, 994 F.2d 595, 606 (9th Cir. 1993).
314. Febre, 128 F.3d 530.
315. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996).
316. FTC v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Plaintiff presents the declaration of an accountant indicating that refunds, charge
backs, and returns have been deducted to obtain the disgorgement amount. The
amount represents Medicor’s net sales. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act permits the
Court to order disgorgement regardless of the amount of the defendant’s profits.

Id. See also FTC v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562 (D. Md. 2005); FTC v.
Citigroup Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2001); and FTC v. Bay Area Bus.
Council, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6192, at *39 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2004).
317. FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Ind.
2000).
318. FTC v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
319. FTC v. Atlantex Ass’n., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at *37 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
The purpose of consumer redress is to remedy the monetary injury to consumers. It is
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the remedies remain either restitution of revenues, compensating
damages, or both. At most, the cases in this area recite that
disgorgement or restitution is an equitable remedy and fail to look
beneath the label.
The court’s opinion in Febre seems to offer very weak precedential
value because of the circumstances of the case. The defendants
defaulted in their obligations to contest the factual claims of the plaintiff,
resulting in the Court’s per se acceptance of the FTC’s remedy
calculations. 322
One of the most predominate problems with both opinions is that
that they juxtapose disgorgement of revenues with disgorgement of
profits. In both opinions, the circuit courts defend the decision of the
district court to equate the remedy to the customer payments for all units
sold, revenue disgorgement, by discussing characteristics of
disgorgement of profits and cite cases for support of those statements.
The majority of the cases cited, however, either awarded a measure of
disgorgement of profits or equitable rescission. For example, three cases
are frequently cited as support for a remedy of revenue disgorgement:
(1) FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312,
1316 (8th Cir. 1991). This case affirmed an award of the
monetary equivalent of rescission which credited the
defendant for the approximate value of the coins remaining
in the possession of the customers. For a description of the
remedy, see FTC v. Security Rare Coin & Bullion Corp.,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15958, at *46-47 (D. Minn. 1989).
(2) FTC v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571-72 (7th
Cir. 1989). In this case, the court determined that travel
certificates that had been used would be excluded from the
remedy calculation 323 but that the remaining unused travel
certifications were worthless. 324 These two key points
an appropriate remedy authorized by this Court’s equitable powers to require the
individual and corporate Defendants to pay consumer redress in the form of a cash
refund measured by amounts previously paid less any amounts returned to consumers
who invested in the oil and gas partnerships or the Teen Disco partnerships.

Id.
320. FTC v. Int’l Diamond Corp., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, at *13-14 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
321. United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2005).
322. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1997).
323. Id. at n.7.
324. Id at 570.
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effectively transform the remedy from restitution to a
reasonable approximation of the monetary equivalent of
rescission.
(3) SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 414 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992). As explained in Part V
infra, the Supreme Court’s opinions in Porter and Mitchell
are equivocal between supporting a profits or revenue basis
for restitution or disgorgement. According to the Seventh
Circuit, however, Porter holds for profits disgorgement.
Otherwise, both opinions relay heavily on cases holding for
disgorgement of profits to justify statements made about disgorgement
that are presumably meant to imply statements about revenue
disgorgement. A minor example includes this interpretation of the
Seventh Circuit’s position on burden of proof from the Court’s opinion
in Febre: “The Commission must show that its calculations reasonably
approximated the amount of customers’ net losses, and then the burden
shifts to the defendants to show that those figures were inaccurate.” 325
Both of the cases cited relate to disgorgement of profits and both state
that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the defendants’ profits.
Then, the burden shifts to the defendants. The burden of proving the
defendant’s profits is based on the requirement that the plaintiff must
specifically identify the sales of the defendant that generates unjust
profits, but that since the defendant has the best access to its own
accounting records, the defendant carries the burden of proof for
establishing legitimate expenses or adjustments to the plaintiff’s claim.
This scheme does not operate in reverse, as the defendant has no access
to information regarding the plaintiff’s losses.
The Eleventh Circuit also justifies disgorgement of revenues with
cites from cases that hold for disgorgement of profits:
Accordingly, disgorgement, the purpose of which “is not to
compensate the victims of fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his
326
see, e.g., SEC v. First
ill-gotten gain” is appropriate. SEC v. Blatt;
325. Id. at 535 (citing SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1996); HUD v. Cost
Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 1995)).
326. SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing SEC v.
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)).
The trial court acted properly within its equitable powers in ordering Pullman to
disgorge the profits that he obtained by fraud. This restitution merely forces the
defendant to give up to the trustee the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.
The purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate the victims of the fraud, but to
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City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (permitting
disgorgement and observing that “disgorgement is an equitable
remedy designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment
327
and to deter others from violating the securities laws”) ; CFTC v.
Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982)
328
(permitting disgorgement and recognizing its deterrent effect).
We conclude that section 13(b) permits a district court to order a
329
defendant to disgorge illegally obtained funds.

Inexplicably, each of the three cases cited by the Eleventh Circuit
held for disgorgement of profits and most of the three cases could well
be said to oppose disgorgement of an amount greater than profits as
punitive. Footnotes with extended quotes from those cases cited are
provided for individual review.
The Seventh Circuit’s cite to Rowe v. Maremont in Febre is
similarly inapposite: “This court has held that disgorgement is designed
to be remedial and not punitive.” 330 Febre’s cite to CFTC v. Hunt is
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.

Id. (internal citations omitted)
327. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Since disgorgement primarily serves to prevent unjust enrichment, the court may
exercise its equitable power only over property causally related to the wrongdoing.
The remedy may well be a key to the SEC’s efforts to deter others from violating the
securities laws, but disgorgement may not be used punitively. Therefore, the SEC
generally must distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
328. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982).
We have not previously considered the propriety of ancillary relief under section 6c of
the Act; The Commodity Exchange Act contains no provision similar to section 27 of
the Securities Exchange Act, but neither does it have any provision restricting the
equitable power of the district court. Porter and Mitchell Indicate that the latter fact is
a sufficient basis for concluding that a district court possesses the authority to order
restitution pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act. Further, as the Second Circuit
noted in the Securities Exchange Act context, to allow a violator to retain the profits
from his violations would frustrate the purposes of the regulatory scheme. Thus we
conclude that a district court may compel a violator of regulations promulgated under
the trading limit provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act to disgorge his illegally
obtained profits.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
329. FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 466 (11th Cir. 1996).
330. Rowe v. Maremont Corp., 850 F.2d 1226, 1241 (7th Cir. 1988).
Deterrence is an important consideration in allowing disgorgement, but disgorgement
is remedial and not punitive. To make Maremont pay back profits that it would have
made even if it told the truth is harsh and punitive. Equity requires only that a
defendant give up its unjust enrichment. The district court did not err in rejecting full
disgorgement as a measure of damages.
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also irrelevant: “Disgorgement does not penalize, but merely deprives
wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains.” 331
In addition to the problematic research, this opinion hides behind a
label. Neither case cited, however, discussed or awarded disgorgement
of revenue so that the court’s comment is, at best, irrelevant. Given the
substance of the case opinions, they appear inapposite.
But there are more serious errors in both Febre and Gem. As is true
of most opinions in this area of the law, both opinions take great pains to
explain the extensive and seemingly unbounded nature of the district
court’s authority to formulate remedies. In support for its assertion of
authority to formulate remedies, the Eleventh Circuit cites FTC v. Amy
Travel Service, Inc.; 332 FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc; 333 and FTC v.
Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 334 all of which discuss the authority of a district
court’s jurisdiction within the limits of traditional remedies in equity.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
331. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997).
Disgorgement of illegally obtained profits has been ordered in a number of Securities
Exchange Commission judicial enforcement proceedings.
In these cases,
disgorgement was ordered despite the fact that there was no specific, express authority
for this remedy in the Securities Exchange Act. Further, the Second Circuit in these
cases explicitly rejected the objection that disgorgement is a penalizing rather than a
remedial, equitable device, correctly reasoning that disgorgement does not penalize,
but merely deprives wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains.

Id. (citing CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1222 (7th Cir. 1979)).
332. FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1989).
In Singer, the Ninth Circuit found that because section 13(b) gives a court authority to
grant a permanent injunction, the statute by implication gives authority “to grant any
ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice because it did not limit that
traditional equitable power explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference.”

Id. (quoting FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982).
333. Singer, 668 F.2d at 1112-13.
We hold that Congress, when it gave the district court authority to grant a permanent
injunction against violations of any provisions of law enforced by the Commission,
also gave the district court authority to grant any ancillary relief necessary to
accomplish complete justice because it did not limit that traditional equitable power
explicitly or by necessary and inescapable inference. In particular, Congress thereby
gave the district court power to order rescission of contracts. Hence § 13(b) provides
a basis for an order freezing assets.

Id.
334. FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 973 (1982) (“Section 13(b) permits courts to exercise full range of traditional
equitable remedies. Specifically, we held that a district court may order preliminary
relief, including an asset freeze, that may be needed to make permanent relief
possible.”).
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Then, the opinion fails to show how the proposed remedy in Gem
complies with this boundary. Both opinions rely heavily on Porter for
the often-repeated notion that the district court is allowed to pursue any
remedy or the full range of remedies to provide complete relief. In light
of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in SEC v. Cherif, the court in Febre is
ignoring a contradictory interpretation:
Language about the importance of granting complete equitable relief,
however, must be read in context. Usually the language advocates
that all equitable powers residing in the district court be visited upon
the defendant or violator before the court . . . . Porter, cited by the
SEC . . . is not dissimilar. Porter involves a statutory provision in
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 similar to the remedies
provision in the Exchange Act. The Supreme Court wrote broadly
about the equitable power residing in a district court adjudicating an
action brought under the Emergency Price Control Act, but it held
only that disgorgement of illegally obtained profits could be sought
335
from a violator.

Both opinions state that remedies under Section 13(b) are not
precluded from including elements of punitive or exemplary damages:
Figgie involved a different statutory provision, Section 19(b) of the
FTCA, which expressly precluded an award of exemplary or punitive
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b). In contrast, Section 13(b) has no such
limitation. See 15 U.S.C. § 45. Febre’s and Ace’s reliance on
336
Figgie is misplaced.

Even before the opinions in Grupo and Great-West were decided, the
majority position held that implied jurisdiction must not award remedies
that include punitive or exemplary damages. 337 This basic difference in
perspective on remedies could easily explain why these opinions support
revenue disgorgement as opposed to profits disgorgement. If the two
opinions applied the position that restitution in excess of the defendant’s
profits is impermissibly punitive, they would need to withdraw their
support for the restitution of revenues.
The Febre opinion makes two other inexplicable statements. First,
335. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992) (quoting Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1779, n.10 (1976)).
336. Febre, 128 F.3d at 537; FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469-70 (11th
Cir. 1996).
337. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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the opinion challenges the defendants’ assertion that profits are the usual
measure of disgorgement. Second, the opinion decries the defendants’
failure to provide an explanation or support for this statement.
Hopefully, Judge Bauer is not serious in this assertion. He cites seven
cases in his opinion that hold for disgorgement of profits, 338 including
CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 339 which held that profits, not
proceeds, are the majority position for disgorgement. Discussing the
appropriateness of eventually disgorging some or all of the remedy to
the U.S. Treasury, Judge Bauer asserted that “disgorgement to the
United States Treasury does not transform compensatory damages into
punitive damages.” 340 It seems fair to infer that the remedy in Febre is
viewed as compensating damages. Indeed, the single biggest objection
to the use of customer losses is that it would transform disgorgement
into a proxy for compensating damages that is not a traditional remedy
in equity.
These last points emphasize the issue of how far the clean-up
doctrine has been stretched to accommodate remedies at law as ancillary
to injunctive relief for the purposes of qualifying the claim for implied
jurisdiction. This doctrine demands that a court that contemplates
ancillary jurisdiction evaluate the remedy as a whole especially in terms
of the total dollar amount of the remedy sought and the relative
importance of the injunctive relief. Second, the remedy must comply
with traditional forms of relief in equity. Opinions like Febre are at
odds with relief in equity because, as its advocates have openly
acknowledged, a remedy measured by gross customer expenditures,
without any offsets or counter-restitution, can be described as any or all
of the following:
(1) Is designed to include punitive or exemplary damages;
(2) Closely resembles compensating damages;
(3) Cannot be deemed similar to any other comparable remedies
except for those awarded to the FTC or FDA.
F. Food and Drug Administration
The FDA has big plans for implied jurisdiction. The FDA intends
to continue to make claims for restitution against defendants that offer

338.
339.
340.

Febre, 128 F.3d at 536.
991 F.2d 71, 77 (3rd Cir. 1993).
Id.
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unapproved products as well as seek claims against established
pharmaceutical companies for “significant violations of current good
manufacturing practice (“CGMP”) requirements.” 341 Given the approval
that many others have received for their similar claims for implied
jurisdiction, the FDA’s claims for unapproved products are not
surprising, but claims and substantial consent decrees (Abbott, $100
million; Wyeth, $30 million; Schering-Plough, $500 million), 342 for
violation of CGMP seems to advance the application of claims in
restitution to administrative law to a more ‘intense’ level.
Claims for Unapproved Products
The FDA’s basic claim against Universal Management Services,
Inc. was:
As part of their business, Defendants sell and distribute a product
known as the Stimulator, and also a product that connects to the
Stimulator known as the Xtender. The Stimulator is essentially a
piezo-electric gas grill igniter, marketed as a pain relieving device.
To produce the Stimulator, Defendants purchase gas grill igniters
and outfit them with finger grips. A user then places the tip of the
Stimulator on his body, presses with his thumb on a plunger, and an
343
electric current passes into that part of the body.

The device was not approved for medical use by the FDA and the
defendants sold 800,000 units at a retail price of $88.30, while the cost
of buying the grill igniters was about $1 per unit. 344
The district court measured the remedy as total consumer purchases
less any refunds. No credit for the value of the device or its use was
341. Eric M. Blumberg, Restitution and Disgorgement Find Another Home at the
Food and Drug Administration, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 170 (2003). Mr. Blumberg
offers the following justification of a claim for the violation of CGMP:
21 U.S.C. §§ 351(a)(2)(B) and 351(h) provide, respectively, that drugs and medical
devices that have not been manufactured in accordance with CGMP are “deemed”
adulterated. To establish a violation of these provisions, FDA need not show that a
product is in fact deleterious in any respect. The failure to follow appropriate
procedures causes the product to be adulterated.

Id. at n.12 (internal citations omitted).
342. Id. at 170.
343. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 974, 976 (N.D.
Ohio 1997).
344. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir.
1999).
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discussed. Instead, the court was trying to decide between awarding
disgorgement and restitution:
While numerous district courts have ordered the equitable remedy of
disgorgement in a variety of FTC cases, neither the parties nor the
court could find an FDA case where disgorgement of profits was
ordered. While the lack of previous use of the equitable remedy of
disgorgement of profits in FDA cases is not necessarily fatal to
Plaintiff’s request for such a remedy, such non-utilization does cast
some doubt on the appropriateness of disgorgement in this matter.
While the court will not order disgorgement of profits in this case,
the court does find that restitution is both available and appropriate.
Such remedy will ensure that the public interest is protected by
providing each person who purchased Defendants’ adulterated
345
product the opportunity to receive his money back.

The district court appears to conclude that either disgorgement of profits
or restitution of revenues could be an appropriate remedy, but it fails to
explain why it chose restitution of revenues over disgorgement of
profits. In searching for controlling or persuasive precedent, the court
limits its research regarding ‘disgorgement of profits’ to FDA cases yet
the court’s precedents for restitution of revenues relies on cases relating
to the FTC and other agencies. The large body of cases on traditional
remedies in equity also remains overlooked.
On the basis of a quote from Gem 346 that refers to Porter, the
district court ‘borrows’ its key supposition: “As Porter makes clear,
absent a clear command to the contrary, the district court’s equitable
powers are extensive. Among the equitable powers of a court is the
power to grant restitution and disgorgement.” 347 And after confirming
that the FDCA includes no restrictive language on remedies, the district
court arrives at its opinion:
The court is convinced that not only is ordering restitution within its
power in this matter, but that such remedy is appropriate. Such a
remedy will send a message to both Defendants and others engaged
in similar behavior that if they violate the law, they will not be able
to keep the proceeds from such illicit activity, but instead will have
to refund all customers the purchase price of the adulterated

345.
346.
347.

Universal Mgmt., 999 F. Supp. at 980.
FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996).
Universal Mgmt., 999 F. Supp. at 981 (internal citations omitted).
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348

The court decided that its overriding purpose is to protect the public
health and chose a harsh remedy to send a deterring message to all
would-be infringers of the FDCA.
The court seems carried away with its ‘authority’ at the expense of
its responsibility to act within its jurisdiction in equity. The court does
not explain how disgorgement and restitution differ or how a refund of
retail revenues conforms to traditional remedies in equity. Of the five
relevant cases cited, only the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Gem awards
revenue disgorgement, the remaining award profit disgorgement or
rescission.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit confirmed the demise of a prior
holding from the Ninth Circuit, 349 which held that the FDA did not have
the jurisdiction for equitable monetary remedies since the FDCA did not
specifically authorize such remedies. 350 The Sixth Circuit rejected the
Ninth Circuit opinion, i.e., that a district court is free to award remedies
unless they are precluded by specific language in the applicable statute.
The Sixth Circuit then tacitly acknowledged that implied
jurisdiction is limited in part to the traditional forms of equitable relief:
Moreover, even accepting the references to legislative concerns
relied upon by the Parkinson and C.E.B. Products line, these
concerns are far from a clear statement of Congress’s intent to
exclude restitution, recalls, disgorgement, or any other traditional
form of equitable relief. Finally, as DeMario instructs, we must
presume that Congress is cognizant of the scope of equity, knows
what it is doing when it provides for general equitable relief in a
regulatory statute, and can use that knowledge to clearly and
explicitly limit the scope of a court’s equitable powers under any
351
particular regulatory structure in which such an authorization lies.

Unfortunately, however, the opinion then fails to define what it
means by restitution, recalls, or disgorgement or how those three
remedies compare to traditional remedies in equity.
Given that the district court chose the remedy of restitution
348.
349.
350.

Id.
United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956).
United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 761 (6th Cir.

1999).
351. Id. at 762 (referencing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292
(1960)).
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(although that opinion also failed to define the term) the Sixth Circuit
defends the district court’s choice:
To circumvent the law by marketing illegally without approval is to
deceive the public both as purchasers and users of the device. In
such cases, restitution exists to make the consumer whole. Because
restitution seeks to remedy the type of economic harm to consumers
contemplated by the FDCA, it serves goals of the FDCA that are
encompassed within the section the FDA charges Appellants
352
violated.

Apparently relying on criminal restitution, the court emphasizes that
restitution exists to make the consumer whole. Such a remedy is
therefore based on compensating damages and does not resemble a
remedy in equity.
The Sixth Circuit responds to the defendants’ charge that the
remedy was inappropriately punitive with quotes and cites for the
proposition that restitution by definition is not punitive and falls into the
‘label’ trap decried by the Supreme Court in Great-West. The Circuit
Court is no more successful at responding to the second charge of the
defendants:
Appellants also claim that restitution is punitive because, unlike
disgorgement which removes ill-gotten gain by forcing surrender of
profits, restitution requires a return of the entire purchase price,
included in which are costs and profits. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v.
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The purpose of
disgorgement is not to compensate the victims of the fraud, but to
deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain.”). See also Sec. Exch.
Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d
Cir. 1978). Simply because disgorgement and restitution are
different, however, does not make restitution punitive. See SEC v.
World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742
F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) (“While disgorgement has been said to
serve more important interests than the compensation of investors,
that principle is a far cry from the proposition that restitution is an
improper end.” (internal citation omitted)).
Appellants, who
disobeyed the law, should not have his expenses covered by
consumers. To say that restitution is unavailable is to say that
consumers must cover the costs of Appellants’ production,
advertising, and illegal distribution. Instead, the district court should
have the discretion in a case such as this to make the consumers

352.

Id. at 763 (internal citations omitted).
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whole rather than allow the illegal activities to stand uncorrected to
353
the consumer’s detriment.

By now, the cases cited in the Court’s defense should be easily
recognized as well as it is easy to recognize that the three cases are
either irrelevant or inapposite. It is also difficult to reconcile the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion with a prior opinion in SEC v. Blavin wherein it
measured an SEC claim for disgorgement in terms of profits, not
revenue. 354
However, the Court has arrived at the true problem in the case: the
remedy of disgorgement/restitution is not well suited to these particular
case facts. The remedy of equitable rescission could have achieved the
aims of the FDA and it would have provided the defendants an
opportunity to establish the use value of their device. The Court could
have ordered the plaintiff and defendants to return each other’s
consideration. In the absence of the customers’ ability to return the
igniter, the Court could hear testimony as to either the value of the
igniter, its use value, or both. Note also that the use of equitable
rescission would preclude the need for the clean-up doctrine.
The key problem in these two cases may lie with the two courts’
sympathy or willingness to assist the agencies in carrying out their
responsibilities. The courts were sitting as courts in equity; otherwise
the courts would have had no subject jurisdiction. The basic relevance
of regulatory statutes is to assist the court in deciding if the defendants’
enrichment has been unjust. When the regulatory and administrative
law issues are thus reduced to their proper proportion, the courts would
be free to realize that they are sitting in equity just as they would for any
other agency claim, most fiduciary or trust claims and closely
approximating how they sit for most issues of misused or
misappropriated intellectual property.
Equally important is the
realization that the relevant statutes cannot add to the possible remedies
or increase the court’s authority or implied jurisdiction; the statutes can
only reduce that authority and jurisdiction. If a court proposes to use a
‘consumer redress’ remedy that seizes the defendant’s assets or recalls
the defendant’s products, the court needs to show that comparable
remedies were awarded in English courts in equity in 1790.
The defendants in Lane Labs-USA, Inc. are alleged to have acted as
unjustly as those in Universal. The FDA alleges that the defendants and
353.
354.

Id. at 764.
SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985).
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their company produced health products, including BeneFin, a powder
that contains shark cartilage that the company marketed and advertised
as helpful to the cure of medical disorders including cancer.
Fairly early in the opinion, the Third Circuit applies Porter and
Mitchell to defeat the defendants’ objection to restitution as a remedy.
Of course, neither Porter nor Mitchell specifically addressed the remedy
of revenue disgorgement which is what the Third Circuit refers to as
“restitution.” Then the Circuit compounds its semantic confusion by
citing to the usual collection of cases that affirm profit disgorgement as
an appropriate remedy.
See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996)
(finding disgorgement to be appropriate under the Federal Trade
Commission Act and Porter); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 281 U.S.
App. D.C. 410, 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (relying on
Porter to award disgorgement under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg.
Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitting
disgorgement under the Commodity Exchange Act); Interstate
Commerce Comm’n v. B&T Transp. Co., 613 F.2d 1182, 1184-85
(1st Cir. 1980) (applying Porter and Mitchell to permit restitution
under the Motor Carrier Act); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1222-23 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that Porter
355
authorized disgorgement under the Commodity Exchange Act).

Regrettably, most of the opinion is spent in response to the
defendants’ irrelevant arguments. Clearly, the defendants were trying to
win the whole case by establishing that the District Court did not have
jurisdiction to award a remedy of restitution. The defendants first
argued that restitution “does not further the purpose of the FDCA.” This
argument missed its own point that restitution of revenue was
inappropriate, but restitution of profits was not. The Third Circuit’s
response also reveals the close relationship between reimbursement and
compensating damages:
Restitution that reimburses consumers who paid for unapproved
drugs, and may have been defrauded or deceived about their
effectiveness, restores aggrieved parties to the same economic
356
position they enjoyed before the Act was violated.

355.
356.

United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 229.
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Thereafter, the Court wastes its time and the Defendants waste their
credibility by debating the relevance of Meghrig v. KFC Western,
Inc., 357 and United States v. Phillip Morris, 358 both of which held that
the relevant claim was not included in implied jurisdiction. RCRA and
RICO, the underlying statutory schemes, may be subject to debate but
the implied jurisdiction of the principal regulatory agencies was settled
in the SEC and CFTC cases more than ten years ago.
Eventually, the Third Circuit tries to return to the key issue:
Also, we view amicus and the commentators as making a
fundamental error in analyzing whether restitution is available: they
view this primarily as a question of what remedies are provided by
the FDCA rather than, as we have emphasized, a question of the
scope of the express legislative grant of equitable power under
§ 332(a). The District Court did not “discover” an implied remedy,
but rather exercised the equitable power that Congress explicitly
359
granted to it under the FDCA.

The Court hopes to seal the opinion with what is now the classic finish
for most such opinions that overstates implied jurisdiction: “When
Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions
contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted
cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in
light of the statutory purposes.” 360
The Seventh Circuit (Posner, J.) disputed this interpretation of
Mitchell in its opinion in SEC v. Cherif, 361 relating to the issue of relief
or nominal defendants. In response to the SEC’s claims that jurisdiction
over a non-party to the litigation was “necessary and appropriate
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) because Sanchou’s participation will
enable the court to grant complete relief,” the opinion states:
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d) and (e) also cannot aid the SEC since the statute
is not so broadly written as the SEC contends. The statute has been
construed to allow the granting of “any form of ancillary relief . . .
where necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes of the
statutory scheme.” Language about the importance of granting

357.
358.
359.
360.

Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, (1996).
United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Lane Labs, 427 F.3d at 235.
Id. at 235-36 (citing Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,
291-92 (1960)).
361. 933 F.2d 403, 414 & n.11 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992).

2007]

A DEFAULT RULE OF OMNIPOTENCE

109

complete equitable relief, however, must be read in context. Usually
the language advocates that all equitable powers residing in the
district court be visited upon the defendant or violator before the
362
court.

Apparently, in contemplation of a victory lap, the Third Circuit
opinion then makes a major mistake in the sign off:
The arguments and analysis of Appellants and the commentators are
creative and forceful, but, for now, are merely arguments as to why
the Supreme Court should draw finer lines around a court’s authority
to fashion specific remedies within a broad statutory grant of
equitable power. Until the Court overrules Porter and Mitchell, we
are bound by the reasoning of those cases. Given the breadth and
open-ended nature of § 332(a), and the direct correlation between the
language of that provision and the directives in Porter and Mitchell,
we hold that the District Court here did have the power to grant
363
restitution. We will therefore AFFIRM its order.

Even though this case was argued in June of 2005 and even though
the opinion makes reference to the Great-West opinion, 364 the opinion
closes with a suggestion for the Supreme Court to provide some finer
guidelines for the fashioning of remedies in implied jurisdiction. Yet the
Third Circuit fails to follow the guidelines in Great-West: it fails to
show how the remedy in question resembles a traditional remedy in
equity, it fails to meaningfully distinguish restitution in equity from
restitution at law, and it fails to suggest how the clean-up doctrine can
accommodate such a blatant remedy at law (by definition, remedies
based on the plaintiffs’ loss cannot be remedies in equity except in the
case of specific restitution which includes identifiable assets and money
in separated accounts).
It is also regrettable that the defendants did not ask the Third
Circuit how it would propose to reconcile its holding in Lane Labs with
Am. Metal Exch. Corp. 365 In the latter opinion, the Third Circuit held
that: “Appellant argues that the measure of disgorgement should be

362.
363.
364.

Id. at 413. (internal citations omitted).
Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 403 (1946).
Lane Labs, 427 F.3d at 231 (“Restitution is properly sought in equity where
money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could
clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” (quoting
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)).
365. CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 168 (D.N.J. 1988).
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unlawful ‘profits.’ Appellees argue that the measure should be unlawful
‘proceeds.’ The term most frequently used in reported decisions appears
to be ‘profits.’” 366 The Circuit’s earlier opinion holds that customer
losses are not a standard measure for disgorgement and that they can
only be used in case it is especially difficult for the plaintiffs to prove
the defendants’ profits:
On the other hand, an award of damages in the amount of investor
losses may go beyond the scope of a Commodity Exchange Act
enforcement proceeding. Absent a hearing to calculate ill gotten
gains, the disgorgement ordered in an amount equal to investor
losses could be a penalty assessment. If investors wish to seek
recovery of their losses as a remedy, they are free to do so in an
independent civil action against defendants. The hardship of
investor losses should not, however, be used as an excuse to impose
a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls
367
outside that remedy’s recognized parameters.

All courts need to be held accountable for the fact that their
opinions in one area of implied jurisdiction are applied to most other
areas, including non-agency cases relating to remedies in equity. Until
then, the case law among the agencies and between implied jurisdiction
and other areas of remedies in equity will not approach a minimum level
of consistency.
The Third Circuit opinion in Amer. Metal Exch. makes it clear that
a remedy in equity cannot be justified by the need to the agency to grant
complete relief or even to execute its responsibilities. This sort of
jurisdiction by necessity is based on consumer hardship or the court’s
perception that it needs to assist the agency. The courts can’t add
remedies that Congress omitted or remedies incompatible with
traditional remedies in equity. 368
Claims for Violation of CGMP
In his article, Blumberg, Deputy Chief Counsel for Litigation of the

366.
367.
368.

CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 79.

Id. at 78 (“The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as
an excuse to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls
outside that remedy’s recognized parameters.”).
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U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 369 informally alludes to
some strained views of how the FDA may assert its claims for CGMP.
Most importantly, these views run roughshod over the causation
standards in litigating claims for restitution. Seemingly, Blumberg
agrees with the view that the violation of CGMP is somewhat vague and
that the calculation of the defendant’s benefit might be difficult, stating
that “the courts have not been reluctant to order equitable monetary
awards merely because calculations are extremely difficult” and that a
“manufacturer that violates the law should not be entitled to any profits
on illegal products.” 370
Eventually, Blumberg suggests that the
defendant must bear the initial burden of proof when the claim is vague
and the benefit difficult to prove, stating “[i]f King and Walsh are
correct and the profits are in fact ‘impossible to quantify’ in CGMP
cases, 371 the companies must bear the risk of imprecision and may well
be required to forfeit the gross proceeds derived from the sale of
unlawful, adulterated products.” 372
It is clear that if a defendant fails to cooperate in the discovery
process or, once the plaintiff has established the defendant’s relevant
revenues, fails to substantiate his claims for offsets, the defendant may
suffer consequences including, in an extreme case, an order to disgorge
the applicable revenues. 373 At the other extreme lies equitable
discretion, which holds that not every violation of a statute warrants
restitution of the defendant’s profits. 374 Furthermore, some courts are
369. See Blumberg, supra note 341. In his article, Mr. Blumberg states that the
article does not represent the views of the FDA. While there is no reason to doubt his
assertion, in the absence of a FDA approved position paper, Mr. Blumberg’s article is
being used as a statement of the FDA on litigating claims for GCMP.
370. See Blumberg, supra note 341, at 188.
371. Erika King and Elizabeth M. Walsh, The Authority of a Court to Order
Disgorgement for Violations of the Current Good Manufacturing Practices
Requirement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149,
154 (2003).
372. Id. at n.195; see also FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1997). (stating
that “lawful gains cannot be distinguished from the unlawful without incurring
inordinate expense, it is well within the district court’s power to rule that the
measurement of disgorgement will be the more readily measurable amount of losses
incurred by the defendants’ customers in the unlawful transactions”) (quoting Am.
Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d at 77 (emphasis added)).
373. See supra Part VI, discussion of Category II cases.
374. CFTC v. Sidoti, 178 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 1999).
The CFTC contends Sidoti’s failure to register as a principal of Trinity provides the
nexus for deeming illegal all profits received by him in connection with Trinity.
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beginning to demand that the plaintiff show some effort to establish only
the defendant’s relevant revenues. 375
Within the spectrum of claims for restitution, there are a number of
types of claims that do not generally warrant the full remedy of
restitution which has resulted in the use of alternative remedies such as
awarding the defendant’s use value or savings as an attempt to recognize
that it would be inequitable to award full restitution but that the nature of
the claim does warrant some measure of benefit. 376
Finally, Blumberg and the FDA appear to believe that the only
appropriate remedy is the restitution or disgorgement of revenues. In
relation to the FDA’s claims against unapproved products, especially
fraudulent or non-functional products, the remedy of revenue
disgorgement would be approximately realized by a claim for equitable
rescission. After proving that the unapproved product had no use or
asset value to the consumer, the net effect of a claim for the plaintiffs
would be revenue disgorgement. Violations of CGMP, however, would
not appear to warrant the rescission model. A defendant might be able
to show that such a claim is unrelated to the defendant’s profits and the
proceeds of the claim would be paid only to the U.S. Treasury.
Therefore, such a claim best resembles an administrative fine or penalty,
which is contrary to the nature of a claim in equity.
G. Fair Housing Act
While the Fair Housing Act is not included in the range of statutory
schemes covered by this article, a claim for restitution under the Fair
Housing Act provides an example of how far the remedy has been

Sidoti asserts the district court should not have ordered disgorgement from him at all
because his failure to register as a principal, by itself, does not justify disgorgement.
We agree.

Id.
375. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).
It was not enough to show Meirick’s gross revenues from the sale of everything he
sold, which is all, really, that Taylor did. If General Motors were to steal your
copyright and put it in a sales brochure, you could not just put a copy of General
Motors’ corporate income tax return in the record and rest your case for an award of
infringer’s profits.

Id.
376. See Tlighman v. Proctor, 146 S. Ct. 894, 899 (1888); Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced
Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1985); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d
652, 654 (Wash. 1946).
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applied. 377 The government’s motion for summary judgment was
denied 378 and there have been no further opinions filed. The case relates
to a federal subsidized housing project to provide special housing
opportunities for an ethnically mixed group of applicants. The
government alleged that most or all of the housing was provided to
white residents, breaching the agreement between the project and the
government, and betraying the project’s fiduciary duty to the
government:
In proposing its constructive trust theory, the government argues
that federally funded homes that should have been awarded on first
come first served basis to a mix of applicants that included blacks,
Hispanics and whites were instead diverted to the pre-selected white
purchasers. Accordingly, a constructive trust should be imposed on
these homes, which the government proposes to provide to minority
families, as part of the Fair Housing Act remedy in Village. 379 No proof
of wrongdoing is necessary. An innocent party may be unjustly
enriched if he holds “property ‘under circumstances that in equity and
good conscience he ought not to retain . . . .’” 380
On the basis of equitable remedies implied merely by the absence
of Congressional expressed opposition to such remedies, the government
is claiming the right to take away the houses from the residents whether
or not those residents were knowing co-conspirators of the developers or
other parties responsible for the housing project. The allegations recite a
terrible injustice being conducted by the housing project and the legal
concepts mesh as they have been laid out, but the concept seems
extreme and harsh for the unknowing homeowners.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
“Most generalizations about restitution are trustworthy only so
long as they are not very meaningful and meaningful only so long as
they are not very trustworthy.” 381

377.
378.
379.

United States v. Village of Island Park, 888 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).

Id.
Id. See also United States v. Nagelberg, 772 F. Supp. 120, 122 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (quoting United States v. Rivieccio, 661 F. Supp. 281, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)).
380. Island Park, 888 F. Supp. at 455-56 (quoting Nagelberg, 772 F. Supp. at 123
(quoting Rivieccio, 661 F. Supp. at 292)).
381. Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1 (2d ED. 1993).
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Why do federal agencies win revenue disgorgement and other
remedies based on uniquely favorable measures? Under implied
jurisdiction, an agency is entitled only to traditional equitable remedies,
the same as any other plaintiff in traditional jurisdiction in equity.
Federal statute may provide separate jurisdiction apart from implied
jurisdiction, but the statute can only restrict the full implied jurisdiction,
such as in the Great-West’s holding that ERISA claims are restricted by
specific statutory language. Any special need of the agency for nontraditional remedies are irrelevant under implied jurisdiction, as an
agency’s needs cannot enlarge a court’s jurisdiction.
The agencies’ right to revenue disgorgement must therefore rest on
the fact that the remedy conforms to traditional remedies in equity or on
the application of the clean-up doctrine. Revenue disgorgement is not a
traditional remedy—federal and state case law, authoritative
commentaries and the Restatement of Restitution support only specific
restoration or profit restitution for this type of claim. Depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case, the clean-up doctrine may allow for
the occasional award of an ancillary remedy at law. The applicability of
the clean-up doctrine, however, needs to include a consideration of
factors generally overlooked, including personal liability, the punitive
nature of the remedy and the availability of alternative remedies at law.
A remaining concern is why it has been so easy for the agencies to
convince a significant segment of the legal community that the remedy
of revenue disgorgement should be awarded. Authorities on restitution,
such as Professors Dobbs, Laycock and Kull, among others, have
published warnings for years that the discipline of restitution needs more
attention from the legal community. In particular, Kull has warned that
in the absence of this needed attention, the discipline could devolve from
a ‘peninsula’ of doctrine into an archipelago of isolated islands of
specific issues or claims. 382
The success of the agencies’ claims and their ability to distort the
nature of traditional equitable remedies suggests an alternative downside
382. Kull, supra note 4 at 1196.
No legal topic can long survive this degree of professional neglect. Unless the means
are found to revive it, restitution in this country may effectively revert to its preRestatement status, in which problems of unjust enrichment were treated in isolation,
classified only by transactional or remedial setting: Mistake, Indemnity, Trustees,
Subrogation. The loss to American law, measured in terms of its ability to yield
coherent and reasoned adjudication, has already been very great, and the outlook is
not encouraging.

Id.
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scenario. Without the willingness of the legal community to engage in
the process suggested by Dobbs 383 (to address each form of restitution
separately) and later prescribed by the Supreme Court in Great-West,
the agencies will continue to select bits and pieces of the law in equity
and combine them with incompatible ‘pieces’ from the common law and
even administrative rulings.
Absent substantial effort to carefully examine the shaky
foundations of the agencies’ claims for revenues, it seems inevitable that
plaintiffs with claims in other areas of substantive law will cite the
agency case law to justify larger monetary remedies in equity. Case
opinions from the Third Circuit in Lane Labs, the Fifth Circuit in United
Energy Partners, Inc., the Seventh Circuit in Febre, the Eleventh Circuit
in Gem Merchandising and the D.C. federal district court in Capital City
Mortgage, among others, could provide substantial precedent for a wide
range of remedies that do not resemble traditional equitable remedies.
Absent the willingness of trial courts to improve their overall
understanding of the law in equity and to reject labels in favor of
analysis, only the Supreme Court remains to challenge this progression.

383. See Dobbs, supra note 381, at § 4.1 (“So restitution today is a general term for
diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant and
measured by the defendant’s gains, but it has many specific forms, each of which must
be addressed separately.”).
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APPENDIX A: FEDERAL VERSUS STATE OPINIONS REGARDING DEFENDANT
PROFITS
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED DATA ON FTC VENUE STATISTICS
While the preliminary data does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the FTC has engaged in forum shopping, the data does
suggest some non-random factor may have a significant influence on the
FTC’s choice of venue. Two sets of data were generated and compared
for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 through 2005: FTC filings by district
and all new claims filed in each district court. First, the absolute
numbers show that the FTC filings have increased more rapidly than the
group of all civil claims in federal district court.
TABLE 1
NEW FTC AND ALL OTHER CLAIMS FILED IN ALL DISTRICT COURTS
New
Filings
FTC
All
District
Courts

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

43

55

123

106

117

103

94

87

112,317

129,224

130,805

126,410

147,155

128,319

155,077

132,204

Each district’s share of FTC filings was then compared with the
share of all new civil claims filed in that district. The ten district courts
with the largest average shares for the last five years were California
(central district); Florida (southern district); Illinois (northern district);
Washington D.C.; Florida (middle district); Washington (western
district); Nevada; California (northern district); Arizona; and Georgia
(northern district). Note that none of the districts of New York, Texas or
Pennsylvania are ranked in the top ten. Equally enigmatic is the fact that
the eastern district of New York had a larger share than the southern
district and the western district of Texas had the largest share of FTC
filings in the state. Both relationships contradict that state’s relative
share of claims filed in the federal courts in those states.
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF FTC CLAIMS AND ALL CIVIL CLAIMS BY
SELECTED DISTRICT 384
(All shares expressed as percentages)
St.

District

Filings

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

5 Yr.
Avg.

CA

Central

All Civil

4.2

4.1

6.4

5.6

4.8

5.0

5.1

5.0

5.1

CA

Central

FTC

7.0

14.5

22.0

11.3

11.1

11.0

16.0

17.2

13.5

CA

Eastern

All Civil

1.1

1.4

1.8

1.7

1.5

1.8

1.6

1.7

1.7

CA

Eastern

FTC

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.9

1.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.5

CA

Northern

All Civil

2.1

2.1

2.2

2.5

2.6

2.3

2.1

2.2

2.3

CA

Northern

FTC

4.7

18.2

6.5

3.8

0.9

1.9

0.0

5.7

2.5

CA

Southern

All Civil

0.9

1.2

1.1

1.0

1.0

1.1

1.0

1.1

1.1

CA

Southern

FTC

16.3

0.0

2.4

2.8

1.7

1.9

1.1

1.1

1.7

DC

All Civil

1.5

1.1

1.3

1.2

1.0

1.1

0.9

1.1

1.0

DC

FTC

11.6

7.3

11.4

5.7

5.1

4.9

5.3

3.4

4.9

DE

All Civil

0.4

0.3

0.5

0.4

0.7

0.5

0.6

0.4

0.5

DE

FTC

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.4

FL

Middle

All Civil

2.0

2.2

2.7

2.7

2.3

2.7

2.6

2.8

2.6

FL

Middle

FTC

14.0

1.8

4.1

1.9

6.0

5.8

5.3

4.6

4.7

FL

Northern

All Civil

0.5

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.6

0.6

FL

Northern

FTC

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

0.0

1.1

1.1

0.6

FL

Southern

All Civil

2.3

2.1

3.2

3.6

2.7

2.8

2.4

2.8

2.9

FL

Southern

FTC

0.0

0.0

6.5

6.6

10.3

7.8

9.6

12.6

9.4

GA

Northern

All Civil

1.6

1.6

1.7

1.8

1.7

1.8

1.7

1.7

1.7

GA

Northern

FTC

2.3

1.8

1.6

4.7

0.9

5.8

3.2

0.0

2.9

IL

Northern

All Civil

3.7

3.2

3.4

4.1

3.7

4.0

3.4

3.2

3.7

IL

Northern

FTC

2.3

0.0

1.6

2.8

9.4

11.7

9.6

10.3

8.8

NV

All Civil

0.8

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.9

1.0

0.9

1.0

0.9

NV

FTC

0.0

1.8

1.6

0.9

6.8

4.9

2.1

4.6

3.9

NY

Eastern

All Civil

2.1

2.2

3.3

3.3

2.8

2.7

2.1

2.5

2.7

NY

Eastern

FTC

0.0

1.8

2.4

1.9

2.6

2.9

3.2

1.1

2.3

NY

Southern

All Civil

4.0

4.1

4.0

4.7

4.5

4.2

3.9

4.5

4.4

NY

Southern

FTC

2.3

3.6

4.1

1.9

1.7

2.9

2.1

1.1

2.0

384. Judicial Facts and Figures, Civil Cases Filed by District, Table 4.2,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table402.pdf. FTC filings are based on
data retrieved from a PACER key word search.
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Table 2 (cont’d)
St.

District
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(All shares expressed as percentages)
Filings

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

5 Yr.
Avg.

PA

Eastern

All Civil

4.1

3.4

3.3

3.0

4.6

4.5

5.4

6.5

4.8

PA

Eastern

FTC

2.3

0.0

2.4

3.8

0.9

0.0

1.1

0.0

1.1

TX

Eastern

All Civil

1.4

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.1

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.2

TX

Eastern

FTC

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.9

1.9

0.0

0.0

0.6

TX

Northern

All Civil

2.3

2.0

2.4

2.1

2.0

2.3

1.9

1.9

2.0

TX

Northern

FTC

16.3

0.0

4.1

2.8

3.4

1.9

0.0

0.0

1.6

TX

Southern

All Civil

2.7

5.1

2.8

2.7

2.8

3.1

2.9

2.8

2.9

TX

Southern

FTC

0.0

0.0

1.6

0.9

0.9

2.9

1.1

1.1

1.4

TX

Western

All Civil

1.5

1.3

1.2

1.3

1.2

1.3

1.2

1.5

1.3

TX

Western

FTC

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.9

5.1

3.9

0.0

2.3

2.6

WA

Western

All Civil

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.2

1.3

1.7

1.4

1.3

1.4

WA

Western

FTC

0.0

5.5

4.1

4.7

6.0

3.9

2.1

4.6

4.3

At most, the data raises or justifies some questions. The data is
preliminary and reflects none of the adjustments that may be necessary
to fairly evaluate the entire picture. The data for northern districts of
Texas and California is included to acknowledge the fact that the data is
quite variable and may reflect certain campaigns on the part of the FTC
unrelated to favorable venues. On the other hand, it would be equally
remiss to ignore the fact, perhaps coincidental, that the districts with
some of the largest shares of recent FTC filings are some of the same
districts that have published opinions in FTC cases at variance with
traditional remedies in equity and that have accepted the FTC arguments
and positions without careful scrutiny or in accordance with the
standards set or endorsed by the Supreme Court.
Finally, even if the data conclusively supported the conclusion that
the FTC actively engages in forum shopping, not everyone would
condemn such a practice. Few plaintiff’s attorneys choose the less
‘friendly’ forum and many justify thinly disguised forum shopping on
the basis of wanting to provide the plaintiff with the most experienced
judge or the expediency of a ‘rocket docket.’ On the other hand, the
issue of forum shopping in addition to other tactical choices of the FTC
in litigation, raise the basic issue of accountability. The FTC was
created as an administrative agency, not a plaintiff’s attorney. As such,
its recent surge of litigation is the result of a manipulated loophole in
federal case law on jurisdiction, not as the result of explicit
Congressional authorization.

